# Demystifying Casualty and Cyber Risk Modeling

Scott Stransky
James Kaufmann



# Cyber Catastrophe Modeling



#### Rethinking Coverage of Large Loss Events

# Missed Opportunities

76% of existing insureds seek higher coverage and limits

Source: Partner Re & Advisen

# Hindered Innovation

47% of insurers say recent events had no impact on their underwriting

Source: Partner Re & Advisen

# Omitted threats

Insurers believe silent cyber can increase combined ratios by 7%

Source: Willis Re



#### Sources of Systemic Cyber Risk






Software Vulnerabilities



Internet Infrastructure



#### Cloud Computing Trends by the Numbers



Increase of laaS as the primary work environment

Source: McKinsey & Company



Source: AIR



#### Historical Cloud Downtime Events

Microsoft Azure "Leap Year Bug"

Amazon Web Services US-East-1 Outage Microsoft Azure Global Outage (SSL Certificate Expiration)

Google Outage by Lightning Strike

• February 2012

• June 2012

• February 2013

• August 2015

Verizon Communications Inc Outage

• January 2016

Microsoft Office 365 Email Outage

January 2016

Salesforce Circuit Fault to NA14

May 2016

Amazon Web Services \$3 Outage

• February 2017






#### Implications for (Re)insurance Industry

- (Contingent) business interruption coverage
- Third party liability coverage
- Development of reinsurance markets
- Non-affirmative (silent) coverage




#### Robust Risk Management Includes Several Approaches

#### **Market Share Approach**




#### **Detailed Accumulation Approach**





#### Cloud Service Provider Recovery

## Percent of Companies with Service Recovered for 3-6 day scenario



#### Modeled Losses Driven by E-business Factors


### B2B and B2C








#### Losses Change Throughout Downtime Event





#### Industry Exposures Determine Event Footprint



12.4 million businesses



Cyber supply chain




Insurance terms



#### Cyber Insurance Take-up Rates Vary Widely


Cyber insurance take-up rates by industry and turnover






**■**0%-10% **■**10%-20% **■**20%-30% **■**30%-40% **■**40%-50% **■**50%-60%

#### Total Industry Losses by Downtime Duration






#### Industry Losses for Extreme Event (3-6 Day Downtime)






©2018 AIR Worldwide

#### Gross Insured Losses by Waiting Period Length






#### Approach Differences Reveal Insights





#### The Challenge of Assigning Probabilities to Scenarios





#### How Can the Cloud Go Down?



Environmental



Accidental



Adversarial

©2018 AIR Worldwide




Structural



#### What is Likelihood of Cloud Downtime Event?

#### **Distribution of Historical Events**





©2018 AIR Worldwide

#### Cyber Data Improves Understanding of Risk



Outside-in



Incident



Inside-out






Process & Policy



Cloud Hosting



Endpoint



Threat Intelligence

22

#### Building a Probabilistic Cyber Model for "One-Off" Breaches


Annual probability of breach

Given a breach, probability of X records stolen

Cost of breach, given Y records stolen



#### Machine Learning Provides Insights on Frequency



#### Rating Variables Refine View of Risk



Antivirus Effectiveness



File Sharing



Intrusion Detection



Firewall Health




Patching Cadence



Security Ratings




#### Records Lost Drives Financial Losses



#### Source: Edwards, Benjamin, Steven Hofmeyr, and Stephanie Forrest. "Hype and heavy tails: A closer look at data breaches." WEIS, 2015.


#### Cost of Breach



Source: Jacobs, Jay. Analyzing Ponemon cost of data breach. Dec. 2014



#### Silent Cyber Threat Looms Throughout





#### Model Many Cyber Scenarios Today



#### ARC (Analytics of Risk from Cyber) Released in 2017



Exposure Management



Data Augmentation




Risk Modeling



#### Modeling Supports Cyber Insurance Industry Growth



Understand Risk



Optimize Coverage



Identify Opportunities









#### Overview

- Examples of casualty catastrophes
- Casualty CAT modelling use cases
- Scenario-based modelling approach
- Challenges with quantification
- Future research



# Casualty Catastrophe Examples



## Casualty Cat Events Come in Two Main Types

Classic Clash Events

- Event occurring at a single point in time
- Examples: infrastructure e.g., MGM Grand shooting, Deepwater Horizon, Grenfell Towers





Other Systemic Events

- Event arising from a single trigger such as a product or business practice but not occurring at a single point in time
- Examples: product-based e.g., opioids, Madoff, LIBOR, silicone breast implants, Chinese dry wall, asbestos or practice-based e.g., sport related concussions, Enron










# Majority of Historic Events Are Classic Clash Events

Type of Event	Total Number of Events	% of Cases	Sum of Losses	Avg. Losses per Event	Average Accident Period
Classic clash	14,118	88%	\$970 B	\$69 M	One day
Other systemic	1,865	12%	\$1735 B	\$930 M	4.6 years (stdev = 11.5 yrs)



# Classic Clash Example: MGM Grand Shooting

2<sup>nd</sup> October 2017



# Systemic Event Example: Sports Concussions

	NFL	College	Schools
# of players	~2,000	73,660	1,080,693
# of institutions	32	633	14,047

- NFL and colleges concentrated in fewer institutions
- Each high school (and medics serving those schools or physicians examining children) may be sued particularly as diagnosis is difficult and high visibility / emotional impact which may increase insured loss

http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/football






# Casualty CAT Modelling Use Cases



## Use Cases





# Portfolio Management


- Exposure aggregation monitoring and management
  - Performed across casualty lines of business
  - Industry, not geographic, aggregation
  - Includes identification of under-exposed pockets as potential growth opportunities
- Estimate the impact of various changes to underwriting guidelines or any strategic initiatives under consideration





# Reinsurance buying and pricing


- Marginal impact pricing
  - Side-by-side comparison of the distribution of loss results with and without a particular treaty on the books
  - Incorporate cost of additional capital as input into pricing
  - Could also apply to large accounts at primary insurers
- Develop an understanding of how different reinsurance structures/attachment points would react to various future scenarios





# Capital Adequacy and Allocation

- Stress testing: Consideration of large casualty event impacts on capital adequacy
- Capital allocation may be influenced by which lines of business are more often impacted by extreme events






# Scenario-based modelling approach




# Framework: Supply chain

- Provides proximity and framework for casualty events
- Enables modeling of accumulations across insured portfolios











## Football Concussions-Portfolio Overlay





### Loss Simulation



- Blue bars represent mean outcomes--conditional AAL
- Box plots also show the 25/50/75<sup>th</sup> percentiles with extreme outcomes noted by vertical bars on each end



# Challenges With Quantification and Future Development Work



## Some Quantification Hurdles

# Non-repeating Events

#### Historical Data

# The Human Element

#### Latency/long tail

- The specific companies or products at the center of a casualty event often do not survive the event
- Although they are non-repeating, past events may still teach us something about the future
- Due to the nonrepeating and infrequent nature of casualty events, historical data must be used carefully
- Proxy data may exist
- Expert input can be used as an alternative data source

- Changes in socioeconomic, environmental, health, and legal environments are difficult to model mathematically
- Expert opinion may be relied upon to estimate the impact of changes to these risk factors

- The latent nature of some casualty events increases uncertainty of estimation
- Example: asbestos loss allocation methods



## Further Development Work-A Stochastic Approach

- **Goal:** to randomly generate any number of events, defined by stochastic parameters, while ensuring a representative variety of realistic potential events.
- This is possible using a combination of expert opinion and historical data to define categories of casualty events and how each category should be parameterized
- Will allow future events to be simulated and their impacts to a portfolio investigated



# Example 1: Corporate Implosion Shape


Property	Description
Footprint Used	Enron
Shape	Corporate
Losses	Related to the number of causative parties, size of the business that implodes
Lines of Business	PL, D&O
Systemic	Mostly single, systemic within an industry
Probability	Stationary





# Example 2: Product/Component Shape

Property	Description
Footprint Used	Carbon Nanotubes-Polymers
Shape	Product component/ingredient
Losses	Additive
Lines of Business	GL, WC, PL, Environmental
Systemic	Between and within industries
Probability	Non-stationary





### For More Information

- Contact me!
  - James Kaufmann
  - AIR Worldwide—Casualty Analytics
  - **-** (617) 954-1847
  - <u>jkaufmann@air-worldwide.com</u>
- Check out the Lloyd's paper that goes into more detail on our stochastic modeling methodology: <a href="https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/risk-reports/library/understanding-risk/arium">https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-risk-insight/risk-reports/library/understanding-risk/arium</a>



