

**GUY CARPENTER**

## Reserve Risk Models: Grey, White and Black Swans



Jessica Leong, FCAS, FIAA, MAAA  
Lead Casualty Specialty Actuary

**“No reality please, we’re economists”**

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- Andrew Lo  
Director of the MIT laboratory  
for financial engineering



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
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- Mark Blaug  
University of London



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
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
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- No tail factor



# Company A Distribution of Homeowners Unpaid as of 12/2000



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
Note that there is no tail factor on the 10x10 year triangle so the \$45 million is only the unpaid from 24 to 120 months.

## 51 Companies


### Hindsight Percentile

Company A	91%
Company B	51%
Company C	6%
....	....
....	....
Company AA	85%
Company AB	37%


# Ideal Histogram of the Hindsight Percentile



## Homeowners as of 12/2000




## Homeowners as of 12/1996




Guy Carpenter

28

## Homeowners as of 12/2000



# Homeowners: Percentiles 1989-2002







From tests done as of 12/1989, 12/1990, ..., 12/2002 using Schedule P paid loss & ALAE on 70+ companies for each period (1,038 tests)


## Homeowners: Percentiles 1989-2002



# Results for other lines



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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# Workers Compensation Cycle




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# Homeowners Cycle



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# Reserve Cycle – Company A




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
50

# Reserve Cycle – Company B



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# Reserve Cycle – Company C



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
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2. **[L]evel of Reserve Deficiency...**
  - Despite substantial reserve increases by ...insurers, during 2003 rating agencies estimate that the non-asbestos reserve shortfall ...is between \$30 billion and \$60 billion.

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
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The profession must continue... its self-review, as these issues will not go away on their own.

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
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- ? What reserving problem ?

# Reserve Cycle




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2015 Top Story:


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
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
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# Reserve Deterioration / (Release)\*



# Reserve Deterioration vs Impairments



\*\*Source: A.M. Best

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
## ■ Why does reserve risk behave like this?

Q: What causes the cycle?

H = Hypothesis


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# WC Cycle




Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change.

# WC Cycle outline




# WC Cycle outline + Incurred chain-ladder cycle




Incurred chain-ladder cycle uses an all year weighted average of 10x10 year Incurred Loss & ALAE triangles (paid + case reserve). Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change.

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


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Guy Carpenter

## ■ Why does reserve risk behave like this?

Q: What causes the cycle?

H: Incurred chain-ladder method + judgment to smooth it out

H = Hypothesis

# ■ Why does reserve risk behave like this?


Q: What causes the cycle?

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Q: Why does the incurred chain-ladder method have a cycle?


H = Hypothesis

# WC Cycle and 12-120 Incurred CDF




Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change. Red line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible.

## WC 12-120 Incurred CDFs



Red line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible.


## WC 12-120 Incurred CDFs & All yr weighted av



Red line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible.

Blue line = All-year weighted LDFs for a 10x10 year incurred loss & ALAE triangle were cumulated for 12-120 month CDF estimate


# WC Cycle outline + Incurred CL cycle (All years)



Incurred chain-ladder cycle uses an all year weighted average of 10x10 year Incurred Loss & ALAE triangles (paid + case reserve). Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change.


Guy Carpenter

## WC 12-24 Incurred LDFs & 3 yr weighted av




Red line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible.  
Blue line = 3-year weighted LDFs for a 10x10 year incurred loss & ALAE triangle were cumulated for 12-120 month CDF estimate

## WC Cycle outline + Incurred CL cycle (3 yr av)



Incurred chain-ladder cycle uses an 3-year weighted average of 10x10 year Incurred Loss & ALAE triangles (paid + case reserve). Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change.


## WC 12-24 Incurred LDFFs & 1 yr weighted av



Red line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible.

Blue line = 1-year LDFFs for a 10x10 year incurred loss & ALAE triangle were cumulated for 12-120 month CDF estimate

# WC Cycle outline + Incurred CL cycle (1 yr av)



Incurred chain-ladder cycle uses an 1-year weighted average of 10x10 year Incurred Loss & ALAE triangles (paid + case reserve).  
Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using  
SNL and subject to change.

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# ■ Why does reserve risk behave like this?

Q: What causes the cycle?

H: Incurred chain-ladder method + judgment to smooth it out

Q: Why does the incurred chain-ladder method have a cycle?

H: The actual LDFs have a cycle and a multi-year average expected LDF is flat or counter-cyclical.

H = Hypothesis

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
H: The actual LDFs have a cycle and a multi-year average expected LDF is flat or counter-cyclical.

Q: Why do the LDFs have a cycle?

H = Hypothesis


Guy Carpenter

## WC 12-120 Incd CDFs



Blue line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible.

# WC 12-120 Incd CDFs & Change in Cost per claim



NCCI Average cost per lost time claim is by accident year. A combination of 50% of the medical and 50% of the indemnity average cost per lost time claim. 2011 is a preliminary value based on data as of 12/31/2011. 1991 to 2010 is based on data through 12/31/2010, developed to ultimate. Dotted red line is 11%, which is the average of WC claims inflation quotes from various sources for the decade of the 1980's.

# ■ Why does reserve risk behave like this?

Q: What causes the cycle?

H: Incurred chain-ladder method + judgment to smooth it out

Q: Why does the incurred chain-ladder method have a cycle?

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
Q: Why do the LDFs have a cycle?

H: Driven by claims inflation

H = Hypothesis


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# Change in Av Cost per claim




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# Change in Av Cost per claim & 12-120 Incd CDF




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# 12-120 Incd CDF




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# 12-120 Incd CDF + Incurred CL cycle (All yr av)



Blue line = 12-120 month Incurred CDF= Incurred at 120 months / Incurred at 12 months, where possible. Incurred chain-ladder cycle uses an all year weighted average of 10x10 year Incurred Loss & ALAE triangles (paid + case reserve). Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change.

# Inurred CL cycle (All yr av)




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# Inurred CL cycle (All yr av) & Reserve Cycle outline




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# Reserve Cycle



Data to 12/2009 is from cleaned Schedule P database from Risk Lighthouse, and updated for 12/2010 & 12/2011 financials using SNL and subject to change.

Guy Carpenter

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## ■ Next steps

- Cycle exists because trends in the future claims environment deviate from past trends

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- E.g. changes in claims inflation, legislation, tort reform, etc


## ■ Next steps

- Cycle exists because trends in the future claims environment deviate from past trends
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- These are all systemic risks


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- The bootstrap model doesn't measure systemic risk


## ■ How the bootstrap model works




## ■ How the bootstrap model works




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
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...systemic risk!



## ■ Next steps

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
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- E.g. changes in claims inflation, legislation, tort reform, etc
- These are all systemic risks
- The bootstrap model doesn't measure systemic risk
- Systemic risks mostly show in the calendar year
- Trying a GLM that measures AY, DY and CY trends with future CY trends modeled as inflationary random walk

...systemic risk!



# **“No reality please, we’re actuaries”**

1. Empirical test of a reserve risk model
2. Let’s start again:
  - (i) Observing reserve risk
  - (ii) How has reserve risk affected us in the past?
  - (iii) Why does reserve risk behave like this?

## **“No reality please, we’re actuaries”**

“Difficult to see. Always in motion is the future.”

## **“No reality please, we’re actuaries”**

“Difficult to see. Always in motion is the future.”

Yoda

Grand Master of the Jedi Order  
& member of the Jedi High Council of the Galactic Republic



Source: Wookieepedia