

# Solvency II:

## Principles - International Cooperation - Current Issues

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# Quantitative Risk Models at BaFin

BaFin is an integrated financial services supervisor

## **Line Supervision (BA/VA/WA)**

**Detailed knowledge of the sector and individual firms**

### **Responsible for**

- ▶ Coordination
- ▶ Qualitative requirements
- ▶ "One face to the client"

## **Cross-Sectoral Risk Modelling (Q RM)**

**Model experience across all risk classes and sectors**

### **Responsible for**

- ▶ Quantitative risk models
  - ▶ On-site inspections
  - ▶ Regulation
  - ▶ Research

## Rules have gaps.

### **Example for rules-based regulation:**

#### **Market risk standard formula (Basle 1996)**

- ▶ only a finite and small number of scenarios measure the market risk of any given portfolio
- ▶ these scenarios are the same for all banks

**Rules encourage “tick-the-box” mentality for supervisors and firms.**

**Rules can be arbitrated.**

**Rules are inflexible**

- ▶ over time
- ▶ across firms

**Real world is too complex for rules.**

# The challenge of complexity

## **Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety (1956):**

**"Only variety can destroy variety."**

### **Example: Increasing complexity in products and markets**

- ▶ Rules cannot keep up with the fast innovation of the financial industry

### **Example: Graduated deterrence**

- ▶ Regulatory agencies have maximum capacity to lever cooperation when they can escalate deterrence in a way that is responsive to the degree of uncooperativeness of the firm, and to the moral and political acceptability of the response (Ayres/Braithwaite 1992)

## Internal models as control for risks

**The growing complexity of financial markets requires internal models for risk control.**

### **Internal models**

- ▶ typically use a large number of scenarios to determine risk
- ▶ are customized to fit the firm's risk profile (proportionality)
- ▶ require a highly developed infrastructure to aggregate the risk information, which improves risk awareness
- ▶ are flexible to adapt to the evolving environment

**Firms may write their own rules within boundaries (self-regulation).**

**In turn, they have to provide transparency.**

## Principles as control for internal models.


**The complexity of internal models require principles-based regulation and supervision**

**Principles enable a flexible regulatory environment.**



**Black 2008: Principles improve**

- ▶ communication
- ▶ effectiveness
- ▶ durability
- ▶ substantive compliance
- ▶ integration and embedding.

## Realistic situation



## Q RM Vision: No Gaps!



## Consequences of PBR

### **Paradigm shift for supervisors: Model must fit firm**

1. Understand firm, its business model and risk profile
2. Judge appropriateness of internal model

### **The hard work is delegated from regulator to supervisor**

- ▶ Interpret principles, apply them to the firm and model at hand
- ▶ Argue principles and interpretation in front of firm

### **Strong need for constant and intensive coordination between supervisors across firms and jurisdictions:**

- ▶ to create common understanding of principles
- ▶ to ensure harmonized application of the principles

## Synthesis between rules and principles

### **Sometimes regulatory rules are needed:**

- ▶ “True” parameters may be unknown / unknowable  
(Example: ultimate forward rates)
- ▶ Parameters set by regulator achieve at least comparability and a level playing field

## International cooperation ...

### **Driven by**

- ▶ Europe-wide harmonized principles-based regulation
- ▶ legal structure of insurance companies

### **Instruments have been defined:**

- ▶ CEIOPS working groups
- ▶ Joint company previsits
- ▶ CoCos, Colleges
- ▶ Preapplication process / Steering Committees

... is a team-building exercise!

**Goals and challenges:**

- ▶ Align mental models
- ▶ Inform and take along “peripheral” supervisors
- ▶ Promote active and open discussion with involved supervisors
- ▶ Create shared vision while guarding against groupthink
- ▶ Allocate tasks

## International supervisors need to form a team

Lencioni 2002:




## Knowledge management ...

**... is essential in the international supervisory community.**

### **Challenge:**

- ▶ Provide each supervisor with all relevant information
- ▶ while protecting necessary confidentiality

## Ongoing dialogue



## Example: Expert Judgement

**Definition? Differentiation from model assumptions?**

**Separate information basis from information processing**

**Governance!**

- ▶ Assign responsibility for expert judgement
- ▶ Consistently use information across the firm

**Validation:**

- ▶ The perception that EJ cannot be validated is ill-founded.
- ▶ However, different/more qualitative validation methods may have to be used.

**EJ validation is different, but necessary**

**Uncertainty remains – but bias has been removed.**

## Example: Consistency...

**... between models for valuation and risk calculation.**

**Interpretation of „consistency“?**

### **Aspects**

- ▶ What is calculated?
- ▶ How is it calculated? Model assumptions, methods etc.
- ▶ Which data sources are used?
- ▶ Coverage?
- ▶ Other topics...

Thank you!

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