# Risk-Based Capital - Calibration of LOB Diversification in Underwriting Risk Charges 

Report 14 of the CAS Risk-Based Capital (RBC) Research Working Parties Issued by the RBC Dependencies and Calibration Working Party (DCWP)


#### Abstract

In this paper we analyze the Line of Business (LOB) diversification elements of the RBC Formula. We compare the diversification credit produced by the NAIC Property/Casualty RBC Formula to the indicated diversification credit, i.e., the observed reduction in risk ${ }^{1}$ with increasing diversification. For the larger/more diversified companies, with the bulk of the reserves/premium and receiving the bulk of the diversification credit, we find that: - The data supports the approach in the RBC Formula, i.e., the data supports a diversification credit that is linear with respect to $100 \%$ minus the percentage of reserves/premium in the largest line of business, by company. - The indicated maximum diversification credit is at least at least $50 \%$, for premium risk and reserves risk, rather than the $30 \%$ maximum credit in the 2010 RBC Formula. Three natural alternatives to the diversification approach in the RBC Formula are the correlation ${ }^{2}$ matrix approach, the Herfendahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) approach, and the RBC approach applied to risk amounts rather than reserves/premium volume. We apply some simple tests of the extent to which each of these approaches fits the data. With our tests, the correlation approach is better than the approach in the RBC Formula for reserves, but the reverse is the case for premium. More interestingly, the RBC approach applied to risk amounts rather than reserves/premium volume is better than the approach in the RBC Formula for both premium and reserves. This is one of several papers being issued by the CAS RBC Dependencies and Calibration Working Party (DCWP).


Keywords: Risk-Based Capital, Capital Requirements, Analyzing/Quantifying Risks, Assess/Prioritizing Risks, Integrating Risks, Diversification, Correlation

## 1. Introduction

The NAIC Property/Casualty RBC Formula (RBC Formula) has six main risk categories, $\mathrm{R}_{0}-\mathrm{R}_{5}$. Underwriting risk is represented in two of these categories, $\mathrm{R}_{4}{ }^{3}$ and $\mathrm{R}_{5}$, reserve risk and premium risk, respectively. The all-lines $\mathrm{R}_{4}$ and $\mathrm{R}_{5}$ values include a credit for diversification. The diversification credit in $\mathrm{R}_{4}$ is based on the ratio of reserves for the LOB with the largest reserves to the total reserves. Similarly, the diversification credit in $\mathrm{R}_{5}$ is based on the ratio of premium for the LOB with the largest premium to the total premium. We refer to this method of measuring diversification as the Company Maximum Line Percentage of Business or the

[^0]CoMaxLine\% Approach. We refer to the ratios as the CoMaxLine\%premium and the CoMaxLine $\%_{\text {reserves, }}$ or CoMaxLine $\%$ generically, for either.

In this paper we evaluate the RBC Formula 30\% Maximum Diversification Credit (MDC) and the assumption that diversification is proportional to $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$.

We also evaluate alternatives to the diversification approach in the RBC Formula, e.g., the correlation ${ }^{4}$ matrix approach, the Herfendahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) approach, and RBC approach applied to risk amounts rather than reserves/premium volume (CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk).

In Section 2 we describe the nature of our risk data. In section 3 we evaluate the CoMaxLine\% Approach. In section 4 we compare the performance of the CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach to the performance of the alternative approaches.

### 1.1 Terminology, Assumed Reader Background and Disclaimer

This paper assumes the reader is generally familiar with the property/casualty RBC Formula ${ }^{5}$ and has a working knowledge of risk data and line of business risk factor calibration approach described in DCWP Reports 6 and 7.

In this paper we use the term diversification, rather than its complement, ${ }^{6}$ concentration unless the context makes the alternative clearer.

Although the term multi-line insurance company is commonly used to refer to an insurer that is well-diversified across LOBs, in this paper we will use the term more broadly to refer to any company for which the diversification credit is greater than zero.

References to "we" and "our" mean the principal authors of this paper. References to "working party," and "DCWP" mean the CAS RBC Dependencies and Calibration Working Party.

The analysis and opinions expressed in this report are solely those of the authors, and are not those of the authors' employers, the Casualty Actuarial Society, or the American Academy of Actuaries.

DCWP makes no recommendations to the NAIC or any other body. DCWP material is

[^1]for the information of CAS members, policy makers, actuaries and others who might make recommendations regarding the future of the RBC Formula. We expect that the material will be used by the American Academy of Actuaries.

This paper is one of a series of articles prepared under the direction of the DCWP.

## 2. Risk Data

We describe our risk data in DCWP Reports $6^{7}$ and $7,{ }^{8}$ and we summarize the characteristics of that data below.

For each year-end (Initial Reserve Date), the reserve risk data consists of the reserve amount (Initial Reserve ${ }^{9}$ ) and reserve development data. We summarize the reserve development data into a Reserve Runoff Ratio (RRR). The RRR is the ratio of (a) movement in incurred loss and defense and cost containment expense (DCCE) from the Initial Reserve date to the most mature valuation date available to (b) the Initial Reserve for loss and DCCE. The ratios in that RRR calculation are net of reinsurance, from Schedule P, Parts 2 and 3, in the 1997-2010 Annual Statements, by LOB and by company for individual companies and DWCP-defined pools, as indicated. ${ }^{10}$ Thus, each reserve data point is the Initial Reserve and RRR from a single Initial Reserve Date and LOB for a single company or DCWP-defined pool (LOB-Company-Initial Reserve Date). We have data for Initial Reserve dates 19872009. ${ }^{11}$

Similarly, the premium risk data consists of net earned premium (NEP) and accident year

[^2](AY) loss and loss adjustment expense ratios (LRs) for AYs 1988-2010, net of reinsurance, at the latest available maturity from Schedule P, Part 1, in the 1998-2010 ${ }^{12}$ Annual Statements, by LOB and by company or DCWP-defined pool, as indicated (LRs). Thus, each premium data point consists of the NEP and LR for a single AY and LOB for a single company or DCWP-defined pool (LOB-Company-AY). ${ }^{13}$

For this analysis of diversification, we also construct all-lines data points. For reserve risk, the all-lines Initial Reserve for each Company-Initial Reserve Date is the sum of the Initial Reserves for each of the company LOBs in the risk data. The all-lines RRR is the all-lines average RRR weighted by Initial Reserves by LOB. ${ }^{14}$ For premium risk, the all-lines NEP for each Company-AY data point is the sum of the NEP for each of the company LOBs in the risk data. The all-lines LR is the all-lines average LR weighted by NEP by LOB.

There are 30,000 all-lines Company-Initial Reserve Date reserve risk data points and 29,000 all-lines Company-AY premium risk data points in the resulting all-lines data set. We categorize each of these points into size and diversification bands, as we describe below.

## Company size bands

We measure company size based on all-lines Initial Reserve or all-lines NEP, for reserves and premium, respectively. We classify each company as being in one of five company size bands, selected so that $20 \%$ of the company data points are in each company size band. We label these company size bands A (smallest) through E (largest).

Company diversification bands
We determine the degree of diversification for each all-lines data point using the CoMaxLine $\%$, correlation matrix, HHI or CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk approaches, as appropriate for the analysis. ${ }^{15}$ We use 6 diversification bands. Diversification band 0 is for monoline

[^3]companies. ${ }^{16}$ We select the other diversification bands so that $20 \%$ of the multi-line company data points are in each diversification band. We call those diversification bands 1 (least diversified multi-line companies) through 5 (most diversified).

### 2.1 Company Size and Diversification Characteristics of Risk Data

In this section we describe the characteristics of the data by company size and company diversification.

Number of Company-Year Data Points
Tables 2-1A and 2-1B show the number of company-year data points for reserve risk and premium risk, respectively, in each of the thirty company size/diversification cells (using CoMaxLine\% Approach to measuring diversification). The cells highlighted in yellow/bold are the largest and most diversified companies.

Table 2-1A
Number of Reserve Data Points by Size and Diversification

| Number of Data Points |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | Total |
| 0 | 3,870 | 2,801 | 2,388 | 1,824 | 1,005 | 11,888 |
| 1 | 539 | 815 | 812 | 764 | 720 | 3,650 |
| 2 | 536 | 718 | 718 | 769 | 909 | 3,650 |
| 3 | 532 | 659 | 763 | 811 | 885 | 3,650 |
| 4 | 452 | 645 | 793 | 925 | 835 | 3,650 |
| 5 | 101 | 387 | 553 | 934 | 1,674 | 3,649 |
| Total | 6,030 | 6,025 | 6,027 | 6,027 | 6,028 | 30,137 |

[^4]Table 2-1B
Number of Premium Data Points by Size and Diversification

| Number of Data Points |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | Total |
| 0 | 3,442 | 2,449 | 1,798 | 1,291 | 688 | 9,668 |
| 1 | 825 | 843 | 909 | 801 | 462 | 3,840 |
| 2 | 529 | 765 | 969 | 885 | 691 | 3,839 |
| 3 | 549 | 806 | 813 | 904 | 767 | 3,839 |
| 4 | 340 | 665 | 778 | 870 | 1,186 | 3,839 |
| 5 | 88 | 244 | 506 | 1,022 | 1,979 | 3,839 |
| Total | 5,773 | 5,772 | 5,773 | 5,773 | 5,773 | 28,864 |

There are approximately 30,000 data points for each of the premium and reserve data sets ( 30,137 for reserves and 28,864 for premium). Over $1 / 3$ of data points are for monoline entities with zero diversification (11,888 for reserves and 9,668 for premium). That might be viewed as more monoline companies than anticipated, but the observation is consistent with two features of the data. First, our data records are individual companies, but not companygroups. ${ }^{17}$ Second, our data records exclude Minor Line ${ }^{18}$ data points by LOB. Some of the monoline companies have other lines, but none of those LOBs has more than $5 \%$ of the total premium in that company.

In both tables, looking at the diagonal of data records from the left top (Size A/Div 0) to the bottom right (Size E/Div 5), we see that, monoline companies tend to be smaller and the most diversified companies tend to be larger. Nonetheless, large companies (size band E) are represented in all diversification bands. Almost all cells have at least 500 data points. ${ }^{19}$

We see that the largest companies, size band E, tend to be highly diversified (diversification band 5), although, interestingly, for reserves, the second highest number of companies in size band E is in diversification band 0 , monoline.

[^5]
## Amount of Reserves/Premium

Tables 2-2A and 2-2B below show the Initial Reserve and NEP, respectively, in each of the thirty company size/diversification cells (using CoMaxLine\% Approach to measuring diversification).

Table 2-2A
Total Reserves Amount by Size and Diversification Band (In million)

| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathbf{A}$ | $\mathbf{B}$ | C | $\mathbf{D}$ | E | Total |  |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | 954 | 6,569 | 22,267 | 73,472 | 794,126 | 897,388 |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | 199 | 1,888 | 7,620 | 32,420 | 651,723 | 693,850 |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | 190 | 1,709 | 7,168 | 31,488 | 790,745 | 831,300 |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | 195 | 1,537 | $\mathbf{7 , 5 5 2}$ | $\mathbf{3 1 , 7 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 1 9 5 , 7 2 9}$ | $1,236,729$ |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | 173 | 1,490 | $\mathbf{7 , 8 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{3 6 , 2 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{8 7 5 , 0 7 8}$ | 920,800 |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | 40 | 964 | $\mathbf{5 , 5 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{4 1 , 1 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{3 , 0 5 4 , 9 2 4}$ | $3,102,554$ |  |
| Total | 1,751 | 14,159 | 57,943 | 246,444 | $7,362,325$ | $7,682,622$ |  |

Table 2-2B
Total Premium Amount by Size and Diversification Band (In million)

| NEP (millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\mathbf{A}$ | $\mathbf{B}$ | $\mathbf{C}$ | $\mathbf{D}$ | $\mathbf{E}$ | Total |  |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | 2,695 | 10,553 | 24,752 | 61,318 | 277,165 | 376,482 |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | 760 | 3,638 | 12,783 | 38,439 | 273,032 | 328,652 |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | 507 | 3,381 | 14,147 | 44,073 | 393,702 | 455,810 |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | 527 | 3,420 | $\mathbf{1 2 , 0 6 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 5 , 3 7 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 1 7 5 , 8 9 2}$ | $1,237,285$ |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | 386 | 2,843 | $\mathbf{1 1 , 2 3 7}$ | $\mathbf{4 4 , 3 6 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 6 5 6 , 5 0 1}$ | $1,715,337$ |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | 114 | 1,115 | $\mathbf{7 , 4 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{5 5 , 7 7 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 , 2 9 3 , 2 3 2}$ | $2,357,643$ |  |
| Total | 4,989 | 24,950 | 82,393 | 289,355 | $6,069,523$ | $6,471,209$ |  |

These two tables show that most of the reserves and premium come from size band E that has $\$ 7.4$ trillion ${ }^{20}$ of reserves, representing $96 \%$ of the total reserves, and $\$ 6.1$ trillion of premium, representing $94 \%$ of total premium. Within this company size band, diversification band 5 has the most reserves ( $\$ 3.1$ trillion) and premium ( $\$ 2.3$ trillion), over $35 \%$ of total reserves and premium.

The yellow/bold cells mark the larger/more diversified companies. Table 2-2A shows these represent $\$ 5.3$ trillion, representing $68 \%$ of all reserves. Looking back at Table 2-1A, we see that the yellow/bold cells have 8,173 data points. This is about $27 \%$ of all companies, and

[^6]slightly over $50 \%$ of multiline companies (diversification band $>0$ ) with size greater than the smallest 20\% (size bands B-E).

The yellow/bold cells in Table 2-2B include $\$ 5.3$ trillion of premium, representing $82 \%$ of all premiums. Looking back at Table 2-1B, we can see that the yellow/bold cells have 8,825 data points, about $31 \%$ of the total and slightly over $50 \%$ of multiline companies (diversification bands 1-5) with size greater than the smallest $20 \%$ (size bands B-E).

## Average Reserve/Premium

Tables 2-3A and 2-3B below show the average reserve and average premium amounts by size and diversification band. The average reserve amount in Table 2-3A is the reserve amount in Table 2-2A divided by the number of data points in Table 2-1A. The average premium amount in Table 2-3B is the value in Table 2-2B divided by the number of data points in Table 2-1B.

As expected, size band E has the largest average reserve or premium size and size A has the lowest. The size range between companies is large. For example, the ratio of the average size for the largest size band divided by the average size for the smallest size band is a factor of over 4,000 for reserves ( $\$ 0.3$ million to $\$ 1.2$ billion) and over 1,000 for premium. ${ }^{21}$

Table 2-3A
Average Reserves Amount by Size and Diversification Band (In million)

| Average Reserve Volume by NAIC Band (millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | Total |
| 0 | 0.2 | 2.3 | 9.3 | 40.3 | 790.2 | 75.5 |
| 1 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 9.4 | 42.4 | 905.2 | 190.1 |
| 2 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 10.0 | 40.9 | 869.9 | 227.8 |
| 3 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 9.9 | 39.1 | 1,351.1 | 338.8 |
| 4 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 9.9 | 39.2 | 1,048.0 | 252.3 |
| 5 | 0.4 | 2.5 | 10.0 | 44.0 | 1,824.9 | 850.2 |
| Total | 0.3 | 2.3 | 9.6 | 40.9 | 1,221.4 | 254.9 |

[^7]Table 2-3B
Average Premium Amount by Size and Diversification Band (In million)

| Average Premium Volume by NAIC Band (millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | $\mathbf{B}$ | C | D | E | Total |  |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | 0.8 | 4.3 | 13.8 | 47.5 | 402.9 | 38.9 |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | 0.9 | 4.3 | 14.1 | 48.0 | 591.0 | 85.6 |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | 1.0 | 4.4 | 14.6 | 49.8 | 569.8 | 118.7 |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | 1.0 | 4.2 | 14.8 | 50.2 | $1,533.1$ | 322.3 |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | 1.1 | 4.3 | 14.4 | 51.0 | $1,396.7$ | 446.8 |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | 1.3 | 4.6 | 14.6 | 54.6 | $1,158.8$ | 614.1 |  |
| Total | 0.9 | 4.3 | 14.3 | 50.1 | $1,051.4$ | 224.2 |  |

## Amount of Diversification Credit

Tables 2-4A and 2-4B below show the dollar amount of diversification credit by company size and diversification band. The dollar amount of diversification credit is the difference between the all-lines risk charge with no diversification credit and the all-lines risk charge after diversification credit, based on the 2010 risk factors and the diversification formula in the 2010 RBC Formula.

Following the RBC Formula, there is zero diversification credit for companies in diversification band 0 . The amount of diversification credit is small for the smaller companies, size bands A and B. That is partly because the companies in those size bands are somewhat less diversified. ${ }^{22}$ It is more so the case because smaller companies have lower reserve /premium amounts, and therefore the diversification amount is smaller, regardless of degree of diversification.

The companies in the yellow/bold cells contain about $94 \%$ of the total dollar amount of diversification credit for both reserves and premium.

[^8]Table 2-4A
Total Reserve Diversification by Company Size and Diversification Band (In million)

| Dollar of Diversification Credit - 2010 Reserve Risk Factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Div } \\ \text { Band } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | Total |
| 0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1 | 1 | 9 | 35 | 173 | 3,491 | 3,709 |
| 2 | 3 | 26 | 116 | 538 | 16,132 | 16,815 |
| 3 | 5 | 43 | 220 | 965 | 49,376 | 50,609 |
| 4 | 7 | 58 | 346 | 1,647 | 48,019 | 50,077 |
| 5 | 2 | 54 | 320 | 2,434 | 204,658 | 207,469 |
| Total | 18 | 189 | 1,038 | 5,757 | 321,676 | 328,679 |

Table 2-4B
Total Premium Diversification by Company Size and Diversification Band (In million)

| Diversification Credit - 2010 Premium Risk Factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Div <br> Band | Size Band |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | Total |
| 0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1 | 9 | 50 | 176 | 613 | 3,757 | 4,606 |
| 2 | 14 | 97 | 395 | 1,301 | 11,118 | 12,925 |
| 3 | 20 | 137 | 470 | 1,858 | 39,438 | 41,923 |
| 4 | 18 | 139 | 536 | 2,181 | 74,966 | 77,838 |
| 5 | 7 | 66 | 426 | 3,320 | 147,419 | 151,237 |
| Total | 68 | 488 | 2,003 | 9,272 | 276,699 | 288,530 |

## 3. Analysis - CoMaxLine\% Approach

### 3.1 RBC Formula - Diversification Rule

The RBC Formula instructions present the details of the $\mathrm{R}_{4}$ and $\mathrm{R}_{5}$ calculations. ${ }^{23}$ The components of those calculations and the simplifications we use in our diversification analysis

[^9]are as follows:
Reserve Risk ( $\mathrm{R}_{4}$ )
For each company, for each of the $19 \mathrm{LOBs}^{24}$ used in the RBC Formula, the reserve risk value depends on the following, which vary by LOB: the loss and loss adjustment expense reserve net of reinsurance (Initial Reserve) at the valuation date (Initial Reserve Date), the Reserve Risk Factor (RRF) applied to all companies, an adjustment for the difference between company reserve development experience and industry reserve development experience (owncompany adjustment), an adjustment for investment income, and a credit for loss sensitive business. The sum of the LOB results is reduced by a diversification credit based on the Loss Concentration Factor (LCF), increased for larger than normal growth and increased by a portion of reinsurance credit risk.

We refer to the ratio of the reserve risk value to the Initial Reserve as the reserve risk charge percentage ( $\mathrm{RRC} \%$ ).

## Premium Risk ( $\mathrm{R}_{5}$ )

For each company, for each of the $19 \mathrm{LOBs}^{25}$ used in the RBC Formula, the premium risk value depends on the following, which vary by LOB: the written premium for the latest year net of reinsurance (NWP), the Premium Risk Factor (PRF) applied to all companies, the owncompany adjustment, an adjustment for investment income, and a credit for loss sensitive business. The total is combined with the company all lines expenses, reduced by a diversification credit based on the Premium Concentration Factor (PCF), and increased for larger than normal growth.

We refer to the ratio of the premium risk value to the net written premium as the premium risk charge percentage ( $\mathrm{PRC} \%$ ).

Simplifications
Our calculations include certain simplifications.
For both reserve risk and premium risk, we do not include the own-company adjustment factor, the loss sensitive business adjustment factor or the growth charge. This is as if the own-

[^10]company adjustment and loss sensitive factors were 1.0 and as if the growth risk charge was $0 \%$. We do not include the investment income offset, assuming that the diversification effect is the same before or after the investment income effects.

For premium risk, we use Net Earned Premium (NEP) rather than net written premium. For company expenses in the premium risk calculation, we use the average of the 2010 industry average expense ratio by LOB, weighted by the company specific premium by LOB. ${ }^{26}$

For reserve risk, reserve amounts do not include reserves for adjusting and other expenses. We also do not include the $\mathrm{R}_{3}$-reinsurance credit risk component for $\mathrm{R}_{4}$.

In this work, we assume our simplifications do not materially affect our findings. ${ }^{27}$

## Determine the Diversification Credit

$\mathrm{R}_{4}$ and $\mathrm{R}_{5}$ are first calculated by line of business (LOB). The all-lines $\mathrm{R}_{4}$, the reserve risk charge, is the sum of the $\mathrm{R}_{4}$ risk charges by LOB, multiplied by a Loss Concentration Factor (LCF). The all-lines $\mathrm{R}_{5}$, the premium risk charge, is the sum of the $\mathrm{R}_{5}$ risk charges by LOB , multiplied by a Premium Concentration Factor (PCF). ${ }^{28}$ Using the CoMaxLine\% Approach, for each company, the PCF and LCF are determined as follows:

CoMaxLine \% for reserves $=$ Initial reserve for the LOB with the largest Initial Reserve divided by the total all-lines Initial Reserve.

CoMaxLine $\%$ for premium $=$ NEP $^{29}$ for the LOB with the largest premium divided by the total all-lines NEP.

> LCF $\left._{\text {COMPANY }}=0.7+0.3 *(\text { CoMaxLine } \% \text { (reserves })_{\text {COMPANY }}\right)$
> PCF $_{\text {COMPANY }}=0.7+0.3 *\left(\right.$ CoMaxLine $\left.\%(\text { premium })_{\text {COMPANY }}\right)$

These can also be written as:
$\operatorname{LCF}_{\text {COMPANY }}=100 \%-0.3 *\left(100 \%-\right.$ CoMaxLine $\left.\%_{\text {reserve }}\right)$
PCF $_{\text {COMPANY }}=100 \%-0.3 *(100 \%-$ CoMaxLine $\%$ premium $)$

Therefore, the diversification credit equals $30 \%$ times ( $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$ ) where the

[^11]diversification index is ( $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$ )

## LOB risk factors

The observed diversification relationship might depend on the selection of LOB risk factors. Therefore, in our analysis, we do not use the LOB PRFs and RRFs in the 2010 RBC Formula. Instead, we use the LOB PRFs and RRFs indicated by the reserve and premium risk data that we use in this diversification analysis. By using these indicated risk factors, we avoid possible distortions resulting from use of LOB risk factors that are not consistent with the data we use for the diversification analysis. In Appendix 1/Exhibit 1, we show the 2010 LOB risk factors and the LOB risk factors that we use in this analysis.

### 3.2 Analysis Method

In our analysis, we examine the data by size band and diversification band. For each of the size/diversification cells, we calculate the following:

1. Observed Risk - For reserves, this is the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile ${ }^{30}$ all-lines RRR. For premium, this is the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile all-lines AY Underwriting Gain/Loss percentage (AYUL in dollars and $\mathrm{AYUL} \%$, as a percentage of premium).
The AYUL\% by company equals the company all lines average loss ratio plus the all lines company expense ratio ${ }^{31}$ minus $100 \%$.
2. Expected Risk - This is the average RBC Formula result, including or excluding the diversification credit, as needed, for premium and reserves separately, averaged across companies.
We express the expected risk as a ratio to reserves, for reserve risk, and as a ratio to premium, for premium risk. We refer to those ratios as the expected reserve risk charge $\%$ and expected premium risk charge $\%$, respectively, and expected risk charge $\%$ generically.
In using the RBC Formula to measured expected risk, we treat the RBC Formula as the model that predicts the RRR or AYUL $\%$ at the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile risk level.
In Appendix 1/Exhibits 2-3 we show an example of how we use the risk data to calculate the all-lines expected risk charge $\%$, the diversification band and size band for

[^12]a sample company/year risk data point, for reserve risk and premium risk, respectively.
3. We vary the MDC ( $30 \%$ in the RBC Formula) to improve the 'fit' between the observed risk and the expected risk based on the RBC Formula.

In our analysis we examine the data in three levels of detail, as follows:

- A $2 \times 2$ split of monoline vs. multi-line and smallest size band vs. all other size bands combined.
- A $2 \times 6$ split treating each of six diversification bands separately and considering two size bands, smallest size band vs. all other size bands combined.
- A $5 \times 6$ split treating each diversification/size band separately.

With the $2 \times 2$ analysis we test the $30 \%$ MDC. With the $2 \times 6$ analysis we evaluate the extent to which the indicated diversification credit varies linearly with the diversification index, $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$, as well as testing the $30 \%$ MDC. The $5 \times 6$ analysis adds more insight into the extent to which differences in experience among company sizes $\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{D}$ and E affect the observed pattern for sizes B-E combined, used in the $2 \times 6$ analysis.

### 3.3 Diversification- 2x2 Analysis

In this section, we examine the data in 4 company size/diversification cells:

- By company size band- split the companies by size into the smallest $20 \%$ of companies and the other $80 \%$, and
- By company diversification band - split the companies into two diversification bands: monoline companies and multiline companies.


### 3.3.1 Observed vs. Expected Effect of Diversification

Expected Risk Charge\%s
Table 3-1, below, shows the all-lines expected reserve and expected premium risk charge $\%$ s based on the CoMaxLine\% Approach, with the $30 \%$ MDC, for each of the cells in the 2 x 2 array by company size and company diversification.

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Table 3-1
Expected Risk Charge\%

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | $\langle\mathbf{2 0} \%$ | $>\mathbf{2 0} \%$ | $\mathbf{2 0 \%}$ |  |
| 0 | $34.1 \%$ | $32.7 \%$ | $27.8 \%$ | $29.3 \%$ |
| $>0$ | $28.7 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 0 . 7 \%}$ | $22.4 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 1 . 8 \%}$ |

Note: Expected risk charge\% is from application of the RBC Formula Value, with the 30\% MDC.

Appendix 1/Exhibits 2 and 3 show how one company-year of data enters the calculation in Table 3-1, for reserve risk and premium risk respectively.
The expected risk charge $\%$ in each cell of Table 3-1 is the unweighted average of the company-year risk charge\%s from the RBC Formula for companies in that cell, i.e., the risk data points are equally weighted, regardless of company reserves/premium amount.

## Observed Risk

Table 3-2, below, shows the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile RRR and the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile $A Y U L \%$ for all company-years in the size/diversification cell. These are the indicated all-lines reserve and alllines premium risk charge $\%$ s corresponding to the expected risk charge $\%$ s in Table 3-1.

Table 3-2
Indicated Risk Charge

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | $<20 \%$ | $>=20 \%$ | $<20 \%$ | $>=20 \%$ |
| 0 | $63.0 \%$ | $26.5 \%$ | $56.2 \%$ | $28.7 \%$ |
| $>0$ | $54.7 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 7 . 2 \%}$ | $43.9 \%$ | $\mathbf{1 7 . 8 \%}$ |

Appendix $1 /$ Exhibits 2 and 3 show how one company-year of data enters the calculation in Table 3-2, for reserve risk and premium risk respectively.
Comments on comparison of expected to observed risk charges/Tables 3-1 and 3-2
Focus on Multi-Line Companies/Company size Excluding Smallest 20\% of Companies
In comparing observed risk charge $\%$ s to expected risk charge $\%$ s, we focus on the yellow/bold cells because:

- Diversification band 0 , monoline companies, provides no information about the benefit of diversification, as there is none, ${ }^{32}$ and
- The small company data in column $<20 \%$ is not useful in a diversification

[^13]calibration, as the risk charge $\%$ s for LOBs at that size are not consistent with the risk charge $\%$ s for the bulk of the companies that have larger sizes. ${ }^{33}$

The Indicated MDC is Greater than 30\%
If the CoMaxLine\% Approach, and all other features of the RBC Formula were "perfect," then the expected values, Table 3-1, would equal the corresponding value in the array of observed values, Table 3-2, at least on average. Looking at the yellow/bold cells, that, is not the case. The observed risk charge $\%$ s are lower than the expected risk charge $\%$ s, so a MDC greater than $30 \%$ is indicated. ${ }^{34}$

For example, for reserves, in the yellow/bold cell, the expected risk charge $\%$ is $30.7 \%$. The indicated risk charge $\%$ is $27.2 \%$. As $27.2 \%$ is less than $30.7 \%$, the data indicates that the $30 \%$ MDC is not giving enough diversification credit for reserve risk, for multi-line companies larger than the smallest $20 \%$.

Similarly, for premium, in the yellow/bold cell, the expected risk charge $\%$ is $21.8 \%$. The indicated risk charge $\%$ is $17.8 \%$. As $17.8 \%$ is less than $21.8 \%$, the data indicates that the $30 \%$ MDC is not giving enough diversification credit for premium risk, for multi-line companies larger than the smallest $20 \%$.

### 3.3.2 Indicated MDC

To determine the indicated MDC, we use Tables 3-1 and 3-2, above, and Tables 3-3 through 3-5 below.

Table 3-3, below, shows the all-lines expected risk charge\% based on the RBC Formula with no diversification credit. As required by the operation of the RBC Formula, the values in Table 3-3 equal the values in Table 3-1 for the 0 diversification band, and the values in Table 3-3 are higher than the values in Table 3-1 for the $>0$ diversification band.

[^14]Table 3-3
Expected Risk Charge\% Before Diversification

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | $<\mathbf{2 0} \%$ | $>\mathbf{2 0} \%$ | $\mathbf{2 0 \%}$ |  |
| 0 | $34.1 \%$ | $32.7 \%$ | $27.8 \%$ | $29.3 \%$ |
| $>0$ | $31.2 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 4 . 2 \%}$ | $24.8 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 5 . 0 \%}$ |

Note: Expected risk charge\% before diversification is the RBC Formula Value before applying LCF/PCF.
Table 3-4, below, shows current average diversification credit, i.e., the value based on the CoMaxLine\% Approach and the 30\% MDC for reserve and premium risk values. ${ }^{35}$

Table 3-4
Current Average Diversification Credit with RBC Formula and 30\% MDC

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |  |  |
|  | $\langle 20 \%$ |  | $>=20 \%$ | $<20 \%$ |  | $>=20 \%$ |
| 0 | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |  |  |
| $>0$ | $7.7 \%$ | $\mathbf{9 . 9 \%}$ | $9.8 \%$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 3 \%}$ |  |  |

As required by the operation of the RBC Formula, the values in Table 3-4 equal zero for the diversification band 0 . The value $9.9 \%$ for reserves, diversification $>0$ and size $>=20 \%$ is the average diversification credit for companies in that size/diversification cell, and the corresponding average CoMaxLine $\%$ for those companies is $67.1 \%{ }^{36}$

Based on Tables 3-1 to 3-4, above, we calculate the indicated MDC in Table 3-5, below. The calculation uses the data for multiline companies, excluding the smallest $20 \%$ of companies, i.e., yellow/bold cells in Tables 3-1 to 3-4, for the reasons described in Section 3.3.1 above.

[^15]Table 3-5
Overall Indicated MDC ( $2 \times 2$ Analysis)

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| \# | Item | Reserves | Premium |
| 1 | Observed Risk - 87.5th RRR/AYUL (Table 3-2) | $27.2 \%$ | $17.8 \%$ |
| 2 | Ixpected Risk - Apply RBC Formula before <br> diversification (Table 3-3) | $34.2 \%$ | $25.0 \%$ |
| 3 | Indicated Diversification Credit 1.0-(1)/(2)\% | $20.6 \%$ | $28.8 \%$ |
| 4verage Diversification Credit (Current Formula) <br> 4 (Table 3-4) | $9.9 \%$ | $13.3 \%$ |  |
| 5 | Indicated Maximum Credit [ (3)/(4) * 30\%] | $62 \%$ | $65 \%$ |

The elements of the calculation in Table 3-5 are as follows:

- Row 1 - The observed risk, $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile all-lines AYUL\% and RRR. This is $27.2 \%$ for reserve risk, and $17.8 \%$ for premium risk (From Table 3-2).
- Row 2 - The expected risk, the all-lines reserve and premium risk charge\%s calculated with from the RBC Formula, before considering the diversification adjustment. This is the average, all companies equally weighted, of the LOB premium or reserves risk charge\%s, before diversification credits (From Table 33).
- Row 3 -The indicated average diversification credit, 1.0- (1)/ (2), expressed as a percentage. This is the diversification credit that, if applied on average, all companies equally weighted, would result in expected reserve and premium risk charge\%s equal to observed risk reserve and premium risk charges.
- Row 4 - The current average diversification credit, the unweighted average, i.e., all companies equally weighted, of the value " $30 \%$ * ( $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$ )," across all company-years in this analysis. (From Table 3-4)
The Row 3 value is more than the Row 4 value showing that the indicated credit diversification is greater than the credit produced by the RBC Formula.
- Row 5 - The indicated MDC, Row (5) = Row (3)/Row (4) * $30 \%$. The indicated MDC is $65 \%$ for premium and $62 \%$ for reserves. ${ }^{37}$

Thus, Table 3-5 shows that, based on $2 \times 2$ analysis, the indicated diversification formulas are:

$$
\text { LCF }=38 \% \text { plus } 62 \% * \text { CoMaxLine } \%
$$

[^16]$$
\text { PCF }=35 \% \text { plus } 65 \% * \text { CoMaxLine } \%
$$

The values $65 \%$ and $62 \%$ are more than twice the current value of $30 \%$, driven by the fact that the indicated diversification ( $20.6 \%$ and $28.8 \%$, line 3, for reserves and premiums, respectively) are more than twice the current average diversification ( $9.9 \%$ and $13.3 \%$, line 4 , for reserves and premiums, respectively).

This indicated MDC reflects risk theory diversification effects and the extent to which indicated LOB risk charge $\%$ s vary by degree of diversification. We describe the latter effect in Section 4 and in Appendix 2. Regardless of the causes, Row 5 is an estimate of the MDC that is indicated by the risk data, using the selected PRFs/RRFs, given the structure of the RBC Formula.

### 3.4 Diversification - 2x6 Analysis (Two Size Bands/Six Diversification Bands)

In this section, we examine the data in 12 cells, as follows:

- By company size - split the companies by size into the smallest $20 \%$ and the other $80 \%$, 2 size bands, and
- By company diversification band - split the companies by diversification into one monoline band and five multiline bands, 6 diversification bands in total.
In this 2 x 6 analysis we can test both the MDC and the extent to which the diversification credit is linear with CoMaxLine $\%$. In Section 3.3, above, with less diversification segmentation, we only tested the value of the MDC. Our analysis, in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below, follows the approach described in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for the 2 x 2 analysis.


### 3.4.1 Observed vs. Expected Effect of Diversification Experience

Table 3-6, below, shows the all-lines expected reserve and premium risk charge\%s based on the CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach with the $30 \%$ MDC, for each of the cells in the $2 \times 6$ array by company size and company diversification. Table 3-6 is a more detailed segmentation of Table 3-1.

Table 3-6
Expected Risk Charge\%

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | <20\% | >=20\% | <20\% | >=20\% |
| 0 | 34.1\% | 32.7\% | 27.8\% | 29.3\% |
| 1 | 27.4\% | 30.0\% | 25.3\% | 28.0\% |
| 2 | 28.9\% | 29.6\% | 23.4\% | 22.3\% |
| 3 | 28.6\% | 31.3\% | 20.0\% | 20.9\% |
| 4 | 29.6\% | 32.0\% | 18.9\% | 19.9\% |
| 5 | 29.8\% | 30.5\% | 19.1\% | 18.9\% |
| all $\times 0$ | 28.7\% | 30.7\% | 22.4\% | 21.8\% |

Note: Expected risk charge\% is the RBC Formula Value, including $30 \%$ MDC.

Table 3-7, below, shows the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile RRR and the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile AYUL $\%$. These are the indicated all-lines reserve and premium risk charge $\%$ s corresponding to the expected risk charge $\%$ s in Table 3-6. Table 3-7 is a more detailed segmentation of Table 3-2. The rows 0 and all x 0 in Table 3-7 have the same values as the corresponding rows, 0 and $>0$ in Table 3-2.

Table 3-7
Indicated Risk Charge

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | <20\% | >=20\% | <20\% | >=20\% |
| 0 | 63.0\% | 26.5\% | 56.2\% | 28.7\% |
| 1 | 53.4\% | 26.7\% | 44.7\% | 24.4\% |
| 2 | 54.0\% | 26.9\% | 42.1\% | 16.5\% |
| 3 | 74.6\% | 28.2\% | 44.1\% | 18.0\% |
| 4 | 44.9\% | 28.5\% | 32.8\% | 16.7\% |
| 5 | 36.5\% | 25.6\% | 55.9\% | 16.0\% |
| all x 0 | 54.7\% | 27.2\% | 43.9\% | 17.8\% |

### 3.4.2 Indicated MDC

To determine the indicated diversification credit with this $2 \times 6$ data segmentation, we use Tables 3-6 and 3-7, above, plus the information in Tables 3-8 to 3-11 below. The analysis is analogous to the Table 3-5 calculation in section 3.3 for the $2 \times 2$ array of data:

- Table 3-8 - Expected Risk Charge\% Before Diversification Credit (analogous to Table 3-3)

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- Table 3-9 - Indicated Average Diversification Credit (analogous to Table 3-5 line 3, but not shown as separate Table in section 3.3).
These values equal 100\% - Table 3-7/Table 3-8.
- Table 3-10 - Current Average Diversification Credit (analogous to Table 3-4)
- Table 3-11 - Indicated MDC (analogous to Table 3-5)

These values equal $30 \%$ * Table 3-9/Table 3-10.
Table 3-8
Expected Risk Charge\% Before Diversification

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | <20\% | >=20\% | <20\% | >=20\% |
| 0 | 34.1\% | 32.7\% | 27.8\% | 29.3\% |
| 1 | 27.9\% | 30.5\% | 26.3\% | 29.2\% |
| 2 | 30.6\% | 31.3\% | 25.7\% | 24.7\% |
| 3 | 31.6\% | 34.6\% | 23.0\% | 24.1\% |
| 4 | 34.2\% | 36.9\% | 22.5\% | 23.9\% |
| 5 | 36.0\% | 37.2\% | 23.9\% | 23.8\% |
| all $\times 0$ | 31.2\% | 34.2\% | 24.8\% | 25.0\% |

Note: Expected risk charge\% Before Diversification is the RBC Formula Value before applying the LCF/PCF.

Table 3-9
Indicated Average Diversification Credit

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | <20\% | >=20\% | <20\% | >=20\% |
| 0 | -84.7\% | 18.8\% | -102.0\% | 1.9\% |
| 1 | -91.3\% | 12.4\% | -69.5\% | 16.5\% |
| 2 | -76.5\% | 14.2\% | -63.4\% | 33.1\% |
| 3 | -135.8\% | 18.4\% | -91.8\% | 25.3\% |
| 4 | -31.3\% | 22.7\% | -45.8\% | 30.1\% |
| 5 | -1.6\% | 31.2\% | -133.5\% | 33.0\% |
| all $\times 0$ | -75.3\% | 20.6\% | -77.3\% | 28.8\% |

Table 3-10
Current Average Diversification Credit with RBC Formula and 30\% MDC

| Div <br> Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | <20\% | >=20\% | <20\% | >=20\% |
| 0 | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| 1 | 1.8\% | 1.7\% | 4.1\% | 4.3\% |
| 2 | 5.5\% | 5.4\% | 9.4\% | 9.5\% |
| 3 | 9.4\% | 9.5\% | 13.2\% | 13.3\% |
| 4 | 13.4\% | 13.4\% | 16.2\% | 16.5\% |
| 5 | 17.2\% | 18.1\% | 20.0\% | 20.8\% |
| all $\times 0$ | 7.7\% | 9.9\% | 9.8\% | 13.3\% |

Table 3-11
Indicated MDC

| Div Band | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band |  | Size Band |  |
|  | <20\% | >=20\% | <20\% | >=20\% |
| 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1 | -1524.0\% | 211.9\% | -513.5\% | 114.1\% |
| 2 | -417.5\% | 78.2\% | -203.2\% | 104.0\% |
| 3 | -431.7\% | 58.4\% | -208.9\% | 57.3\% |
| 4 | -70.3\% | 51.0\% | -84.6\% | 54.7\% |
| 5 | -2.7\% | 51.7\% | -200.3\% | 47.6\% |
| all $\times 0$ | -291.9\% | 62.5\% | -236.8\% | 64.9\% |

For calibration, we focus on the cells in yellow/bold because:

- Diversification band 0 , monoline companies, provide no information about the benefit of diversification, as there is none.
- The small company data in column $<20 \%$ is not useful in diversification calibration of as the risk charge $\%$ s for LOBs at that size are not consistent with the risk charge $\%$ s for the bulk of the companies that have reserve/premium larger sizes and the bulk of the diversification credit. ${ }^{38}$
- Those cells represent the overwhelming proportion of diversification credit, as shown in Table 2-4A and 2-4B.
- Moreover, the diversification bands " 1 " and " 2 " show high values for the indicated

[^17]MDC, compared to the indicated MDC for diversification bands 3-5.
In Appendix 2 we show that, for diversification bands 1 and 2, the indicated LOB risk factors are different from the indicated LOB risk factors for diversification bands 3-5. Thus, the high indications for diversification levels 1 and 2 are not relevant for calibrating diversification for the companies in diversification bands 3-5 that constitute the bulk of premium and reserves amounts and the overwhelming proportion of industry total diversification credit.
For these yellow/bold cells, Table 3-11 shows that the indicated MDC is almost always more than $50 \%$. ${ }^{39}$

### 3.4.3 Testing Linear Relationship between CoMaxLine\% and Indicated Diversification Credit

Next, we use regression through the origin to test the validity of the linear relationship between indicated diversification credit and $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$ and to further test the indicated diversification credit. We use regression through the origin because a diversification formula must give zero credit when there is zero diversification. The dependent variable is the indicated average diversification credit (Table 3-9). The independent variable is the diversification index, " $100 \%$ - CoMaxLine $\%$," (Table 3-10 divided by $30 \%$ ). ${ }^{40}$ We exclude the smallest $20 \%$ of companies from this analysis, for the reasons discussed above.

Table 3-12, below, presents the regression results. ${ }^{41}$

[^18]Table 3-12
Regression Analysis of Diversification Formula

| DivBand | Reserves |  |  | Premium |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|  | Average <br> Div Index | Indicated <br> Div <br> Credit | Fitted Div Credit | Average <br> Div Index | Indicated <br> Div <br> Credit | Fitted Div Credit |
| 0 | 0.0\% | 18.8\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 1.9\% | 0.0\% |
| 1 | 5.8\% | 12.4\% | 3.2\% | 14.5\% | 16.5\% | 8.3\% |
| 2 | 18.1\% | 14.2\% | 9.9\% | 31.8\% | 33.1\% | 18.4\% |
| 3 | 31.5\% | 18.4\% | 17.2\% | 44.2\% | 25.3\% | 25.5\% |
| 4 | 44.5\% | 22.7\% | 24.2\% | 55.0\% | 30.1\% | 31.7\% |
| 5 | 60.5\% | 31.2\% | 32.9\% | 69.4\% | 33.0\% | 40.1\% |
|  | Slope |  | 54\% | Slope |  | 58\% |
|  | R-square |  | 82\% | R-square |  | 92\% |

Columns 1 and 4 equal Table 3 -10 divided by .30 . We use the diversification index rather than the average diversification credit, for simplicity, so that the slope equals the indicated MDC. Columns 2 and 5 from Table 3-9.
Data excludes company size band A, the $20 \%$ smallest companies.
The regression includes data from diversification band 0 . If we exclude diversification band 0 and recalculate the regression, the slope is not affected but the R-squared values are $95 \%$ and $92 \%$ for reserve and premium respectively.
Table 3-13 shows the regression results graphically. Table 3-13 shows that the linear relationship through the origin is particularly close for the three data points representing the largest/most diversified companies.

Based on those results, the indicated diversification formulas are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { LCF }=46 \% \text { plus } 54 \% * \text { CoMaxLine } \% \\
& \text { PCF }=42 \% \text { plus } 58 \% * \text { CoMaxLine } \%
\end{aligned}
$$

The regression lines show that, for reserves, every 100 -basis point increase in the diversification index will result in a 54 -basis point increase in the indicated diversification credit. For premium, every 100 -basis point increase in the diversification index will result in a 58 basis point increases in the indicated diversification credit.

These formulas provide larger diversification credits than the current $30 \% \mathrm{MDC}$, over $50 \%$, but less than the parameters from the $2 \times 2$ analysis.

Table 3-13
Regression Results


X-Axis shows 100\% - CoMaxLine \% that equals Average Diversification Credit /0.3.
Y-Axis shows indicated diversification credit.

### 3.5 Diversification - 5x6 Analysis (Five Size Bands /Six Diversification Bands

In this section, we examine the data in 30 cells,

- By company size - split the companies into 5 size bands, and
- By company diversification - split the companies into 6 diversification bands

We follow the same approach as in the $2 \times 2$ and $2 \times 6$ analyses in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. We show that the findings from section 3.4 , the $2 \times 6$ analysis, remain valid.

### 3.5.1 Observed vs. Expected Effect of Diversification Experience

Table 3-14, below, shows the all-lines expected reserve and premium risk charge $\%$ s based on the CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach with the $30 \%$ MDC, for each cell in the $5 \times 6$ array by company size and company diversification. ${ }^{42}$ This analysis is analogous to the analysis shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-6.

[^19]Table 3-14
Expected Risk Charge\%

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 34.1\% | 33.9\% | 33.0\% | 31.1\% | 31.3\% | 27.8\% | 28.5\% | 28.9\% | 31.1\% | 30.0\% |
| 1 | 27.4\% | 28.0\% | 30.9\% | 32.4\% | 28.6\% | 25.3\% | 26.4\% | 26.4\% | 30.3\% | 30.2\% |
| 2 | 28.9\% | 29.2\% | 29.6\% | 30.4\% | 29.2\% | 23.4\% | 22.9\% | 21.6\% | 21.8\% | 23.5\% |
| 3 | 28.6\% | 29.2\% | 30.4\% | 30.2\% | 34.7\% | 20.0\% | 21.2\% | 20.2\% | 20.5\% | 22.0\% |
| 4 | 29.6\% | 28.7\% | 31.6\% | 31.8\% | 34.9\% | 18.9\% | 20.0\% | 19.4\% | 20.0\% | 20.1\% |
| 5 | 29.8\% | 29.4\% | 30.0\% | 29.7\% | 31.3\% | 19.1\% | 18.8\% | 18.2\% | 18.4\% | 19.3\% |
| All Ex 0 | 28.7\% | 28.8\% | 30.6\% | 30.9\% | 31.8\% | 22.4\% | 22.5\% | 21.6\% | 21.9\% | 21.4\% |

Note: Expected risk charge\% is the RBC Formula Value, including 30\% MDC.

Table 3-15, below, shows the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile RRR and the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile AYUL $\%$. These are the indicated all-lines reserve and premium risk charge $\%$ s corresponding to expected risk charge\%s in Table 3-13. ${ }^{43}$ This analysis is analogous to the analysis shown in Tables 3-2 and 3-7.

Table 3-15
Indicated Risk charge\%

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 63.0\% | 38.2\% | 25.1\% | 21.2\% | 18.2\% | 56.2\% | 29.0\% | 25.9\% | 27.2\% | 36.6\% |
| 1 | 53.4\% | 33.6\% | 27.2\% | 29.9\% | 15.1\% | 44.7\% | 20.8\% | 25.1\% | 21.8\% | 38.5\% |
| 2 | 54.0\% | 34.7\% | 29.7\% | 28.7\% | 17.0\% | 42.1\% | 19.4\% | 15.2\% | 16.5\% | 15.0\% |
| 3 | 74.6\% | 39.4\% | 27.0\% | 22.2\% | 25.2\% | 44.1\% | 20.7\% | 17.2\% | 17.9\% | 16.6\% |
| 4 | 44.9\% | 36.3\% | 31.9\% | 22.5\% | 28.8\% | 32.8\% | 13.7\% | 18.1\% | 18.2\% | 15.7\% |
| 5 | 36.5\% | 30.5\% | 24.1\% | 23.6\% | 25.6\% | 55.9\% | 22.0\% | 15.4\% | 16.4\% | 15.3\% |
| All Ex 0 | 54.7\% | 35.2\% | 27.9\% | 25.1\% | 23.7\% | 43.9\% | 19.3\% | 18.2\% | 17.8\% | 16.8\% |

### 3.5.2 Indicated MDC

To examine the indicated diversification credit, we use Table 3-14 and 3-15, above, and the information in Tables 3-16 to 3-19 below. The analysis is analogous to that used in section 3.3.2, for the $2 \times 2$ analysis, and section 3.4.2, for the $2 \times 6$ analysis:

- Table 3-16 - Expected risk charge\% before diversification credit (analogous to Tables 3-8 and 3-3)
- Table 3-17-Indicated Average Diversification Credit (analogous to Tables 3-9 and 3-5 line 3). These are $100 \%$ - Table 3-15/Table 3-14

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- Table 3-18 - Current Average Diversification Credit (analogous to Tables 3-10 and 3-4)
- Table 3-19 - Indicated MDC (analogous to Tables 3-11 and 3-5)

This is 30\% times Table 3-17 / Table 3-18.
Table 3-16
Expected Risk Charge\% Before Diversification

| Diversif.BandQuintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 34.1\% | 33.9\% | 33.0\% | 31.1\% | 31.3\% | 27.8\% | 28.5\% | 28.9\% | 31.1\% | 30.0\% |
| 1 | 27.9\% | 28.5\% | 31.4\% | 32.9\% | 29.1\% | 26.3\% | 27.6\% | 27.6\% | 31.6\% | 31.5\% |
| 2 | 30.6\% | 30.9\% | 31.3\% | 32.1\% | 30.9\% | 25.7\% | 25.3\% | 23.9\% | 24.1\% | 26.0\% |
| 3 | 31.6\% | 32.2\% | 33.6\% | 33.4\% | 38.4\% | 23.0\% | 24.4\% | 23.3\% | 23.6\% | 25.4\% |
| 4 | 34.2\% | 33.2\% | 36.5\% | 36.7\% | 40.3\% | 22.5\% | 23.9\% | 23.2\% | 24.0\% | 24.1\% |
| 5 | 36.0\% | 35.6\% | 36.5\% | 36.2\% | 38.4\% | 23.9\% | 23.5\% | 22.9\% | 23.2\% | 24.5\% |
| All Ex 0 | 31.2\% | 31.6\% | 33.7\% | 34.4\% | 36.0\% | 24.8\% | 25.3\% | 24.3\% | 25.1\% | 25.4\% |

Note: Expected risk charge\% Before Diversification is the RBC Formula Value before applying the LCF/PCF.

Table 3-17
Indicated Average Diversification Credit

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | -84.7\% | -12.6\% | 24.0\% | 31.8\% | 41.8\% | -102.0\% | -1.7\% | 10.4\% | 12.5\% | -22.0\% |
| 1 | -91.3\% | -18.0\% | 13.5\% | 9.1\% | 48.2\% | -69.5\% | 24.5\% | 9.0\% | 31.0\% | -22.3\% |
| 2 | -76.5\% | -12.5\% | 5.0\% | 10.7\% | 45.0\% | -63.4\% | 23.2\% | 36.6\% | 31.6\% | 42.1\% |
| 3 | -135.8\% | -22.4\% | 19.5\% | 33.7\% | 34.2\% | -91.8\% | 15.4\% | 26.1\% | 24.2\% | 34.7\% |
| 4 | -31.3\% | -9.3\% | 12.8\% | 38.8\% | 28.5\% | -45.8\% | 42.8\% | 21.9\% | 24.1\% | 35.0\% |
| 5 | -1.6\% | 14.4\% | 33.9\% | 34.8\% | 33.5\% | -133.5\% | 6.4\% | 32.7\% | 29.3\% | 37.4\% |
| All Ex 0 | -75.3\% | -11.5\% | 17.4\% | 27.0\% | 34.3\% | -77.3\% | 23.6\% | 25.4\% | 29.2\% | 33.7\% |

Table 3-18
Current Average Diversification Credit with RBC Formula and 30\% MDC

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| 1 | 1.8\% | 1.7\% | 1.6\% | 1.7\% | 2.0\% | 4.1\% | 4.4\% | 4.4\% | 4.3\% | 4.2\% |
| 2 | 5.5\% | 5.4\% | 5.5\% | 5.4\% | 5.4\% | 9.4\% | 9.5\% | 9.5\% | 9.6\% | 9.6\% |
| 3 | 9.4\% | 9.4\% | 9.4\% | 9.6\% | 9.4\% | 13.2\% | 13.2\% | 13.3\% | 13.2\% | 13.3\% |
| 4 | 13.4\% | 13.3\% | 13.3\% | 13.4\% | 13.4\% | 16.2\% | 16.3\% | 16.5\% | 16.6\% | 16.6\% |
| 5 | 17.2\% | 17.4\% | 17.8\% | 18.0\% | 18.5\% | 20.0\% | 20.2\% | 20.2\% | 20.5\% | 21.2\% |
| All Ex 0 | 7.7\% | 8.3\% | 9.0\% | 10.1\% | 11.3\% | 9.8\% | 11.3\% | 11.8\% | 13.2\% | 15.8\% |

Table 3-19
Indicated MDC

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1 | -1524.0\% | -310.2\% | 247.1\% | 165.0\% | 731.8\% | -513.5\% | 167.1\% | 61.4\% | 218.5\% | -159.0\% |
| 2 | -417.5\% | -69.6\% | 27.3\% | 59.1\% | 248.8\% | -203.2\% | 73.4\% | 115.6\% | 98.9\% | 131.1\% |
| 3 | -431.7\% | -71.6\% | 61.9\% | 105.7\% | 108.8\% | -208.9\% | 35.0\% | 58.9\% | 54.9\% | 78.1\% |
| 4 | -70.3\% | -20.9\% | 28.7\% | 87.0\% | 64.0\% | -84.6\% | 78.8\% | 39.9\% | 43.7\% | 63.3\% |
| 5 | -2.7\% | 24.8\% | 57.2\% | 58.0\% | 54.3\% | -200.3\% | 9.6\% | 48.5\% | 42.8\% | 52.9\% |
| All Ex 0 | -291.9\% | -41.5\% | 57.7\% | 80.3\% | 91.0\% | -236.8\% | 62.9\% | 64.3\% | 66.3\% | 63.9\% |

We focus on data cells highlighted in yellow/bold, for the reasons we discuss in Section 3.4.2. Those yellow/bold cells in Table 3-19 show indicated MDCs that average over $50 \%$ for reserve and premium risk charges. This is consistent with the findings from Table 3-11, the $2 \times 6$ analysis.

### 3.5.3 Testing Linear Relationship between CoMaxLine\% and Indicated Diversification Credit

Next, we use regression through the origin to further test both the indicated MDC and to test the validity of the linear relationship between $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$ and the indicated diversification credit. The dependent variable is the indicated average diversification credit (Table 3-17). The independent variable is $100 \%$ - CoMaxLine $\%$ (Table 3-18 divided by $30 \%$ ).

Table 3-20A, below, presents the regression results showing that the indicated MDC, the value of the slope, is approximately $50 \%$, although with lower R -square ${ }^{44}$ values than in the

[^21]
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2 x 6 analysis. For reserves, for every 100 -basis point increase in the diversification index will result in 48 basis point increases in the diversification credit. For premium, for every 100-basis point increase in the diversification index will result in 54 basis point increases in the diversification credit.

Table 3-20A
Regression Analysis of Diversification Formula Excluding Smallest Companies and Monoline Companies

| Div Band | Size <br> Band | Reserves |  |  | Premium |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|  |  | Average Div Level | Indicated Div Credit | Fitted <br> Div <br> Credit | Average Div Level |  | Fitted Div Credit |
| 1 | B | 5.8\% | -18.0\% | 2.8\% | 14.7\% | 24.5\% | 7.9\% |
| 1 | C | 5.5\% | 13.5\% | 2.6\% | 14.7\% | 9.0\% | 7.9\% |
| 1 | D | 5.5\% | 9.1\% | 2.6\% | 14.2\% | 31.0\% | 7.7\% |
| 1 | E | 6.6\% | 48.2\% | 3.1\% | 14.0\% | -22.3\% | 7.6\% |
| 2 | B | 18.0\% | -12.5\% | 8.6\% | 31.6\% | 23.2\% | 17.0\% |
| 2 | C | 18.2\% | 5.0\% | 8.7\% | 31.6\% | 36.6\% | 17.0\% |
| 2 | D | 18.2\% | 10.7\% | 8.7\% | 32.0\% | 31.6\% | 17.2\% |
| 2 | E | 18.1\% | 45.0\% | 8.6\% | 32.1\% | 42.1\% | 17.3\% |
| 3 | B | 31.3\% | -22.4\% | 14.9\% | 44.1\% | 15.4\% | 23.8\% |
| 3 | C | 31.5\% | 19.5\% | 15.0\% | 44.2\% | 26.1\% | 23.8\% |
| 3 | D | 31.9\% | 33.7\% | 15.2\% | 44.0\% | 24.2\% | 23.7\% |
| 3 | E | 31.4\% | 34.2\% | 15.0\% | 44.5\% | 34.7\% | 24.0\% |
| 4 | B | 44.5\% | -9.3\% | 21.2\% | 54.3\% | 42.8\% | 29.3\% |
| 4 | C | 44.5\% | 12.8\% | 21.2\% | 54.9\% | 21.9\% | 29.6\% |
| 4 | D | 44.6\% | 38.8\% | 21.3\% | 55.2\% | 24.1\% | 29.7\% |
| 4 | E | 44.6\% | 28.5\% | 21.3\% | 55.3\% | 35.0\% | 29.8\% |
| 5 | B | 57.9\% | 14.4\% | 27.6\% | 67.2\% | 6.4\% | 36.2\% |
| 5 | C | 59.3\% | 33.9\% | 28.3\% | 67.5\% | 32.7\% | 36.3\% |
| 5 | D | 59.9\% | 34.8\% | 28.6\% | 68.4\% | 29.3\% | 36.9\% |
| 5 | E | 61.7\% | 33.5\% | 29.4\% | 70.7\% | 37.4\% | 38.1\% |
|  |  | Slope |  | 48\% | Slope |  | 54\% |
|  |  | R-square |  | 40\% | R-square |  | 72\% |

Columns 1 and 4 equal the values in Table 3-18/30\%.
Columns 2 and 5 from Table 3-17.
Column 3 is based on regression through the origin.
The R -squared values based on regression through the origin. ${ }^{45}$
Table 3-20B shows the fitted diversion credit regression results graphically.

[^22]Table 3-20B
Table 3-20A Graphically
Reserves


X-Axis shows 100\% - CoMaxLine $\%$ (Average Diversification Credit /0.3).
Y-Axis shows indicated diversification factor.
Line is the fitted diversion credit in Table 3-21A
Line is extrapolated back to origin, zero diversification implying zero diversification credit.
Tables 3-21A and 3-21B, below, show the same information as 3-20A and 3-20B, above, for the nine data points, C3 to E5, which represent the largest and most diversified companies that constitute the bulk of the reserve, premium and diversification credit amounts. The ninepoint regressions in Tables 3-21A and 3-21B have a much higher R -square value than the 20point regressions in Tables 3-20A and 3-20B. Based on the 9-point regression, for reserves, every 100 -basis point increase in the diversification index will result in a 63 basis point increases in the diversification credit. For premium, every 100 -basis point increase in diversification index will result in a 52 basis point increases in the diversification credit.

Table 3-21A
Regression Analysis of Diversification Formula All (Large and Diversified Only)
Size Band B-E/Diversification Bands 3-5

| Div <br> Band | Size <br> Band | Reserves |  |  | Premium |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|  |  | Average Div Level | Indicated <br> Div <br> Credit | Fitted Div Credit | Average Div Level | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Indicated } \\ \text { Div } \\ \text { Credit } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Fitted Div Credit |
| C | 3 | 31.5\% | 19.5\% | 19.8\% | 44.2\% | 26.1\% | 22.8\% |
| D | 3 | 31.9\% | 33.7\% | 20.1\% | 44.0\% | 24.2\% | 22.7\% |
| E | 3 | 31.4\% | 34.2\% | 19.8\% | 44.5\% | 34.7\% | 23.0\% |
| C | 4 | 44.5\% | 12.8\% | 28.0\% | 54.9\% | 21.9\% | 28.3\% |
| D | 4 | 44.6\% | 38.8\% | 28.0\% | 55.2\% | 24.1\% | 28.5\% |
| E | 4 | 44.6\% | 28.5\% | 28.0\% | 55.3\% | 35.0\% | 28.5\% |
| C | 5 | 59.3\% | 33.9\% | 37.3\% | 67.5\% | 32.7\% | 34.8\% |
| D | 5 | 59.9\% | 34.8\% | 37.7\% | 68.4\% | 29.3\% | 35.3\% |
| E | 5 | 61.7\% | 33.5\% | 38.8\% | 70.7\% | 37.4\% | 36.5\% |
|  |  | Slope |  | 63\% | Slope |  | 52\% |
|  |  | R-square |  | 91\% | R-square |  | 96\% |

Columns 1-6 from selected rows of Table 3-20A
The R-squared values based on regression through the origin. ${ }^{46}$
Table 3-21B
Table 3-21A Graphically


X-Axis shows 100\% - CoMaxLine \%, or, equivalently Average Diversification Credit /0.3.
Y-Axis shows indicated diversification factor.
Line is the fitted diversion credit in Table 3-21A
Line is extrapolated back to origin, zero diversification implying zero diversification credit.

[^23]Based on those results, the indicated diversification formulas are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { LCF }=37 \% \text { plus } 63 \% * \text { CoMaxLine } \% \\
& \text { PCF }=48 \% \text { plus } 52 \% * \text { CoMaxLine } \%
\end{aligned}
$$

## 4. Alternative Diversification Approaches

In this section we test alternatives to the CoMaxLine\% Approach.

### 4.1 Alternatives to CoMaxLine\%

From the risk theory perspective, the natural approach to diversification is to combine risk charges by LOB using correlation factors between each pair of LOBs. Individual company capital models often use this pairwise correlation approach. The Solvency II Standard Formula uses the pairwise correlation approach. The correlation approach, if applied in the RBC Formula, uses 171 parameters. ${ }^{47}$ In contrast to the correlation approach, the RBC Formula CoMaxLine\% Approach might be described as ‘simple," perhaps too simple, and ad hoc.

One difference between the CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach and the correlation matrix approach, as normally applied, is that the degree of diversification in the correlation matrix approach is based on risk by LOB while the degree of diversification in the CoMaxLine\% Approach is based on volume (premium amount or reserve amount) by LOB. Therefore, another alternative to CoMaxLine $\%$ and correlation matrix approaches, is the CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk Approach, in which we apply the CoMaxLine\% Approach to LOB risk rather than LOB volume, when calculating the LCF and PCF for a company.

Another alternative to the CoMaxLine\% and the correlation matrix approach is the HHI approach, used by economists to measure concentration. HHI considers the relative proportions of all LOBs, the largest, second largest, third largest, and so on. ${ }^{48}$ This is simpler than the correlation approach, but it is more complex than the CoMaxLine\% Approach in

[^24]that the HHI approach recognizes the extent of diversification for the $2^{\text {nd }}, 3^{\text {rd }}, 4^{\text {th }}$, etc. largest LOBs. ${ }^{49}$

Any of these approaches to diversification is an approximation. The theoretical requirements for risk theory diversification approach do not fully apply to standard formulas, at least as evidenced by our risk data, for reasons that include the following:

1. LOB charges vary not only by LOB, but within LOBs based on the degree of specialization of the insurer, extent of reinsurance usage, etc.
For example, with our risk data, the indicated personal automobile risk charge $\%$ for a monoline, or near monoline, company is not the same as the indicated risk charge $\%$ for personal lines automobile for multi-line companies. ${ }^{50}$ Appendix 2 shows our analysis of variation in LOB risk charge \% by variation in company diversification.
2. The LOB risk charge $\%$ s and, possibly, diversification parameters, might vary by LOBsize. The differences by LOB-size are not part of either the RBC or the Solvency II Standard Formula. As such, the LOB risk charges and the correlations relationships are, at best, correct for a particular set of LOB-sizes and/ or on average across all LOBsizes.
3. For the most plausible LOB-size distributions, the "normal-family" assumption underlying the covariance formula might not be satisfied. ${ }^{51}$
In addition to those three issues, which affect the theoretical framework, as a practical matter there may not be enough data for all the potential parameters. For the correlation matrix approach, even the DCWP database, with 30,000 company/year/all-line data points (for each of the premium and reserve data sets), ${ }^{52}$ may not be adequate to support a datadriven calibration of the 171 required diversification parameters, especially if differences in the diversification relationship by company size are reflected.
[^25]
### 4.2 Analysis of Alternatives

To apply the correlation approach for our testing, we first construct a set of pairwise correlation factors, called a correlation matrix. Following the Solvency II approach, we construct the correlation matrix using values of $25 \%$ or $50 \%{ }^{53}$ for most of the 171 LOB-pairs. For several LOB-pairs that we consider very highly correlated we select correlation factors of $75 \%$ or $100 \%{ }^{54}$ Appendix 3/Exhibit 1 shows the Solvency II correlation matrix for the 12 Solvency II non-life LOBs. Appendix 3/Exhibit 2 shows the correlation matrix that we use.

Then, for each of the four diversification approaches, i.e., the CoMaxLine\% Approach, the correlation matrix approach, the CoMaxLine $\%$-risk approach and the HHI approach, we compare the indicated risk charge $\%$ s to the formula risk charge $\%$ s for each of the thirty company-size/diversification band cells, separately for premium risk and reserve risk. Appendix 4 shows the calculations of indicated risk charge $\%$ s and differences between the indicated risk charge\%s and the risk charge\%s from the RBC Formula with the CoMaxLine\% and correlation matrix dependency formulas. ${ }^{55}$

In Table 4-1, below, we summarize the 30 indicated versus formula results, for CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach and correlation matrix approach, from Part 5 of Appendix 4. We use three measures of indicated versus formula differences. We refer to those as 'error statistics' for each method. These error statistics are as follows:

- Standard deviation,
- Average error, and
- Average absolute error

We calculate the error statistics for each of the following three sets of points by company size/diversification band, separately for reserves and premium:

- All Points - All, excluding monoline companies ( 25 size/diversification segments)
- Exclude the smallest - All, other than the smallest company sizes and monoline companies, i.e., across company size/diversification bands B1-E5 (20

[^26]- Include only the largest/most diversified - The largest, most diversified companies that constitute the bulk of the reserves/premiums and diversification credit, i.e., company size/diversification bands C3-E5 (9 size/diversification segments).
Table 4-1, below, shows that, for reserves, the correlation approach has somewhat lower error statistics. For example, the correlation matrix approach has the lowest error statistic for 8 of the 8 tests $^{56}$, and the lowest error statistic for the 9 -point test that represents the bulk of the reserves, premium and diversification credit. For premium, Table 4-1 shows that the CoMaxLine \% Approach (labeled NAIC) often has somewhat lower error statistics. For example, the CoMaxLine\% Approach has the lowest error statistic for 7 of the 8 tests, and the lowest error statistic for the 9-point test that represents the bulk of the reserves, premium and diversification credit.

Overall, we conclude that the correlation approach does not better represent the data than the CoMaxLine\% Approach.

[^27]Table 4-1
Error Statistics - CoMaxLine\% (NAIC) vs. Correlation Matrix (Correlation) Approaches
Error Measured as \% of Reserves/Premium
Multi-Line Companies Only
[Green Highlight indicates the lower value within each pair of models]

| Standard Deviations |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
| All Points (25 points) | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.040 | 0.038 |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 |


| Average Error |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
| All Points (25 points) | $6.5 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $4.4 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | $1.2 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ | $-0.7 \%$ | $-1.2 \%$ |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | $0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |


| Absolute Average Error |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Reserves |  | Premium |  |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
| All Points (25 points) | $9.7 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ | $7.4 \%$ | $7.7 \%$ |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | $5.3 \%$ | $4.9 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | $2.9 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ | $1.1 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |

Green highlight indicates whether NAIC (CoMaxLine\%) or Correlation Matrix approaches provide the lower error within each group of cells. Data rounded to show differences.
Note - For "Average Error" section, the overall level is set so that the average error equals zero for the largest 9 points.
We express the error statistics as a percentage of reserves/premium. Risk charge\%s are approximately $20 \%$ of reserves/premium, so a $1 \%$ error premium is a $5 \%$ error in the risk charge. Thus $1 \%$ is a small, but not negligible proportion of the risk charge.
Table 4-2, below, shows the same error statistics but for all four of the methods for reserve risk and premium risk. ${ }^{57}$

[^28]Table 4-2
Error Statistics - CoMaxLine\% (NAIC) vs. CoMaxLine\%-Risk Approach
Error Measured as \% of Reserves/Premium
[Green Highlight indicates the lowest value among the four models]

| A. Standard Deviations |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reserves |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | HHI | CoMaxLine \% - Risk | NAIC | Correlation | HHI | CoMaxLine \% - Risk |
| All Points (25 points) | 0.133 | 0.120 | 0.168 | 0.126 | 0.114 | 0.128 | 0.125 | 0.105 |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | 0.067 | 0.063 | 0.050 | 0.066 | 0.040 | 0.038 | 0.037 | 0.031 |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | 0.035 | 0.023 | 0.026 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.021 | 0.014 | 0.010 |


| B. Average Error |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reserves |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | HHI | CoMaxLine \% - Risk | NAIC | Correlation | HHI | CoMaxLine \% - Risk |
| All Points (25 points) | 6.5\% | 5.6\% | 9.6\% | 5.7\% | 4.37\% | 4.43\% | 5.8\% | 3.5\% |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | 1.2\% | 0.8\% | 3.3\% | 1.1\% | -0.7\% | -1.2\% | 0.2\% | -1.4\% |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0\% | 0.0\% |


| C. Absolute Average Error |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reserves |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | HHI | CoMaxLine \% - Risk | NAIC | Correlation | HHI | CoMaxLine $\% \text { - Risk }$ |
| All Points (25 points) | 9.7\% | 8.9\% | 10.5\% | 9.3\% | 7.4\% | 7.8\% | 7.7\% | 6.7\% |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | 5.3\% | 4.9\% | 4.4\% | 5.2\% | 3.0\% | 3.1\% | 2.5\% | 2.6\% |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | 2.9\% | 1.9\% | 2.1\% | 2.3\% | 1.1\% | 1.6\% | 1.1\% | 0.9\% |

Green highlight indicates whether NAIC (CoMaxLine\%), correlation matrix, HHI or CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk approaches provides the lower error within each group of cells. Data rounded to show differences.
Note - For "Average Error" section, the overall level is set so that the average error equals zero for the largest 9 points.
We express the error statistics as a percentage of reserves/premium. Risk charge\%s are approximately $20 \%$ of reserves/premium, so a $1 \%$ error premium is a $5 \%$ error in the risk charge. Thus $1 \%$ is a small, but not negligible proportion of the risk charge.
In this 4-way comparison, we see that:

- The RBC CoMaxLine\% Approach does not have the lowest error statistics for any size group for either premium or reserves; however,
- As we saw in Table 4-1, comparing CoMaxLine\% and correlation matrix approaches, CoMaxLine $\%$ has lower error statistics premium while correlation matrix approach has lower error statistics for reserves.
- CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk has lower error statistics than CoMaxLine $\%$ for both premium and reserves ( 8 of 8 for reserves and 7 of 8 for premium and, in particular, for the two 9-point tests). For premium, CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk has the lowest error statistics across the four approaches.
- The difference between the RBC Approach and the method with the lowest error
statistics is always less than $1.7 \%$ of reserves/premium (therefore less than about $10 \%$ of average UW risk RBC).
LOB Risk Factors that vary by LOB-size
In Appendix 5, we address the extent to which our findings regarding diversification with CoMaxLine\% Approach would be affected if the RBC Formula used risk factors that vary by LOB-size.

This question is motivated, in part, because we observe that LOB-size, company-size and diversification level are inter-related. For example, we observe that larger LOB-sizes indicate risk charge $\%$ s that are lower than the risk charges $\%$ s indicated by smaller LOB-sizes. Therefore, it could be the case higher indicated diversification credits are a proxy for lower LOB risk charge $\%$ s for larger companies.

We test that hypothesis by applying LOB risk charge\%s that vary by LOB-size. We find that the indicated MDC would be different if the risk factors were determined by LOB size, we find that the indicated $\mathrm{MDC} \%$ is greater than $30 \%$ and our conclusion regarding CoMaxLine $\%$ versus correlation matrix remains the same. ${ }^{58}$

## 5. Overall Findings

Thus, we find that:

- The linear relationship between diversification discount and $100 \%$-CoMaxLine $\%$, in the CoMaxLine\% Approach is not perfect, but it is a reasonable approximation, especially close for the most diversified companies.
- A MDC of at least $50 \%$ is better supported by the data than the current $30 \%$ MDC.
- The CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk Approach may be better than the CoMaxLine\% Approach.
- Neither the correlation matrix approach nor the HHI approach represents the data significantly better than the diversification approach in the RBC Formula for both reserve risk and premium risk.


## 6. Future Research

Our analysis uses certain simplifications. The expected risk charge $\%$ s in our analysis do not include the effect of Investment Income Offset (IIO), loss sensitive business, own-company adjustment or growth risk in the expected risk charges. To convert premium risk factors to

[^29]AYUL and AYUL\% we use industry-total expense by LOB, adjusted to the company LOB distribution, rather than company-by-company expenses. Our analysis uses risk data that satisfies the LOB filtering tests, described in DCWP Reports 6 and 7, and therefore does not include Minor Lines data points or other data points removed for LOB risk factor analysis. We do not include the $\mathrm{R}_{3}$-Reinsurance Credit Risk Element of $\mathrm{R}_{4}$. Future research could test the extent to which, if at all, those simplifications affect the indicated MDC or the conclusion regarding the extent to which there is a linear relationship between diversification and CoMaxLine $\%$.

We did not evaluate the HHI-Risk approach, analogous to CoMaxLine\%-Risk, in which HHI is applied to amount of risk rather than amount of reserve/premium. Also, the RBC formula might consider both diversification by LOB and diversification among types of multiline companies, e.g., personal vs. standard commercial vs. specialty. Future research could test the extent to which those approaches better reflect observed diversification patterns.

Future research could evaluate the extent to which there might be improvements to the error statistics we used to compare the alternative diversification formulas.

Our analysis is based on a target safety level of $87.5 \%$. Future research could examine the extent to the conclusions vary if a different safety level were selected.

## 7. Glossary

| Annual Statement | US NAIC Annual Statement |
| :--- | :--- |
| CoMaxLine\% | The NAIC measure of concentration, the percentage of a company's total <br> premium or reserves from its single largest LOB. |
| CoMaxLine\% $\%$ <br> Approach | The NAIC method of determining diversification credit. <br> The diversification credit is (1.0 - CoMaxLine\%) times 30\%. |
| CoMaxLine\%-Risk <br> Approach | CoMaxLine\% Approach based on risk charge value by LOB rather than <br> premium or reserve volume by LOB. |
| Correlation approach | We use that term to characterize methods of combining LOB risk charges to <br> produce an all-lines risk charge using 'correlation factors.' <br> Our use of the term does not imply that the assumptions underlying individual <br> and joint distributions of the parameters are satisfied. |
| Correlation Factor | A factor used to express the relationship between individual risks to produce <br> the risk parameter of interest for the combined risk. <br> Our use of the term does not imply that the assumptions underlying individual <br> and joint distributions of the parameters are satisfied. |
| Correlation Matrix | A matrix array of correlation factors, with one factor for each pair of LOBs. |
| DCWP | Risk-Based Capital Dependency and Calibration Working Party of the Casualty <br> Actuarial Society |
| Initial Reserve | The reserve amount at the Initial Reserve Date for all accident years prior to <br> the Initial Reserve Date. |
| Initial Reserve Date | December 31st for the year specified (i.e., December 31, 2010 is the Initial <br> Reserve Date for the 2010 net loss reserve which includes AY's 2010 and <br> prior) |
| LCF | Loss (Reserve) Concentration Factor as calculated in 2010 RBC Formula. <br> Based on CoMaxLine\% Approach. |
| LOB | Schedule P Lines of Business used in the RBC Formula. Note that three pairs <br> of Schedule P LOBs are combined; occurrence and claims Other Liability <br> (Line H), occurrence and claims made Products Liability (Line R), and <br> Reinsurance: nonproportional property and Reinsurance: nonproportional <br> financial (Lines P and N, respectively). |
| Loss sensitive | An element of the RBC Formula that reduces the risk charge if <br> unfavorable experience can be offset by increases in revenue on loss <br> sensitive business. |
| NAIC | Maximum Diversification Credit, 30\% in the 2010 RBC Formula |
| Own-company <br> adjustment, or <br> $50 / 50 ~ r u l e ~$ | National Association of Insurance Commissioners <br> RBC premium and reserve factors are based $50 \%$ on factors calibrated based <br> on industry data and 50\% based on the industry data adjusted by the ratio of <br> company experience to industry experience. (Subject to certain exceptions.) |


| PCF | Premium Concentration Factor as calculated in 2010 RBC Formula. Based on CoMaxLine\% Approach. |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{R}_{0}$ | Insurance affiliate investment and (non-derivative) off-balance sheet risk. |
| $\mathrm{R}_{1}$ | Asset Risk - Fixed Income Investments |
| $\mathrm{R}_{2}$ | Asset Risk - Equity |
| $\mathrm{R}_{3}$ | Credit risk (non-reinsurance plus one half of Reinsurance Credit Risk) ${ }^{56}$ |
| $\mathrm{R}_{3}$-Reinsurance Credit Risk | See Reinsurance Credit Risk |
| R4 | Reserve risk plus one half of $\mathrm{R}_{3}$-reinsurance credit risk. ${ }^{59}$ This paper uses $\mathrm{R}_{4}$ without $\mathrm{R}_{3}$-reinsurance credit risk. |
| R5 | Premium risk. |
| RBC | Risk-Based Capital |
| RBC Formula or Formula | The 2010 NAIC Property-Casualty RBC Formula |
| RBC UW Risk Value | The Company Action Level amount calculated for the UW risk components of the RBC Formula for a company or DCWP defined group of companies. |
| Reinsurance Credit Risk | An element of $\mathrm{R}_{3}$, representing both credit risks related to reinsurance counterparty and the difference in premium and reserve risk of between companies with varying levels of ceded reinsurance. |
| Reserves or Loss Reserves | Case, bulk and IBNR loss and defense and cost containment expense ${ }^{60}$ reserves net of reinsurance, as shown in Schedule P - Part 2 and 3. |
| Schedule P | A set of exhibits in the Annual Statement that provide most of the risk data used in our analysis. |
| Solvency II | EU regulation and related implementing measures |
| Standard Formula | A formula determining capital requirements under Solvency II, RBC or other regulatory capital systems |
| UW | Underwriting |
| UW risk | Underwriting risk - the combination of premium risk and reserve risk |

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[^30]Work was supported by the DCWP party with 2015-2017 membership as follows:

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# Appendix 1- Indicated Risk Factors and Sample Calculations 

| Appendix 1/Exhibit 1 <br> Indicated PRC\% and RRC\% by LOB |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Line of Business | 2010 PRFs/RRFs |  | Indicated PRFs/RRFs for Dependency Analysis |  |  |  |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | PRF | RRF | PRF | CER | PRC\% | RRF |
| A- Homeowners/Farmowners | 0.937 | 0.201 | 0.956 | 0.301 | 0.257 | 0.225 |
| B- Private Passenger Auto | 0.969 | 0.192 | 0.969 | 0.252 | 0.221 | 0.179 |
| C- Commercial Auto | 0.988 | 0.230 | 0.988 | 0.308 | 0.296 | 0.352 |
| D - Workers Compensation | 1.033 | 0.324 | 1.039 | 0.268 | 0.307 | 0.333 |
| E - Commercial Multi-Peril | 0.921 | 0.465 | 0.879 | 0.355 | 0.234 | 0.488 |
| F1-Med Prof Liab-Occ | 1.822 | 0.431 | 1.458 | 0.280 | 0.738 | 0.306 |
| F2-Med Prof Liab-CM | 1.092 | 0.306 | 1.146 | 0.280 | 0.426 | 0.106 |
| G - Special Liability | 0.904 | 0.257 | 0.947 | 0.344 | 0.291 | 0.455 |
| H - Other Liability | 1.042 | 0.511 | 1.015 | 0.303 | 0.318 | 0.525 |
| I-Special Property | 0.941 | 0.191 | 0.817 | 0.326 | 0.143 | 0.331 |
| J - Auto Physical Damage | 0.843 | 0.112 | 0.828 | 0.252 | 0.080 | 0.194 |
| K - Fidelity/Surety | 0.883 | 0.325 | 0.644 | 0.454 | 0.098 | 0.560 |
| L - Other | 0.893 | 0.172 | 0.923 | 0.358 | 0.281 | 0.274 |
| M - International | 1.169 | 0.327 | 0.899 | 0.400 | 0.299 | 0.508 |
| N\&P - Reinsurance-Prop/Fin | 1.349 | 0.286 | 1.288 | 0.247 | 0.535 | 0.422 |
| O-Reinsurance-Liabiity | 1.507 | 0.769 | 1.302 | 0.247 | 0.549 | 0.650 |
| R - Products Liability | 1.214 | 0.643 | 1.184 | 0.311 | 0.495 | 0.883 |
| S - Financial/Mort Guarantee | 1.482 | 0.200 | 0.725 | 0.285 | 0.010 | 0.560 |
| T - Warranty | 0.883 | 0.325 | 0.879 | 0.359 | 0.238 | 0.488 |

CER = Company Expense Ratio. Equals 2010 industry average underwriting expense ratio by LOB.
F1 and F2 - same expense ratio;
H is average of H 1 and H 2 ; R is average of R 1 and R 2
Same expense ratio for $\mathrm{N} \& \mathrm{P}$ and O

## Risk Data Selection

As described in DCWP Reports 6 and 7, the risk data we use in our calculation of the RRFs/PRFs shown above excludes anomalous values; treats pool company data on a combined basis; excludes Minor Lines data points; and, for premium risk data, excludes companies with less than 5 AYs of NEP. We also exclude the LOB data points for the smallest LOBs, defined as those in the smallest $15^{\text {th }}$ percentile of all LOB-company-year data points, with the $15^{\text {th }}$ percentile determined separately for each AY/Initial Reserve Date.

For premium risk, the data points do not include data for 2001-2010 AYs for companies that did not file a 2010 Annual Statement. For reserve risk, the data points include 2001-2000

Initial Reserve Dates, to the extent such information is in any Annual Statement. The risk data values are the values at the latest available maturity.

To convert premium risk factors to premium risk charge\%s we use 2010 industry-total expense by LOB.

Appendix 1/Exhibit 2
Example of Data Underlying Expected Risk Charge\% and Indicated Risk charge\% Calculation for a Sample Company

Reserve Risk Data

| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Modeled Reserve Risk |  |  | Observed Reserve Experience |  |  |
| Line | Initial <br> Reserve | Modeled Risk Charge \% | Modeled Risk Charge \$ | Observed <br> Reserve <br> Runoff \$ | Observed <br> Reserve <br> Runoff \% | Reserve <br> \% by LOB |
| A | 6,458 | 22.5\% | 1,453 | $(1,733)$ | -26.8\% | 5.2\% |
| B | - | 17.9\% | - | - | - |  |
| C | 25,334 | 35.2\% | 8,918 | $(4,111)$ | -16.2\% | 20.4\% |
| D | 28,643 | 33.3\% | 9,538 | 1,524 | 5.3\% | 23.0\% |
| E | 18,091 | 48.8\% | 8,828 | $(4,623)$ | -25.6\% | 14.6\% |
| F1 | - | 30.6\% | - | - | - |  |
| F2 | - | 10.6\% | - | - | - |  |
| G | - | 45.5\% | - | - | - |  |
| H | 35,596 | 52.5\% | 18,688 | $(9,834)$ | -27.6\% | 28.6\% |
| 1 | - | 33.1\% |  | - | - |  |
| J | - | 19.4\% | - | - | - |  |
| K | - | 56.0\% | - | - | - |  |
| L | - | 27.4\% | - | - | - |  |
| M | - | 50.8\% | - | - | - |  |
| N_P | - | 42.2\% | - | - | - |  |
| 0 | - | 65.0\% | - | - | - |  |
| R | 10,203 | 88.3\% | 9,009 | 4,098 | 40.2\% | 8.2\% |
| S | - | 56.0\% | - | - | - |  |
| T | - | 48.8\% | - | - | - |  |
| Total/Avg | 124,325 | 45.4\% | 56,434 | $(14,679)$ | -11.8\% | 100.0\% |


| Diversification Approach | Diversification Index |
| :--- | :---: |
| 8.CoMaxLine\% | $71.4 \%$ |
| 9.CoMaxLine\%-Risk | $66.9 \%$ |
| 10. HHI | $79.3 \%$ |
| 11. Correlation Matrix | $76.7 \%$ |

These calculations are described below, in Notes to Appendix 1/Exhibit 2.

Notes to Appendix 1/Exhibit 2

| Col/ <br> Row | Notes |
| :---: | :--- |
| Col 1 | Line of Business |
| Col 2 | Data - loss and LAE reserve for the sample company-year-line of business |
| Col 3 | Indicated Reserve Risk Factor shown in Appendix 1/Exhibit 1/Column 6 |
| Col 4 | $(2)$ x (3) |
| Col 5 | Data - company-year-LOB reserve runoff from Initial Reserve Date through <br> the latest available maturity. Negative values indicate favorable runoff. |
| Col 6 | (5)/ (1) - reserve runoff as a percentage of Initial Reserve; |
| Col 7 | LOB Initial Reserve / all line total Initial Reserve <br> $(2) /$ All line total (2) |
| Row 8 | $100 \%$ - Maximum LOB \% from column (7) |
| Row 9 | $100 \%$ - Maximum value in Column 4/Total of Column 4 |
| Row 10 | HHI calculation <br> $100 \%$ - Sum of squares of percentages in column 7 |
| Row 11 | Calculated from correlation matrix in Appendix 3/Exhibit 1 applied to <br> expected risk amounts column 4. |

The all-lines risk information in the Total/Avg row provides a single company-year data point used to calculate expected risk and indicated risk. We use the data in Rows 8-11 to categorize each company by diversification band.

Appendix 1/Exhibit 3
Example of Data Underlying Expected Risk Charge\% and Indicated Risk charge\% Calculation for a Sample Company

Premium Risk Data

| $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ | $(6)$ | $(7)$ | $(8)$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Expected Premium Risk |  | Observed Premium Experience |  |  |  |  |
| Line | Premium | Expected <br> Risk <br> Charge $\%$ | Expected <br> Risk <br> Charge \$ | Observed <br> Loss Ratio | Industry <br> Expense <br> Ratio | Observed <br> AYUL\% | Premium <br> \% by LOB |
| A | 14,903 | $25.7 \%$ | 3,833 | $80.5 \%$ | $30.1 \%$ | $10.6 \%$ | $6.9 \%$ |
| B | 13,679 | $22.1 \%$ | 3,018 | $89.2 \%$ | $25.2 \%$ | $14.4 \%$ | $6.3 \%$ |
| C | 18,591 | $29.6 \%$ | 5,512 | $85.1 \%$ | $30.8 \%$ | $15.9 \%$ | $8.6 \%$ |
| D | 22,324 | $30.7 \%$ | 6,863 | $72.9 \%$ | $26.8 \%$ | $-0.3 \%$ | $10.3 \%$ |
| E | 20,541 | $23.4 \%$ | 4,808 | $101.7 \%$ | $35.5 \%$ | $37.2 \%$ | $9.5 \%$ |
| F1 | - | $73.8 \%$ | - | - | $28.0 \%$ | - | - |
| F2 | - | $42.6 \%$ | - | - | $28.0 \%$ | - | - |
| G | - | $29.1 \%$ | - | - | $34.4 \%$ | - | - |
| H | 24,492 | $31.8 \%$ | 7,800 | $43.1 \%$ | $30.3 \%$ | $-26.6 \%$ | $11.3 \%$ |
| I | 34,772 | $14.3 \%$ | 4,960 | $51.5 \%$ | $32.6 \%$ | $-15.9 \%$ | $16.1 \%$ |
| J | 20,933 | $8.0 \%$ | 1,684 | $84.4 \%$ | $25.2 \%$ | $9.6 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ |
| K | 16,893 | $9.8 \%$ | 1,660 | $11.8 \%$ | $45.4 \%$ | $-42.8 \%$ | $7.8 \%$ |
| L | - | $28.1 \%$ | - | - | $35.8 \%$ | - | - |
| M | - | $29.9 \%$ | - | - | $40.0 \%$ | - | - |
| N_P | 28,979 | $53.5 \%$ | 15,504 | $75.7 \%$ | $24.7 \%$ | $0.4 \%$ | $13.4 \%$ |
| O | - | $54.9 \%$ | - | - | $24.7 \%$ | - | - |
| R | - | $49.5 \%$ | - | - | $31.1 \%$ | - | - |
| S | - | $1.0 \%$ | - | - | $28.5 \%$ | - | - |
| T | - | $23.8 \%$ | - | - | $35.9 \%$ | - | - |
| Total/Avg | 216,107 | $25.7 \%$ | 55,641 | $68.1 \%$ | $30.4 \%$ | $-1.4 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |


| Diversification Approach | Diversification Index |
| :--- | :---: |
| 9. CoMaxLine\% | $83.9 \%$ |
| 10.CoMaxLine\%-Risk | $72.1 \%$ |
| 11. HHI | $89.2 \%$ |
| 12. Correlation Matrix Diversification | $64.8 \%$ |

These calculations are described below, in Notes to Appendix 1/Exhibit 3.

DCWP Report 14: RBC - Calibration of LOB Diversification in UW Risk Charges
Notes to Appendix 1/Exhibit 3

| Col/ <br> Row | Notes |
| :---: | :--- |
| Col 1 | Line of Business |
| Col 2 | Data - Net earned premium for the sample company-year-line of business |
| Col 3 | Indicated Premium Risk Charge shown in Appendix 1/Exhibit 1/Column 5 |
| Col 4 | $(2)$ x (3) |
| Col 5 | Data - Loss and LAE ratio at the latest available maturity |
| Col 6 | Data - 2010 industry expense ratio. Used as a proxy for company expense <br> ratios as these are not readily available for each year in the experience period. |
| Col 7 | $(5)+(6)-100 \%$ |
| Col 8 | Line of Business Premium/ all line total Premium; <br> $(2) /$ All line total (2) |
| Row 9 | $100 \%$ - Maximum LOB \% from column 8 |
| Row 10 | $100 \%$ - Maximum value in Column 4/ Total of column 4 |
| Row 11 | HHI calculation <br> $100 \%$ - Sum of squares of percentages in column 8 |
| Row 12 | Calculated from correlation matrix in Appendix 3/Exhibit 1 applied to <br> expected risk amounts in column 4. |

The all-lines risk information in the Total/Avg row provides a single company-year data point used to calculate expected risk and indicated risk. We use the data in Rows 9-12 to categorize each company by diversification band.

## Appendix 2 - LOB Risk Charge\%s Vary with Degree of Diversification of The Company.

In individual company capital modeling, diversification credit arises because the risk ${ }^{61}$ associated with the combined LOB $(1+2)$ business is generally less than the sum of LOB 1 risk and LOB 2 risk. The magnitude reduction depends on the extent to which the two LOBs risk characteristics are correlated. Using the correlation relationship (and some statistical assumptions) allows the determination of the $\mathrm{LOB}(1+2)$ risk from the separate LOB1 and LOB2 risk. This framework requires that the LOB risk charge $\%$ s are independent of the degree of diversification of the company.

In calibrating a Standard Formula, on the other hand, the LOB1 risk charge is based on data for all levels of company diversification combined, i.e., \{LOB1 | all diversification levels $\}$. This $\{$ LOB1|all diversification levels $\}$ may not have the same as risk as \{LOB1|monoline company\} or \{LOB1|given that the company writes some of LOB2 and perhaps other LOBs $\}$. Similarly, $\{$ LOB2|all diversification levels\} may not have the same risk as $\{$ LOB2|monoline Company\} and $\{\mathrm{LOB} 2 \mid$ given the companies writes some LOB1 and perhaps other LOBs $\}$.

Therefore, the risk for LOB (1+2) (at specific diversification levels) would not necessarily follow from $\{$ LOB1 $\mid$ all diversification levels $\}$ and $\{\mathrm{LOB} 2 \mid$ all diversification levels $\}$. In fact, our review of the Risk Data we find that there are variations in LOB risk charge\%s with the degree of diversification of the company. For some LOBs, for example, for the personal automobile liability LOB, monoline companies ${ }^{62}$ have higher PPA LOB risk charge $\%$ s than diversified companies. That might follow from reduced geographic risk diversification in monoline companies, or other features of those companies. For other LOBs, e.g., monoline MPL, monoline companies have lower LOB risk charge\%s than diversified companies. That might follow from benefits of specialization, the type of policies, e.g., primary vs. excess or physicians vs. hospitals, or other factors.

Regardless of the underlying causes, Appendix 2/Exhibits 1A and 1B, below, show that LOB risk charge $\%$ s vary with diversification level of the company. For more than half of the 32 LOBs ( 16 for each of premium and reserve risk), the indicated PRF/RRF at zero

[^31]diversification is either the highest of the six values for that LOB or the lowest of the six values for that LOB. If the distribution of risk charge\%s by diversification level were random, we would expect that the zero-diversification band would be the highest or lowest, on average, for about $1 / 3$ of the LOBs. To have that be the case for 19 or more of the 32 LOBs has a probability of less than $1 \%$. This effect is much stronger for reserves than form premium. ${ }^{63}$
Indicated RRFs - Variation in LOB Risk Charge\% with Variation in Company
Diversification

| Indicated RRF by Diversification Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Diversification Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOB | $\mathbf{0}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | all | $\mathbf{0}$ vs. rest |  |  |
| A | 0.35 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.22 | Highest |  |  |
| B | 0.30 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.18 | Highest |  |  |
| C | 0.57 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.28 | 0.35 | Highest |  |  |
| $\mathbf{D}$ | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.31 | 0.33 |  |  |  |
| E | 0.54 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.43 | 0.49 |  |  |  |
| F1 | 0.09 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.40 | 0.87 | 0.31 | Lowest |  |  |
| F2 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.37 | 0.11 | Lowest |  |  |
| G | 0.39 | 0.08 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 0.31 | 0.63 | 0.45 |  |  |  |
| H | 0.29 | 0.85 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.55 | 0.54 | 0.53 | Lowest |  |  |
| $\mathbf{I}$ | 0.12 | 0.59 | 0.43 | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.33 | Lowest |  |  |
| J | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.06 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.19 | Lowest |  |  |
| K | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.74 | 1.28 | 0.64 | 0.50 | 0.56 | Lowest |  |  |
| L | 0.11 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 0.73 | 0.21 | 0.34 | 0.27 | Lowest |  |  |
| N\&P | 0.17 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.48 | 0.42 | Lowest |  |  |
| $\mathbf{O}$ | 0.66 | 0.43 | 0.58 | 0.59 | 0.68 | 0.76 | 0.65 |  |  |  |
| R | 0.56 | 1.48 | 0.49 | 1.05 | 0.67 | 0.82 | 0.88 |  |  |  |
| Average | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.38 | 0.37 | Lowest |  |  |

[^32]DCWP Report 14: RBC - Calibration of LOB Diversification in UW Risk Charges

## Appendix 2/Exhibit 1B

Indicated PRFs - Variation in LOB Risk Charge \% with Variation in Company
Diversification

| Indicated PRF by Diversification Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diversification Band |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOB | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | all | 0 vs. rest |
| A | 1.04 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.96 | Highest |
| B | 1.01 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.97 | Highest |
| C | 0.97 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 0.99 |  |
| D | 1.04 | 0.98 | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.11 | 1.00 | 1.04 |  |
| E | 0.87 | 0.95 | 0.84 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.88 |  |
| F1 | 1.37 | 1.49 | 1.37 | 1.45 | 1.39 | 1.19 | 1.46 |  |
| F2 | 1.07 | 1.19 | 1.22 | 1.26 | 1.36 | 1.24 | 1.15 | Lowest |
| G | 0.99 | 0.81 | 0.92 | 1.03 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.95 |  |
| H | 1.02 | 1.01 | 0.97 | 1.05 | 1.03 | 1.00 | 1.02 |  |
| 1 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.79 | 0.81 | 0.80 | 0.84 | 0.82 |  |
| J | 0.82 | 0.78 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.83 |  |
| K | 0.41 | 0.69 | 0.78 | 0.75 | 0.86 | 0.70 | 0.64 | Lowest |
| L | 0.85 | 0.93 | 0.86 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.98 | 0.92 | Lowest |
| N\&P | 1.14 | 1.16 | 1.37 | 1.14 | 1.36 | 1.25 | 1.29 | Lowest |
| 0 | 0.96 | 1.50 | 1.19 | 1.34 | 1.15 | 1.33 | 1.30 | Lowest |
| R | 1.93 | 1.56 | 1.41 | 1.05 | 1.14 | 1.11 | 1.18 |  |
| Average | 0.96 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.95 | 0.96 |  |

To further test the statistical significance of the pattern by LOB, including the extent to which zero diversification indicated risk factors are the highest or lowest, we construct standardized differences ${ }^{64}$ between each value and mean for the LOB across all diversification bands. Appendix 2-Exhibits 2A, 2B, and 3, below, show those standardized differences.

## Appendix 2/Exhibit 2A <br> Indicated RRFs - Standardized Variation in LOB Risk Charge\% with Variation in Company-diversification

| Standard Normal Difference <br> LOB RRF by Diversification Band vs. LOB RRF for all Div Bands |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Diversification Band |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOB | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| A | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.5 |
| B | 2.0 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.6 | 0.8 | -0.8 |
| C | 2.3 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.5 | -0.8 |
| D | -0.2 | -1.8 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | -0.4 |
| E | 0.7 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.7 |
| F1 | -0.9 | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.4 | 0.4 | 2.3 |
| F2 | -0.6 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 2.4 |
| G | -0.4 | -2.2 | -0.5 | 0.3 | -0.9 | 1.0 |
| H | -1.5 | 2.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| 1 | -1.5 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.2 |
| J | -1.9 | -0.3 | -0.3 | -1.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 |
| K | -0.7 | -0.5 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 0.3 | -0.2 |
| L | -0.8 | -0.1 | 1.0 | 2.3 | -0.3 | 0.3 |
| N\&P | -2.3 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| 0 | 0.1 | -2.1 | -0.6 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 1.1 |
| R | -0.9 | 1.8 | -1.2 | 0.5 | -0.6 | -0.2 |
| Average | -1.2 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 0.5 |
| Avg Absolute value | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.8 |

[^33]DCWP Report 14: RBC - Calibration of LOB Diversification in UW Risk Charges
Appendix 2/Exhibit 2B
Indicated PRFs - Standardized Variation in LOB Risk Charge\% with Variation in Company-diversification

| Standard Normal Difference <br> LOB PRF by Diversification Band vs. LOB RRF for all Div Bands |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Diversification Band |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOB | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| A | 1.7 | -1.2 | -1.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| B | 2.1 | -0.9 | -0.9 | 0.6 | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| C | -1.0 | 0.0 | -0.6 | 1.1 | 1.5 | -1.0 |
| D | 0.0 | -1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.4 | -0.8 |
| E | -0.2 | 2.2 | -1.1 | 0.0 | -0.3 | 0.0 |
| F1 | -1.0 | 0.4 | -1.0 | -0.1 | -0.7 | -2.8 |
| F2 | -0.9 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.1 |
| G | 0.6 | -2.0 | -0.4 | 1.2 | -0.4 | -0.1 |
| H | 0.2 | -0.1 | -1.9 | 1.3 | 0.6 | -0.4 |
| 1 | 0.0 | -0.4 | -2.0 | -0.2 | -0.9 | 1.3 |
| J | -0.5 | -2.2 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | -0.4 |
| K | -1.7 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 0.4 |
| L | -1.5 | 0.2 | -1.5 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 1.3 |
| N\&P | -1.5 | -1.3 | 0.8 | -1.5 | 0.7 | -0.4 |
| 0 | -2.0 | 1.1 | -0.7 | 0.2 | -0.9 | 0.1 |
| R | 2.4 | 1.2 | 0.7 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -0.2 |
| Total | 0.5 | -1.4 | -0.9 | 1.4 | 0.9 | -0.4 |
| Avg Absolute value | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 |

Appendix 2/Exhibit 3, below, shows the premium/reserve weighted averages of the absolute values of the standardized differences between each level of diversification and the all-diversification risk charges. At diversification band 0 , the PRFs/RRFs, on average, are 1.1 or 1.2 standard deviations, respectively, either above or below the mean. At diversification band 5 the PRFs/RRFs are closer to the mean, 0.7 or 0.8 standard deviations, respectively. Thus, there appears to be trends towards different LOB risk charge\%s in companies with different levels of diversification.

The patterns in Appendix 2/Exhibit 3 might be the result of random effects, of course. Nonetheless, the data contributing to that pattern contribute to the observations that the indicated diversification credit does not increase smoothly with higher diversification, particularly at the lower levels of diversification (bands 0-2)

Appendix 2/Exhibit 3
Variation in Indicated LOB Risk Charge\% with Variation in Company-diversification

| Standardized Normal Difference <br> Average of Absolute Values |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| Diversification <br> Band | Reserves | Premium |
| 0 | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| 2 | 0.6 | 1.0 |
| 3 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| 4 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| 5 | 0.8 | 0.7 |

## Appendix 3-Construction of Correlation Matrix for Diversification Testing

To apply the correlation approach, we construct a set of pairwise correlation factors, called a correlation matrix. In Solvency II correlation matrix, the factors were not calibrated from analysis of data. Rather, the factors represent an expert judgment on whether the LOB pairwise correlation is lower ( 0.25 ) or higher ( 0.50 ).

In the Solvency II $4^{\text {th }}$ Quantitative Impact Analysis (QIS4) analysis, the factors were sensitivity tested with additional analysis assuming a minus or plus 25 percentage points adjustment to each "non-diagonal" value. These changes resulted in capital requirements that were $25 \%$ lower and $21 \%$ higher (respectively) than the proposed QIS4 factors. After this sensitivity analysis was completed, the selected factors were maintained at the QIS3 level, "translating the broad support there is around these parameters and the lack of more evidence for changing the correlations". ${ }^{65}$ Thus, the overall level represents an expert judgment much like the $30 \%$ MDC in the RBC Formula.

Appendix 3/Exhibit 1 shows the Solvency II correlation matrix for the 12 Solvency nonlife LOBs. ${ }^{66}$ Appendix 3/Exhibit 2 provides the LOB definitions.

Following the Solvency II approach, ${ }^{67}$ we construct the correlation matrix using values of $25 \%$ or $50 \%$ for most of the 171 LOB-pairs. For a few LOB-pairs that we consider very highly correlated we select correlation factors of $75 \%$ or $100 \% .{ }^{68}$ Appendix 3/Exhibit 2 shows the correlation matrix that we use to test the diversification relationship.

[^34]
## Appendix 3/Exhibit 1

Solvency II Standard Formula Correlation Matrix_for Premium and Reserves

| LOB/LOB | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 100\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 2 | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 3 | 50\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% |
| 4 | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% |
| 5 | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 6 | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 100\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 7 | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 8 | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% |
| 9 | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% |
| 10 | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 11 | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% |
| 12 | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% |

Solvency II LOBs ${ }^{69}$

| 1 | Motor vehicle liability | 7 | Legal expenses |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | :--- |
| 2 | Other motor | 8 | Assistance |
| 3 | Marine, aviation and <br> transport | 9 | Miscellaneous financial loss |
| 4 | Fire and other damage to <br> property | 10 | NP casualty reinsurance |
| 5 | General liability | 11 | NP marine, aviation and <br> transport reinsurance |
| 6 | Credit and suretyship | 12 | NP property reinsurance |

Direct LOBs include proportional reinsurance of the same type.
NP = Non-proportional

[^35]
## DCWP Report 14: RBC - Calibration of LOB Diversification in UW Risk Charges

Appendix 3/Exhibit 2
Selected DCWP Correlation Matrix - Applied by the DCWP to US NAIC LOBs for this Study

| LOB | HO | PPA | CA | WC | CMP | M-Occ | M-CM | SL | OL | SP | Ohy | Fid | Other | IntI | Re Prop | Re Liab | Prod | FG | Warrnty |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HO | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 75\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| PPA | 25\% | 100\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 75\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| CA | 25\% | 50\% | 100\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 75\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| WC | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| CMP | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| M-Occ | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 100\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| M-CM | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 100\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| SL | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 100\% | 75\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| OL | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 75\% | 100\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| SP | 75\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Phy | 50\% | 75\% | 75\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Fid | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Other | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| IntI | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Re Prop | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Re Liab | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 50\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Prod | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 25\% | 50\% | 50\% | 50\% | 100\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 50\% | 100\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| FG | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% | 25\% |
| Warrnty | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 100\% |

Note: Off diagonal values other than $25 \%, 50 \%$ are in bold.
LOB Definitions

| LOB | Abbreviation | LOB | Abbreviation | LOB |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Homeowners/Farmowners | HO | Special Liab | SL | International |  |
| Priv. Passenger Auto | PPA | Other Liab-Occ and CM | OL | Reinsurance-Fin and Prop |  |
| Commercial Auto | CA | Spec Property | Re Prop |  |  |
| Workers Compensation | WC | Auto Physical Damage | Phy | Reinsurance-Liab |  |
| Commercial Multi-peril | CMP | Fidelity \& Surety | Froducts Liability-Occ and CM | Prod |  |
| Medical Prof Liab - Occ | P-Occ | Other | Other | Fid | Warranty |
| Medical Prof Liab - CM | M-CM |  |  | FG |  |

## Appendix 4 - Diversification Based on Correlation Matrix Approach

In Appendix 4/Exhibits 1 and 2, we compare how well diversification formulas for CoMaxLine $\%$ and correlation matrix approach fit the experience by company size and diversification level, for reserves and premium respectively.

Part 1 of these exhibits shows the expected risk charge\%s, before diversification. These are the unweighted averages of the expected risk charge\%s, for each company-year in the size/diversification bands, before application of diversification. For the CoMaxLine $\%$ section the values are the same as the values in Table 3-16. For the correlation matrix approach, the values are very similar to the values in Table 3-16. This should be the case, as the values are calculated before any diversification effect. Therefore, the values differ only to the extent that the diversification band under CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach is different from the diversification band under the correlation matrix approach.

Part 2 of these exhibits shows the indicated risk charge $\%$ s. These values are the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile RRR and the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile AYUL\% for all company-years in the size/diversification cell. For the CoMaxLine $\%$ column, the values are the same as the values in Table 3-15. For the correlation matrix approach, the values are very similar to the values in Table 3-15. This is the case because the values differ only to the extent that the diversification band under CoMaxLine\% Approach is different from the diversification band under the correlation matrix approach.

Part 3 of these exhibits shows the current average diversification credit.
Using Parts 1, 2 and 3, we calculate the factor that, when applied to the current average diversification credit, minimizes the difference between actual experience (Part 2) and expected experience [Part $1^{*}(1$-Part 3)] for company size/diversification bands C3.E5. We determine that factor through an iterative process. We manually "goal seek' to produce the adjustment to the Part 3 diversification credit that minimizes the sum of the differences between (a) Part 2 values and (b) the values of $\left[\right.$ Part $1^{*}(1$-Part 3$) *$ test adjustment to the average diversification credit], for the cells in section C3.E5. In the first line below Part 2, we show the increase/decrease in diversification credit that is necessary to achieve the target diversification credit, e.g., $+120 \%$ for CoMaxLine $\%$, or an MDC of $66 \%$, $(1+1.2) \times 30 \% .^{70,71}$

Part 4 equals Part 1 times the adjusted average diversification credit.
Part 5 shows the differences between indicated risk charge\%s (Part 2) and expected risk charge $\%$ s at the target diversification level (Part 4).

[^36]
## Appendix 4/Exhibit 1 - Reserves

Diversification Analysis by LOB-size/Diversification (5x6 analysis)
Calculation of Normalized Variability with Array by Method

| CoMaxLine\%/Single Factor Risk Charge |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Expected Risk - No diversification Credit-Part 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 34\% | 34\% | 33\% | 31\% | 31\% |
| 1 | 28\% | 28\% | 31\% | 33\% | 29\% |
| 2 | 31\% | 31\% | 31\% | 32\% | 31\% |
| 3 | 32\% | 32\% | 34\% | 33\% | 38\% |
| 4 | 34\% | 33\% | 37\% | 37\% | 40\% |
| 5 | 36\% | 36\% | 37\% | 36\% | 38\% |
| All Ex 0 | 31\% | 32\% | 34\% | 34\% | 36\% |


| Correlation/Single Factor Risk Charge |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diversif. <br> Band Quintiles | Expected Risk - No diversification Credit-Part 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 34\% | 34\% | 33\% | 30\% | 29\% |
| 1 | 29\% | 31\% | 34\% | 39\% | 39\% |
| 2 | 32\% | 33\% | 35\% | 36\% | 36\% |
| 3 | 32\% | 33\% | 35\% | 35\% | 38\% |
| 4 | 32\% | 31\% | 34\% | 35\% | 38\% |
| 5 | $34 \%$ | 30\% | 32\% | 32\% | 36\% |
| All Ex 0 | 31\% | 32\% | 34\% | 35\% | 37\% |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Indicated Risk - Part 2 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 63\% | 38\% | 25\% | 21\% | 18\% |
| 1 | 53\% | 34\% | 27\% | 30\% | 15\% |
| 2 | 54\% | 35\% | 30\% | 29\% | 17\% |
| 3 | 75\% | 39\% | 27\% | 22\% | 25\% |
| 4 | 45\% | 36\% | 32\% | 22\% | 29\% |
| 5 | 37\% | 30\% | 24\% | 24\% | 26\% |
| All Ex 0 | 55\% | 35\% | 28\% | 25\% | 24\% |
| Calibration to Target Diversification Level |  |  |  |  | 120.0\% |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Current Average Diversification- Part 3 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| 1 | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| 2 | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| 3 | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 10\% | 9\% |
| 4 | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% |
| 5 | 17\% | 17\% | 18\% | 18\% | 19\% |
| All Ex 0 | 8\% | 8\% | 9\% | 10\% | 11\% |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Indicated Risk - Part 2 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 63\% | 39\% | 26\% | 22\% | 16\% |
| 1 | 50\% | 34\% | 28\% | 31\% | 24\% |
| 2 | 65\% | 39\% | 36\% | 32\% | 22\% |
| 3 | 62\% | 30\% | 26\% | 29\% | 30\% |
| 4 | 35\% | 34\% | 25\% | 22\% | 26\% |
| 5 | 38\% | 30\% | 24\% | 16\% | 23\% |
| All Ex 0 | 54\% | 35\% | 28\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| Calibration to Target Diversification Level |  |  |  |  | 50.0\% |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Current Average Diversification- Part 3 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| 1 | 3\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| 2 | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% |
| 3 | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% | 14\% |
| 4 | 20\% | 20\% | 20\% | 19\% | 20\% |
| 5 | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 26\% | 26\% |
| All Ex 0 | 10\% | 11\% | 13\% | 15\% | 17\% |


| Diversif. <br> Band | Expected Risk With Target Div Level- Part 4 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | A |  |  |  |  |
|  | B | C | D | E |  |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | $34 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | $27 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $28 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | $27 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $27 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | $25 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $30 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $28 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | $22 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $23 \%$ |
| All Ex 0 | $26 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $27 \%$ |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Expected Risk With Target Div Level- Part 4 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 34\% | 34\% | 33\% | 30\% | 29\% |
| 1 | 28\% | 30\% | 33\% | 38\% | 38\% |
| 2 | 28\% | 29\% | 31\% | 31\% | 31\% |
| 3 | 26\% | 26\% | 27\% | 27\% | 30\% |
| 4 | 23\% | 22\% | 24\% | 25\% | 27\% |
| 5 | 21\% | 19\% | 20\% | 19\% | 22\% |
| All Ex 0 | 26\% | 26\% | 27\% | 27\% | 28\% |


| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Actual vs. Expected - Part 5 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 29\% | 4\% | -8\% | -10\% | -13\% |
| 1 | 27\% | 6\% | -3\% | -2\% | -13\% |
| 2 | 27\% | 8\% | 2\% | 0\% | -10\% |
| 3 | 50\% | 14\% | 0\% | -4\% | -5\% |
| 4 | 21\% | 13\% | 6\% | -3\% | 0\% |
| 5 | 14\% | 8\% | 2\% | 2\% | 3\% |
| All Ex 0 | 29\% | 9\% | 1\% | -2\% | -3\% |


| Diversif. <br> Band Quintiles | Actual vs. Expected - Part 5 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 29\% | 6\% | -7\% | -9\% | -13\% |
| 1 | 23\% | 4\% | -4\% | -7\% | -13\% |
| 2 | 37\% | 10\% | 6\% | 0\% | -9\% |
| 3 | 36\% | 4\% | -1\% | 2\% | 0\% |
| 4 | 12\% | 12\% | 1\% | -3\% | -1\% |
| 5 | 16\% | 11\% | 4\% | -4\% | 1\% |
| All Ex 0 | 27\% | 8\% | 0\% | -2\% | -3\% |

## Appendix 4/Exhibit 2 - Premium

Diversification Analysis by LOB-size/Diversification (5x6 analysis)
Calculation of Normalized Variability with Array by Method

| CoMaxLine\%/Single Factor Risk Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Expected Risk - No diversification Credit-Part 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A |  |  |  |  |  | B | C | D | E |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | $28 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $30 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | $26 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $31 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | $26 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $26 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $25 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Ex 0 | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Correlation/Single Factor Risk Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Expected Risk - No diversification Credit-Part 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | A |  |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{B}$ | C | D | E |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | $28 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $35 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | $23 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $21 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $25 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Ex 0 | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Indicated Risk Charge - Part 2 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 56\% | 29\% | 26\% | 27\% | 37\% |
| 1 | 45\% | 21\% | 25\% | 22\% | 39\% |
| 2 | 42\% | 19\% | 15\% | 16\% | 15\% |
| 3 | 44\% | 21\% | 17\% | 18\% | 17\% |
| 4 | 33\% | 14\% | 18\% | 18\% | 16\% |
| 5 | 56\% | 22\% | 15\% | 16\% | 15\% |
| All Ex 0 | 44\% | 19\% | 18\% | 18\% | 17\% |
| Calibration to Target Diversification Level $75.0 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Indicated Risk Charge - Part 2 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 57\% | 30\% | 28\% | 29\% | 46\% |
| 1 | 62\% | 17\% | 18\% | 17\% | 13\% |
| 2 | 35\% | 18\% | 18\% | 15\% | 18\% |
| 3 | 33\% | 18\% | 18\% | 18\% | 14\% |
| 4 | 51\% | 18\% | 15\% | 17\% | 16\% |
| 5 | 48\% | 25\% | 18\% | 17\% | 15\% |
| All Ex 0 | 43\% | 19\% | 17\% | 17\% | 15\% |

Calibration to Target Diversification Level

| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Current Average Diversification-Part 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A |  |  |  |  |  | B | C | D | E |
|  | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $\mathbf{1 6} \%$ | $\mathbf{1 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 \%}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $21 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 2} \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | $28 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 8} \%$ | $\mathbf{2 8} \%$ | $\mathbf{2 9 \%}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Ex 0 | $10 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $21 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Modeled Risk With Target Div Level - Part 4 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 28\% | 29\% | 29\% | 31\% | 30\% |
| 1 | 24\% | 25\% | 25\% | 29\% | 29\% |
| 2 | 22\% | 21\% | 20\% | 20\% | 22\% |
| 3 | 18\% | 19\% | 18\% | 18\% | 19\% |
| 4 | 16\% | 17\% | 17\% | 17\% | 17\% |
| 5 | 16\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% |
| All Ex 0 | 21\% | 20\% | 19\% | 19\% | 18\% |


| Diversif. <br> Band <br> Quintiles | Modeled Risk With Target Div Level - Part 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A |  |  |  |  |  | B | C | D | E |
|  | $28 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $35 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | $22 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $20 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | $21 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $21 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | $20 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $18 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $18 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Ex 0 | $20 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $17 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Actual vs. Expected - Part 5 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 28\% | 0\% | -3\% | -4\% | 7\% |
| 1 | 20\% | -5\% | 0\% | -7\% | 9\% |
| 2 | 21\% | -2\% | -5\% | -4\% | -7\% |
| 3 | 26\% | 2\% | -1\% | 0\% | -3\% |
| 4 | 17\% | -3\% | 2\% | 1\% | -1\% |
| 5 | 40\% | 7\% | 1\% | 2\% | 0\% |
| All Ex 0 | 23\% | -1\% | -1\% | -2\% | -2\% |


| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Diversif. } \\ & \text { Band } \\ & \text { Quintiles } \end{aligned}$ | Actual vs. Expected - Part 5 |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quinitiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | 29\% | 0\% | -3\% | -5\% | 11\% |
| 1 | 40\% | -5\% | -4\% | -5\% | -6\% |
| 2 | 14\% | -2\% | -3\% | -6\% | -3\% |
| 3 | 13\% | -2\% | -1\% | 0\% | -4\% |
| 4 | 33\% | 1\% | -1\% | 1\% | -1\% |
| 5 | 34\% | 11\% | 4\% | 2\% | 0\% |
| All Ex 0 | 23\% | -1\% | -1\% | -1\% | -2\% |

## Appendix 5- Diversification Analysis - Results using Risk Factors by LOBSize

In this section, we address the extent to which our findings regarding diversification with CoMaxLine\% Approach would be affected if the RBC Formula used risk factors that vary by LOBsize.

This question is motivated, in part, because we observe that LOB-size, company-size and diversification level are inter-related. For example, we observe that larger LOB-sizes indicate risk charge $\%$ s that are lower than the risk charges $\%$ s indicated by smaller LOB-sizes. Therefore, it could be the case higher indicated diversification credits are a proxy for lower LOB risk charge $\%$ s for larger companies.

To analyze that question, we first use the risk data to construct reserve and premium risk factors that vary by LOB-size. ${ }^{72}$ Appendix 5/Exhibit 1, below, shows those risk factors.

[^37]Appendix 5/Exhibit 1
Indicated PRC\% and RRC\% by LOB-size

| Premium Risk Charge = PRF + CER - 100\% by LOB-Size |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Line of Business | 0\%-15\% | 15\%-25\% | 25\%-35\% | 35\%-45\% | 45\%-55\% | 55\%-65\% | 65\%-75\% | 75\%-85\% | 85\%-95\% | 95\%-100\% |
| A- Homeowners/Farmowne, | 58.8\% | 32.4\% | 28.6\% | 26.5\% | 24.1\% | 21.5\% | 25.9\% | 24.0\% | 22.9\% | 24.8\% |
| B- Private Passenger Auto | 49.6\% | 27.1\% | 25.5\% | 26.5\% | 22.3\% | 22.3\% | 21.4\% | 21.2\% | 17.1\% | 14.7\% |
| C- Commercial Auto | 56.9\% | 37.9\% | 31.7\% | 30.3\% | 29.7\% | 28.1\% | 29.7\% | 28.1\% | 25.2\% | 24.6\% |
| D - Workers Compensation | 58.3\% | 49.0\% | 37.2\% | 34.8\% | 28.8\% | 24.5\% | 22.2\% | 22.4\% | 28.5\% | 37.9\% |
| E - Commercial Multi-Peril | 44.8\% | 23.1\% | 23.1\% | 23.7\% | 25.4\% | 24.2\% | 22.2\% | 21.0\% | 23.5\% | 25.5\% |
| F1 - Med Prof Liab-Occ | 171.5\% | 84.1\% | 54.5\% | 72.1\% | 54.1\% | 71.1\% | 97.6\% | 71.0\% | 66.0\% | 71.7\% |
| F2-Med Prof Liab-CM | 104.0\% | 28.5\% | 43.5\% | 34.2\% | 31.7\% | 45.6\% | 52.1\% | 37.9\% | 49.5\% | 45.6\% |
| G - Special Liability | 57.6\% | 45.8\% | 28.9\% | 34.5\% | 38.5\% | 21.4\% | 30.9\% | 28.7\% | 19.2\% | 4.4\% |
| H - Other Liability | 68.6\% | 32.7\% | 38.2\% | 37.6\% | 32.8\% | 31.7\% | 28.8\% | 32.6\% | 26.5\% | 28.4\% |
| I-Special Property | 32.6\% | 9.5\% | 9.6\% | 12.5\% | 9.9\% | 15.4\% | 14.6\% | 18.4\% | 16.1\% | 18.2\% |
| J - Auto Physical Damage | 29.1\% | 13.1\% | 9.7\% | 9.4\% | 8.7\% | 7.2\% | 10.0\% | 6.6\% | 4.4\% | 4.2\% |
| K - Fidelity/Surety | 43.1\% | 13.7\% | 8.8\% | 21.1\% | 11.9\% | 1.3\% | 7.6\% | 1.0\% | 10.2\% | 1.0\% |
| L - Other | 44.9\% | 27.0\% | 23.6\% | 19.1\% | 27.6\% | 31.0\% | 29.6\% | 15.3\% | 33.3\% | 27.1\% |
| M - International | 46.8\% | 25.1\% | 25.1\% | 25.7\% | 27.4\% | 26.2\% | 24.2\% | 23.0\% | 25.5\% | 27.5\% |
| N\&P - Reinsurance-Prop/Fin | 109.6\% | 53.0\% | 85.1\% | 55.3\% | 40.0\% | 65.9\% | 43.8\% | 47.0\% | 32.7\% | 26.4\% |
| O-Reinsurance-Liabiity | 95.7\% | 68.4\% | 42.2\% | 53.5\% | 51.9\% | 58.3\% | 54.1\% | 42.1\% | 61.8\% | 28.6\% |
| R - Products Liability | 72.7\% | 14.1\% | 80.8\% | 23.9\% | 81.8\% | 46.9\% | 131.9\% | 45.5\% | 39.8\% | 34.4\% |
| S - Financial/Mort Guarante | 43.1\% | 13.7\% | 8.8\% | 21.1\% | 11.9\% | 1.3\% | 7.6\% | 1.0\% | 10.2\% | 1.0\% |
| T - Warranty | 44.8\% | 23.1\% | 23.1\% | 23.7\% | 25.4\% | 24.2\% | 22.2\% | 21.0\% | 23.5\% | 25.5\% |


| Reserve Risk Charge = RRF by LOB-Size |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Line of Business | 0\%-15\% | 15\%-25\% | 25\%-35\% | 35\%-45\% | 45\%-55\% | 55\%-65\% | 65\%-75\% | 75\%-85\% | 85\%-95\% | 95\%-100\% |
| A- Homeowners/Farmowne, | 83.3\% | 41.1\% | 33.6\% | 28.8\% | 27.7\% | 27.5\% | 14.1\% | 8.3\% | 12.2\% | 10.4\% |
| B-Private Passenger Auto | 79.4\% | 41.0\% | 31.3\% | 26.0\% | 19.3\% | 13.5\% | 15.7\% | 8.7\% | 5.2\% | 8.0\% |
| C- Commercial Auto | 126.5\% | 69.8\% | 44.9\% | 39.4\% | 35.3\% | 32.4\% | 26.0\% | 34.0\% | 23.1\% | 13.1\% |
| D - Workers Compensation | 69.5\% | 36.4\% | 49.1\% | 41.7\% | 44.6\% | 29.1\% | 30.7\% | 24.0\% | 22.8\% | 27.3\% |
| E - Commercial Multi-Peril | 134.9\% | 76.4\% | 57.1\% | 52.4\% | 58.1\% | 54.2\% | 41.1\% | 32.9\% | 41.2\% | 31.5\% |
| F1-Med Prof Liab-Occ | 195.2\% | 67.8\% | 32.8\% | 31.4\% | 17.4\% | 58.4\% | 40.2\% | 12.2\% | 7.6\% | 7.1\% |
| F2-Med Prof Liab-CM | 67.2\% | 20.1\% | 21.0\% | 14.8\% | 12.6\% | 12.0\% | 10.6\% | 1.0\% | 1.0\% | 1.0\% |
| G - Special Liability | 172.6\% | 18.4\% | 78.9\% | 119.6\% | 39.4\% | 36.0\% | 35.3\% | 31.8\% | 29.5\% | 6.0\% |
| H - Other Liability | 155.8\% | 81.0\% | 61.5\% | 44.8\% | 37.6\% | 35.4\% | 36.6\% | 55.2\% | 71.3\% | 67.2\% |
| I-Special Property | 120.0\% | 45.3\% | 35.2\% | 29.1\% | 27.0\% | 25.9\% | 26.1\% | 34.1\% | 36.4\% | 43.4\% |
| J - Auto Physical Damage | 62.8\% | 44.6\% | 19.4\% | 15.8\% | 27.1\% | 15.0\% | 9.4\% | 10.3\% | 24.9\% | 9.2\% |
| K - Fidelity/Surety | 188.9\% | 43.7\% | 103.7\% | 71.4\% | 127.3\% | 112.4\% | 33.5\% | 42.4\% | 26.2\% | 30.8\% |
| L - Other | 118.6\% | 38.7\% | 37.9\% | 12.9\% | 19.1\% | 11.9\% | 22.7\% | 91.3\% | 19.1\% | 27.9\% |
| M - International | 136.9\% | 78.4\% | 59.1\% | 54.4\% | 60.1\% | 56.2\% | 43.1\% | 34.9\% | 43.2\% | 33.5\% |
| N\&P - Reinsurance-Prop/Fin | 74.1\% | 39.7\% | 51.3\% | 34.5\% | 72.4\% | 53.1\% | 40.0\% | 42.4\% | 31.3\% | 6.5\% |
| O-Reinsurance-Liabiity | 114.1\% | 55.2\% | 78.7\% | 58.3\% | 94.0\% | 43.8\% | 46.4\% | 68.8\% | 66.4\% | 104.2\% |
| R - Products Liability | 138.9\% | 68.7\% | 73.0\% | 137.1\% | 70.0\% | 28.2\% | 180.3\% | 74.6\% | 22.8\% | 1.0\% |
| S - Financial/Mort Guarante | 188.9\% | 43.7\% | 103.7\% | 71.4\% | 127.3\% | 112.4\% | 33.5\% | 42.4\% | 26.2\% | 30.8\% |
| T - Warranty | 134.9\% | 76.4\% | 57.1\% | 52.4\% | 58.1\% | 54.2\% | 41.1\% | 32.9\% | 41.2\% | 31.5\% |

Minimum of $1 \%$ PRC $\%$ and PRF \% applied as needed

## 2x2 Analysis - Risk Factors by LOB-size

Table 3-5 shows the indicated MDC based on all multiline companies and all company sizes larger than the smallest $20 \%$. We found that the indicated MDC was $62 \%$ and $65 \%$ for reserve risk and premium risk respectively. Appendix 5/Exhibit 2, below, shows that if the RBC Formula used LOB risk factors based on LOB-size, the indicated MDC would be higher, $76 \%$ and $85 \%$ for reserves and premium, respectively (column C/line 5).

Appendix 5/Exhibit 2
Indicated MDC - $2 \times 2$ Analysis

| Reserves |  | Single RRF | RRF by LOB- <br> size |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| (A) | (B) | (C) |  |
| \# | Item | Premium | Premium |
| 1 | Observed Risk - 87.5th RRR/AYUL | $27.2 \%$ | $27.2 \%$ |
| 2 | Expected Risk - 87.5th RRR/AYUL before <br> diversification | $34.2 \%$ | $36.2 \%$ |
| 3 | Indicated Diversification Credit - 100\%-(1)/(2)\% | $20.6 \%$ | $24.9 \%$ |
| 4 | Current Average Diversification Credit | $9.9 \%$ | $9.9 \%$ |
| 5 | Indicated Maximum Credit (3)/(4) $* 30 \%$ | $62.5 \%$ | $75.7 \%$ |


| Premium | Single PRF | PRF by LOB- size |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (A) | (B) | (C) |
| \# Item | Reserves | Reserves |
| 1 Observed Risk - 87.5th RRR/AYUL | 17.8\% | 17.8\% |
| Expected Risk - 87.5th RRR/AYUL before diversification AYULedit | 25.0\% | 28.7\% |
| 3 Indicated Diversification Credit - 100\%-(1)/(2)\% | 28.8\% | 37.8\% |
| 4 Current Average Diversification Credit | 13.3\% | 13.3\% |
| 5 Indicated Maximum Credit (3)/(4) * 30\% | 64.9\% | 85.4\% |

The column "Single PRF/RRF" is the same as Table3-5
Notes:
The values in column B are the same as the values in Table 3-5.
Row 1- Observed Risk - This is based on LRs and RRRs and is not affected by the expected risk calculation. Hence columns B and C have the same values.
Row 2 - Expected risk calculated using the single risk factor or risk factor by LOBsize, hence columns B and C are not the same.
Row 3 - Calculated as shown.
Row 4 - Current average diversification credit. It is not affected by the risk factors; hence column B and C are the same values.
Row 5 - Calculated as shown.

## $5 \times 6$ Analysis - Risk Factors by LOB-size

Table 3-19, in which risk factors by LOB do not vary by LOB-size, shows that the indicated MDC is generally greater than $50 \%$ for both reserve risk and premium risk, for company size/diversification bands C3 through E5. We repeat Table 3-19 below, labeled Appendix 5/Exhibit 3.

Appendix 5/Exhibit 4, below shows the corresponding indicated MDC values when the LOB-risk factors vary by LOB-size. Table 3-19 shows unexpected negative indicated MDC values for the company size bands A and B , the smallest sizes. These negative values do not appear in Appendix 5/Exhibit 4, where the LOB risk factors vary by LOB-size. The observation that the negative indicated risk factors are eliminated is evidence that the negative values in Table 3-19 are due to the variation in LOB-risk factors by IOB-size.

Looking at the indicated MDC in each of yellow/bold cells, in Appendix 5/Exhibit 4, we see that values often exceed $50 \%$, and average over $50 \%$.

## Appendix 5/Exhibit 3

Indicated MDC - Single risk factor by LOB for all LOB-sizes
Copy of Table 3-19

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1 | -1524.0\% | -310.2\% | 247.1\% | 165.0\% | 731.8\% | -513.5\% | 167.1\% | 61.4\% | 218.5\% | -159.0\% |
| 2 | -417.5\% | -69.6\% | 27.3\% | 59.1\% | 248.8\% | -203.2\% | 73.4\% | 115.6\% | 98.9\% | 131.1\% |
| 3 | -431.7\% | -71.6\% | 61.9\% | 105.7\% | 108.8\% | -208.9\% | 35.0\% | 58.9\% | 54.9\% | 78.1\% |
| 4 | -70.3\% | -20.9\% | 28.7\% | 87.0\% | 64.0\% | -84.6\% | 78.8\% | 39.9\% | 43.7\% | 63.3\% |
| 5 | -2.7\% | 24.8\% | 57.2\% | 58.0\% | 54.3\% | -200.3\% | 9.6\% | 48.5\% | 42.8\% | 52.9\% |
| All Ex 0 | -291.9\% | -41.5\% | 57.7\% | 80.3\% | 91.0\% | -236.8\% | 62.9\% | 64.3\% | 66.3\% | 63.9\% |

Appendix 5/Exhibit 4
Indicated MDC - LOB-risk factors by LOB-size

| Diversif. Band Quintiles | Reserves |  |  |  |  | Premium |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  | Size Band (Quintiles) |  |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C | D | E | A | B | C | D | E |
| 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 1 | 449.6\% | 383.1\% | 296.2\% | 4.2\% | 475.6\% | 139.4\% | 295.0\% | 93.8\% | 234.6\% | -203.4\% |
| 2 | 172.3\% | 147.9\% | 55.1\% | 5.4\% | 165.1\% | 77.1\% | 159.3\% | 138.5\% | 102.2\% | 121.1\% |
| 3 | 39.6\% | 69.5\% | 87.5\% | 80.0\% | 81.2\% | 31.0\% | 112.0\% | 82.2\% | 59.3\% | 69.1\% |
| 4 | 111.2\% | 66.3\% | 50.0\% | 79.3\% | 46.5\% | 60.8\% | 123.9\% | 69.1\% | 47.4\% | 55.1\% |
| 5 | 109.3\% | 87.9\% | 75.6\% | 52.1\% | 37.6\% | -15.0\% | 75.3\% | 75.9\% | 48.7\% | 47.8\% |
| All Ex 0 | 129.2\% | 104.2\% | 83.0\% | 62.0\% | 60.3\% | 53.2\% | 137.6\% | 91.8\% | 71.5\% | 56.4\% |

Appendix 5/Exhibit 5 below compares the error statistics for CoMaxLine\% Approach and correlation matrix approach with risk factors that vary (by LOB-size) and risk factors that are the same for all LOB-sizes (as in RBC Formula).

## Appendix 5/Exhibit 5

Error Statistics - Diversification Models/Size Bands
Error Measured as \% of Reserves/Premium
[Green Highlight indicates the lower value within each pair of models]
Standard Deviations - Part A

|  | Reserves |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
|  | Single LOB Risk Factor |  | LOB Risk Factor Varies |  |
| All Points (25 points) | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.12 |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.029 | 0.032 |


|  | Premium |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Points Included |  | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC |
| Correlation |  |  |  |  |
|  | Single LOB Risk Factor | LOB Risk Factor Varies |  |  |
| All Points (25 points) | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.08 |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | 0.040 | 0.038 | 0.07 | 0.05 |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.021 | 0.022 |

Average Error - Part B

|  | Reserves |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Points Included |  | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Single LOB Risk Factor | LOB Risk Factor Varies |  |  |
| All Points (25 points) | $6.5 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $-4.3 \%$ | $-3.5 \%$ |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | $1.2 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ | $-1.8 \%$ | $-2.3 \%$ |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |


|  | Premium |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
|  | Single LOB Risk Factor | LOB Risk Factor Varies |  |  |
| All Points (25 points) | $4.4 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $-0.2 \%$ | $-2.2 \%$ |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | $-0.7 \%$ | $-1.2 \%$ | $-1.7 \%$ | $-4.0 \%$ |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |

Average Absolute Error - Part C

|  | Reserves |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
|  | Single LOB Risk Factor | LOB Risk Factor Varies |  |  |
| All Points (25 points) | $9.7 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ | $6.2 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | $5.3 \%$ | $4.9 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | $2.9 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ |


|  | Premium |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Points Included | NAIC | Correlation | NAIC | Correlation |
|  | Single LOB Risk Factor | LOB Risk Factor Varies |  |  |
| All Points (25 points) | $7.4 \%$ | $7.7 \%$ | $5.8 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ |
| Exclude Smallest (20 points) | $3.0 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ | $5.1 \%$ | $4.9 \%$ |
| Include only Largest (9 points) | $1.1 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |

The type of information in Appendix 5/Exhibit 5 is the same as Table 4-1. The values in the columns labeled "single risk factor" are the same as the values in Table 4-1.

For risk factors that vary by LOB-size, the CoMaxLine\% Approach (labeled NAIC) has lower error statistics in more tests than the correlation matrix approach (7 of 8 tests for reserves and 5 of 8 tests for premium). Hence, evening using risk charges by LOB-size, it does not appear that the correlation matrix fits the data better than CoMaxLine\% Approach.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Risk, in our analysis, is $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile Reserve Runoff Ratio, for reserve risk, and the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile accident year ultimate operating loss (AYUL), for premium risk.
    ${ }^{2}$ We use the term correlation to describe a factor-based method for combining individual risks to produce risk measures for the combination of several risks. The source of the factor might be linear correlation, copulas or other techniques. In using this term, we do not intend to imply that the assumptions related to linear correlation are appropriate.
    ${ }^{3}$ When applied in the RBC Formula, the pure reserve risk component is combined with a portion of the reinsurance credit risk component. This paper deals with the pure reserve risk component of $\mathrm{R}_{4}$.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ We use the term correlation to describe a factor-based method for combining individual risks to produce risk measures for the combination of several risks. The source of the factor might be linear correlation, copulas or other techniques. In using this term, we do not intend to imply that the assumptions related to linear correlation are appropriate.
    ${ }^{5}$ For a detailed description of the formula and its basis, see Feldblum, Sholom, NAIC Property/Casualty Insurance Company Risk-Based Capital Requirements, Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society, 1996 and NAIC, Risk-Based Capital Forecasting \& Instructions, Property Casualty, 2010.
    ${ }^{6}$ A company with a concentration ratio of $80 \%$ can equivalently be described as a having a diversification ratio of $20 \%, 100 \%-80 \%$.

[^2]:    ${ }^{7}$ http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/13fforum/01-Report-6-RBC.pdf
    ${ }^{8}$ http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/14wforum/Report-7-RBC.pdf
    ${ }^{9}$ Reserve for loss and defense and containment expenses, but not including adjusting and other expenses.
    ${ }^{10}$ The Risk Data points are filtered as we describe in DCWP Report 6 (on PRFs) and Report 7 (on RRFs). In brief, the main filters are that we exclude anomalous values; treat pool company data on a combined basis (DCWP-defined group pools); exclude Minor Lines data points (see Glossary); exclude the smallest LOBs data points, defined as those in smallest $15^{\text {th }}$ percentile of LOB-size, by AY; exclude companies with less than 5 AYs of NEP; use values at the latest available maturity; and include companies regardless of whether they filed a 2010 Annual Statement (Survivorship Adjustment).
    The runoff ratio includes movement related to "all prior year" element of Schedule P.
    Those filters are largely the same as the filters used in the 2016 American Academy of Actuaries calibration report 2016 Update to Property and Casualty Risk-Based Capital Underwriting Factors http://www.actuary.org/files/publications/PC RBC UWFactors 10282016.pdf
    ${ }^{11}$ The most recent RRRs in our data are from the runoff on Initial Reserve Date December 2009, which represents one year of reserve development, from December 2009 to December 2010. There is one fewer year of reserve development than there are of AYs in that for the latest year, 2010, we have AY LRs, but no runoff on the 2010 Initial Reserve.

[^3]:    ${ }^{12}$ As was the case for all other DCWP research, this work was done with data obtained from the NAIC in late 2011.
    ${ }^{13}$ In the remainder of the text when we refer to 'company' or 'companies' we mean companies or DCWPdefined pools, as appropriate.
    ${ }^{14}$ Because the all-lines data points are constructed from the filtered LOB data points, the all-lines data excludes the LOBs that do not satisfy the Report 6 and 7 filtering tests. The most important LOB exclusions are the exclusion of Minor Lines data points and the exclusion of data points with less than five years of net earned premium by LOB. In future analyses, the effect of those exclusions might be reviewed.
    ${ }^{15}$ The diversification index for CoMaxLine $\%$ Approach is $100 \%$ - CoMaxLine $\%$. The diversification index for HHI Approach is $100 \%-\mathrm{HHI}$ value $\%$. The diversification index for CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk Approach is $100 \%$ CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk. The diversification index for correlation matrix approach is $100 \%$ - risk value after diversification/sum of LOB risk charge $\%$ s without diversification, as a percentage.
    With different diversification metrics, e.g., correlation or HHI, the diversification band might differ. In practice, we find that the diversification metrics produce ranking of companies by diversification level. That is consistent

[^4]:    with the findings in DCWP Report 14, showing that the RBC UW Risk Values are similar across a variety of diversification metrics.
    ${ }^{16}$ For our purpose, "monoline" means zero diversification credit in the Risk Data. This includes companies with one "major line" and, possibly, several Minor Lines, each of which has less than $5 \%$ of all-lines NEP. When we apply the correlation matrix approach, monoline incudes a company with two lines that are $100 \%$ correlated.

[^5]:    ${ }^{17}$ We consolidate data across groups only if the data is affected by pooling, as described in Reports 6 and 7 .
    ${ }^{18}$ A Minor Line data point is a LOB data point for which the LOB premium or initial reserve is $5 \%$ or less of the total all-lines premium and initial reserve.
    ${ }^{19}$ We imply no significance to the value of 500 .

[^6]:    ${ }^{20}$ The amounts seem large because they represent the sum of reserve amounts at year for each of 22 years of reserve data. The reserve at December 2009 alone was $\$ 492$ Billion.

[^7]:    ${ }^{21}$ Some of the companies in the data set may be small enough that state regulations might exempt them from making RBC filings. We do not adjust our analysis to reflect that situation.

[^8]:    ${ }^{22}$ Table 3-18 shows the diversification as a percentage of the UW Risk RBC Value prior to diversification.

[^9]:    ${ }^{23}$ Also, for a detailed description of the operation of the RBC Formula, see Odomirok, et al, Chapter 19, Risk Based Capital https://www.casact.org/library/studynotes/Odomirok-etal Financial-Reportingv4.pdf
    For an older description of the Formula and its original basis, see Feldblum, Sholom, NAIC Property/Casualty Insurance Company Risk-Based Capital Requirements, Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society, 1996. http://www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed96/96297.pdf.
    For the actual Formula, see NAIC, Risk-Based Capital Forecasting \& Instructions, Property Casualty, 2010.

[^10]:    ${ }^{24}$ RBC UW risk values are determined using data in the Annual Statement Schedule P, which shows 22 LOBs. RBC calculations treat occurrence and claims made LOBs for other liability and products liability on a combined basis and treat non-proportional property and non-proportional financial on a combined basis, leaving a net of 19 LOBs.
    ${ }^{25}$ RBC UW risk values are determined using data in the Annual Statement Schedule P, which shows 22 LOBs. RBC calculations treat occurrence and claims made LOBs for other liability and products liability on a combined basis and treat non-proportional property and non-proportional financial on a combined basis, leaving a net of 19 LOBs.

[^11]:    ${ }^{26}$ We make this simplification because expenses by LOB for all years in our data set were not readily available to us.
    ${ }^{27}$ Further research will be necessary to verify that assumption.
    ${ }^{28}$ The LCF and PCF are applied to the sum of the LOB RBC amounts, where those RBC amounts reflect the investment income offset, the own-company experience adjustment, and the loss sensitive business adjustment. ${ }^{29}$ NWP in the RBC Formula. NEP in our simplified calculation.

[^12]:    ${ }^{30}$ We use the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile because that is the safety level last used (2016) in the calibration of LOB risk factors. The diversification relationship might be different if the safety level were the $90^{\text {th }}$ percentile or some other value. Evaluating the variation in indicated diversification credit with changing safety level is a matter for future research.
    ${ }^{31}$ As noted in the "Simplifications" subsection above, for company expense we use industry expenses by LOB, weighted by the company NEP by LOB.

[^13]:    ${ }^{32}$ Also, see Section 4 and Appendix 2 for further discussion of the extent to which LOB indicated risk charge $\%$ s vary by company level of diversification.

[^14]:    ${ }^{33}$ For similar reasons, our calibration of indicated risk charge\%s by LOB in DCWP Reports 6 and 7 uses data excluding the smallest $15 \%$ of LOB data points. In those reports we observe that the indicated risk charge\%s for small LOB-sizes are much higher than the risk charge\%s for larger LOB-sizes that constitute the bulk of the number of companies and premium and reserve amounts. As the RBC Formula does not allow different rick charges \% by LOB-size. Reports 6 and 7, and the American Academy of Actuaries analysis of risk changes, exclude experience of the smallest companies in determined risk charge\%s. As small LOB-sizes will predominate in smaller companies, excluding the smallest companies from the dependency analysis is the alllines analogue of the LOB-size strategy with respect to LOB risk charge\% caligba5tion.
    ${ }^{34}$ The only parameter in the diversification element in the RBC Formula is the MDC, and for this analysis we take all other features of the RBC Formula as fixed.

[^15]:    ${ }^{35}$ This is the unweighted average of the company-year diversification credits for companies in that cell, i.e., the risk data points are equally weighted, regardless of company reserves/premium amount.
    ${ }^{36} \mathrm{LCF}=1$ - diversification credit $=90.1 \% .90 .1 \%=0.7+.3 * .671$.

[^16]:    ${ }^{37}$ Given the structure of the RBC Formula, the only parameter that can be adjusted is the MDC.

[^17]:    ${ }^{38}$ See footnote 33.

[^18]:    ${ }^{39}$ Note that the typical indicated MDC in the yellow/bold cells of Table 3-10 is $50 \%$. This is lower than the $60^{+\%} \%$ indicated MDC from Table 3-5. Looking at Table 3-11, we see that the highest indicated values for the indicated MDC are in diversification bands 1 and 2 with indicated MDC values from $75 \%$ to over $200 \%$. Thus, the $2 \times 6$ analysis enables us to calibrate the diversification credit using the experience of companies in diversification bands 3-5, that represent the bulk of reserves, premiums and diversification credit, with no distortion from the indications for bands 1 and 2 .
    ${ }^{40}$ We graph the values divided, by $30 \%$, rather than the Table 3-10 values, so that the slope of graph is the indicated MDC.
    ${ }^{41}$ The R-squared statistics on Table 3-12 are calculated by Excel regression in Excel data pack. The Excel formula for R -squared for regression through the origin is not the same as the R -squared formula used for OLS regression. Joseph G Eisenhauer (2003), Teaching Statistics, 25(3), 76-80. We use this form of the R-squared statistic to compare regression results, given the 'through the origin' constraint.

[^19]:    ${ }^{42}$ Table 3-14 is a more detailed segmentation of Table 3-1 and Table 3-6.

[^20]:    ${ }^{43}$ Table 3-15 is a more detailed segmentation of Table 3-2 and Table 3-7.

[^21]:    ${ }^{44}$ The R-squared statistic is calculated by Excel regression in Excel data pack. The Excel formula for R-squared for regression through the origin is not the same as the R-squared formula used for OLS regression. Joseph G Eisenhauer (2003), Teaching Statistics, 25(3), 76-80.

[^22]:    ${ }^{45}$ The R-squared statistic is calculated by Excel regression in Excel data pack. The Excel formula for R-squared for regression through the origin is not the same as the R-squared formula used for OLS regression. Joseph G Eisenhauer (2003), Teaching Statistics, 25(3), 76-80.

[^23]:    ${ }^{46}$ The R-squared statistic is calculated by Excel regression in Excel data pack. The Excel formula for R-squared for regression through the origin is not the same as the R-squared formula used for OLS regression. Joseph G Eisenhauer (2003), Teaching Statistics, 25(3), 76-80. We use this form of the R-squared statistic to compare regression results, given the 'through the origin' constraint.

[^24]:    ${ }^{47}$ One parameter for each pair of LOBs, i.e., 19 LOBs each need to be paired with the 18 other LOBs, thus $19 \mathrm{x} 18=342$, divided by 2 because the relationship be LOB " X " and LOB " Y " is the same as the relationship between LOB " Y " and LOB " X ". Therefore, in theory that requires 171 parameters. In practice Solvency II uses 2 parameters, $25 \%$ and $50 \%$, and judgement to decide whether each of 171 LOB pairs is lower correlation ( $25 \%$ ) or higher correlation ( $50 \%$ ).
    ${ }^{48} \mathrm{HHI}$ equals the sum of the squares of the LOB shares of total. For example, if there is only one LOB, HHI is 1.0 , as is the case for CoMaxLine $\%$. With two lines split $25 \%$ and $75 \% \mathrm{HHI}$ is $0.25^{\wedge} 2$ plus $0.75^{\wedge} 2$ or 0.625 compared the CoMaxLine $\%$ of 0.750 , i.e., it shows less concentration/more diversification. With three lines split $50 \%, 25 \%$ and $25 \% \mathrm{HHI}$ is $0.50^{\wedge} 2$ plus $0.25^{\wedge} 2$ plus $0.25^{\wedge} 2$ or 0.375 , less concentration/more diversification than the CoMaxLine\% of 0.5.

[^25]:    ${ }^{49}$ The HHI is sometimes applied to only the n-th largest segments, e.g., the degree of diversification among the top ten LOBs. The HHI index applied to the single largest segment would be very similar to the CoMaxLine $\%$. HHI can be written as $\mathrm{p}_{1} \wedge 2+\mathrm{p}_{2} \wedge 2+\mathrm{p}_{3} \wedge 2 \ldots \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}{ }^{\wedge} 2$. The truncated HHI limited to one element would be $\mathrm{p}_{1} \wedge 2$. CoMaxLine $\%$ is $\mathrm{p}_{1}$.
    ${ }^{50}$ This feature of the data implies that a key assumption in the risk theory diversification framework not valid. In mathematical terms, the risk distribution by $\operatorname{LOB} \mathrm{f}(\mathrm{x})$ should be the same regardless of the proportion of business from line of business $y$. We find that $f(x \mid$ no other business $) \neq f(x \mid$ there is some other business); $f(x \mid$ (company has enough $y$ to be at Diversification level 1$), \neq \mathrm{f}(\mathrm{x} \mid$ (company has enough y to be at Diversification level 2$), \neq$ $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{x} \mid$ (company has enough y to be at Diversification level 2), etc.
    ${ }^{51}$ This issue might be addressed using copulas, but that requires further parameterization.
    ${ }^{52}$ To our knowledge, this database is larger than any other database used for Standard Formula calibrations.

[^26]:    53 "Advice for Band 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: SCR Standard Formula Article 111(d) Correlations," (former Consultation Paper 74), January 2010, pp 39-44. See Appendix 3 of this paper for further discussion of the origin of the Solvency II correlation matrix.
    ${ }^{54}$ We select pairwise correlations of $100 \%$ for claims made and occurrence medical malpractice and for general liability, special liability and products liability. We select pairwise correlations of $75 \%$ between special property and homeowners, between private passenger automobile liability and automobile physical damage and between commercial automobile liability and automobile physical damage.
    ${ }^{55}$ The analysis for the HHI and CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk are analogous to those in Appendix 4, for CoMaxLine $\%$ and correlation matrix. We do not present the HHI or CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk details in this Report.

[^27]:    ${ }^{56}$ There are eight tests, rather than nine. The value for "Include only largest ( 9 points)" for Average Error is always zero because we select the best fitting risk charge $\%$ s to achieve that result.
    By a "lower error score" we mean the absolute value of the difference between indicated and expected has a smaller absolute value.

[^28]:    ${ }^{57}$ The analysis for the HHI and CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk are analogous to those in Appendix 4, for CoMaxLine\% and correlation matrix. We do not present the HHI or CoMaxLine $\%$-Risk details in this Report.

[^29]:    ${ }^{58}$ We did not test the comparison for HHI or CoMaxLine\% risk.

[^30]:    ${ }^{59}$ The 'transfer' from credit risk to reserve risk applies only if the reserve risk without the reinsurance credit risk component is larger than the reinsurance credit risk, as is most often the case.
    60 "Defense and Cost Containment Expenses" are called "Allocated Loss Adjustment Expenses" in older Annual Statements. In our analysis we treat defense and cost containment expense and allocated loss adjustment expenses as equivalent.

[^31]:    ${ }^{61}$ As in earlier sections of this paper, we use the term "risk" to mean the $87.5^{\text {th }}$ percentile of the observed distribution. The analysis in this section applies regardless of the percentile safety level and for alternative risk metrics other than VaR
    ${ }^{62}$ In our diversification Risk Data, 'monoline' includes companies with a small proportion of business (less than $5 \%$ of premium) in other LOBs, e.g., Minor Line data points that we exclude from the Risk Data.

[^32]:    ${ }^{63}$ Looked at for reserves and premium, separately, the situation is less clear. The probability of 12 of 16 for reserves is well under $1 \%$, but the probability of the observed seven or more for premium is $26 \%$, hence not unusual by itself.

[^33]:    ${ }^{64}$ For each LOB, we calculate the PRF/RRF for each diversification level, minus the PRF/RRF for all diversification levels combined, divided the standard deviation across diversification levels for the LOB.

[^34]:    65 "CEIOPS-DOC-70/10" (Page 44, paragraph B.31)
    ${ }^{66}$ (See next line)
    http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the $\% 20$ market/operating $\% 20$ at $\% 201 l o y d s /$ solvency $\% 20 i i / 2016 \% 20 \mathrm{gu}$ idance/2015 yesf synd v62.xlsx., "Non-Life and Health UW Section," Tab "Premium and Reserve Risk Params"
    ${ }^{67}$ "Advice for Band 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: SCR Standard Formula Article 111(d) Correlations," (former Consultation Paper 74), January 2010, pp 39-44.
    ${ }^{68}$ We select pairwise correlations of $100 \%$ for claims made and occurrence medical malpractice and for general liability, special liability and products liability. We select pairwise correlations of $75 \%$ between special property and homeowners, between private passenger automobile liability and automobile physical damage and between commercial automobile liability and automobile physical damage.

[^35]:    69
    http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the \%20market/operating\%20at\%20lloyds/solvency $\% 20 \mathrm{ii} / 2016 \% 20 \mathrm{gu}$ idance/2015_yesf_synd_v62.xlsx. "Non-Life and Health UW Section," Tab "Premium and Reserve Risk Params"

[^36]:    ${ }^{70}$ For the correlation matrix approach, the percentage is the effect that would need to be achieved by changes in pairwise correlation values.
    ${ }^{71}$ Immediately below that value, we show the remaining difference between Part 2 values and Part 5. Part 5 values are the differences between indicated and formula risk charge $\%$ s after applying adjustment factor.

[^37]:    ${ }^{72}$ We develop these risk factors by LOB-size using our calibration approach, described in DCWP Reports 6 and 7, applied separately to each LOB-size band. For this purpose, we measure "LOB-size" for each company/LOB/year as the percentile of reserve/premium amount relative to reserve/premium for all Company/LOBs in that year.

