

# UNDERWRITING CYCLES AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES

by *Sholom Feldblum*

## ABSTRACT

Underwriting cycles, with their wide and puzzling swings in premiums and profitability, challenge the pricing actuary to adapt rates to market realities. Understanding the forces behind insurance price fluctuations is a prerequisite to analyzing market prices.

Underwriting cycles have been ascribed to actuarial rate making procedures, to under-writing philosophy, and to interest rate volatility. These interpretations underestimate the dynamics of the insurance marketplace, and they ignore the competitive pressures that drive insurance pricing.

Underwriting cycles, like profit fluctuations in other industries, reflect the interdependence of rival firms. Strong policyholder loyalty and demand inelasticity hold the allure of large returns for incumbent firms, but the apparent ease of entry into insurance, the lack of market concentration, and the difficulty of monitoring competitors' prices preclude excessive profits. The interaction of these forces keeps the market in disequilibrium, with continuing price oscillations.

With the decline of rating bureaus and the growing competitiveness of the insurance marketplace, the proficient actuary may no longer set rates based solely on indicated costs. Insurers seek actuaries who understand the competitive forces that drive market prices and who can set future rates that are most advantageous for the firm. They seek actuaries who can price their products through the vicissitudes of the underwriting cycle. \*\*

---

\*\* The author is indebted to Benjamin Lefkowitz, Jay Siegel, and Richard Homonoff, who suggested numerous corrections to earlier drafts of this manuscript. The remaining errors, of course, should be attributed to the author alone.

## **UNDERWRITING CYCLES AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES**

### **Section I: The Education of an Actuary**

When I began work as a pricing actuary, I was struck by the simplicity of our rate making procedures. Actuarial techniques are cost-based: premiums are based on anticipated losses and expenses. Marketplace pricing, however, considers supply/demand interactions, consumer desires, and competitive pressures. When I asked about this, I was told that actuaries determine the “proper” rates – those which best serve insurance companies and the public.

As the months passed, I learned that insurers do not actually set prices based on actuarial indications. Schedule rating modifications of as much as 50% are used in the Commercial Lines, and discretionary rate deviations from actuarial indications are used in the Personal Lines. So I wondered: what is the use of our rate making procedures?

When I asked about this, I was told that the poor, misguided folk in Underwriting and Marketing always wanted lower rates. Management was forced to cut prices below adequate levels to keep everyone happy. Rate deviations and modifications were the random effects of strong officers in the field.

Years later, I understood that these deviations are not entirely random. Underwriting cycles billow through our industry, raising and lowering the premium rates charged by insurers. The price fluctuations are not discretionary:

insurers that have ignored the phases the cycle have lost both money and market share. Most important, these are industry wide cycles, unrelated to the internal politics of individual firms. Actuaries indicate rates, but the market sets prices.

## Causes of the Cycle

Some actuaries believe that rates should be based only on anticipated costs. Stable actuarial rates ensure adequate returns for insurers, and they mitigate the price variations that anger consumers. Carriers may be tempted by the marketing benefits of rate cutting, but actuaries should not encourage such follies.

On the contrary – cost-based pricing is rarely optimal. Careful consideration of the marketplace and of competitors' actions is essential for ensuring profitable operations. And this aforementioned view is dangerous to the actuarial profession as well. For if actuaries ignore market realities, their companies relegate them to technical busy-work. If we wish to influence actual prices, we must address real business concerns.

The view described and deprecated above is ensconced in two prevalent convictions: First, underwriting cycles are seen as external to insurer strategies. For example, the severe downturn in Commercial Lines operating income during the early 1980's is sometimes attributed to high and fluctuating interest rates that encouraged "cash **flow**" underwriting. How can we price for these variations if we can not control them or even predict them?'

Second, underwriting cycles seem unrelated to profit cycles in other industries. Some say that insurance profits are counter-cyclical to general business conditions: rates are high during depressions and decline during prosperous periods. Others add that underwriting cycles vary with supply restraints, not demand pressures. Pricing techniques used in other industries are therefore

inapplicable to insurance rate making.

To understand the relationship of insurance insolvencies to underwriting cycles, we must uncover the causes of the cycle. Four interpretations of the cycle are described below, emphasizing (i) actuarial rate making, (ii) underwriting philosophy, (iii) interest rate movements, and (iv) competitive strategy. The first three imply irrational business behavior by actuaries, underwriters, or investment officers. In addition, the actuarial and underwriting interpretations do not explain the synchronized pricing of independent insurers, and the interest rate interpretation can not account for the recurrence of cycles in more stable interest rate environments.

The fourth interpretation views underwriting cycles as rational business behavior among competing firms striving to optimize long-term profits. Competition may be rough, and it may be inexact, but it tells us a rational story if we pause to listen.

## Section II: Interpretations of the Cycle

### ACTUARIAL RATE MAKING: **UNCERTAINTY** AND **COUNTER-CYCLICALITY**

Some actuaries ascribe profit cycles to the uncertainty and counter-cyclicalities of loss costs:

- ☞ Property/Casualty insurance costs depend upon random loss occurrences and uncertain macroeconomic and social trends. Random losses may be unusual weather disturbances, such as windstorms and earthquakes. Social trends may be unexpected legal changes, such as retroactive liability for pollution exposures.
- ☞ The counter-cyclicalities of insurance loss costs stem from the time lag between the compilation of historical experience and the implementation of new rates. Generally, two or more years of experience are used for rate making, losses are developed three months beyond the end of the experience period, systems processing of the historical data requires another month or two, rate analysis and filing take six months, and the rates remain in effect for one year. Rating bureaus require an additional half year, for editing and verification of insurance data, and for notification to member companies of intended rate filings. Thus, the time between the average loss date in the experience period and the midpoint of the effective period of the new rates often exceeds three or four years (Cummins and Nye [1984], pages 232-236).

The uncertainty and counter-cyclicalities of insurance loss costs contribute to

underwriting cycles. During recessions, inflation is moderate, automobile travel is low, jury awards are less liberal, factories operate below capacity, industrial injuries are infrequent, and so forth.\* The experience from this period, and the time lag between data compilation and rate implementation, ensures moderate rate revisions for several years.

The economy soon recovers, and loss costs rise rapidly. Insurers, wary of increasing their rates and losing business volume, ascribe the mounting costs to random loss occurrences. Even when the rate inadequacy is recognized, and rate revisions are requested, the time lag between data compilation and rate implementation means that the needed premiums are not earned until years later.

Historical experience continues to indicate a rate inadequacy when the economy once again slides into a recession. Insurers continue filing for rate increases, even though rates have returned to adequate levels. And so the cycle goes on.<sup>3</sup>

#### ***AWARENESS AND ACTION***

There are some factual problems with this interpretation. Are underwriting cycles truly counter-cyclical to macroeconomic conditions? (Generally not.) Are loss cost trends that different in prosperous times and recessionary times? (Not always.) But there are more fundamental reasons why this explanation fails.

First, this interpretation presumes that pricing actuaries are unable to learn from past mistakes, incapable of forecasting loss cost trends despite years of experience. This is not true: actuaries are proficient at estimating insurance costs and are not easily fooled by macro-economic conditions or long-term

social trends. Both actuaries and insurers are frequently aware of the true loss cost trends even as rates move in the opposite direction. For example, insurers knew that General Liability loss costs were rising rapidly in the early 1980's, but they continued cutting rates well below marginal cost.

#### ***INDICATIONS AND PRICES***

Second, underwriting cycles are not due to actuarial rate indications. They are due to insurer reluctance to adopt actuarially recommended rate increases, to rate deviations below bureau rates, to schedule rating credits for commercial risks, and to similar “discretionary” rate **reductions**.<sup>4</sup> Underwriting cycles are as manifest in the disparity between actuarially indicated rates and marketplace prices as in the reported net income of insurers.’

The disparity between insurer knowledge and insurer pricing actions was particularly stark in the late 1980's, when 25% of the workers' compensation was being written by the involuntary pools. Insurers were pricing the policies below cost, but they would not write the business that they were pricing.

If disinterested analysts, uninvolved in the economic fortunes of particular insurers, were to generate “actuarially indicated rates” to which the entire industry adhered, there might be no underwriting cycles. Rate making procedures have little or no influence on actual profit cycles. However, insurance premium rates are different from actuarial indications. Real-world prices are not the result of mathematical exercises, whether simple or sophisticated. And it is in the prices charged on the street that we may discern the workings of the cycle.

## UNDERWRITING PHILOSOPHY

A second interpretation of insurance underwriting cycles relies on the “mass psychology” of underwriters. During profitable years, insurers grow optimistic and compete strenuously for new business. Since capacity is limited only by financial and psychological constraints, not by physical plant and equipment, supply expands. Demand is inelastic, so premium growth means attracting business from other insurers. Severe competition in a mature market requires insurers to lower prices to gain market share (Stewart [1984]; Bloom [1987]; Berger [1988]).

Profits soon decline, due to low rates and the poor quality of some risks. Underwriters become pessimistic, curtail their acceptance of marginal applicants, and file for rate increases. Profits remain low until insurers re-underwrite their business and the new rates take effect. Eventually, the rate increases and the more careful underwriting lead to increased profits, and the cycle starts anew.

This interpretation of the cycle is popular, and variations abound. Boor suggests numerous factors that might strengthen or weaken cycles, such as premium-to-surplus rules, reserve management, and the ease or difficulty of entry into and exit from the insurance market.

## ***INFORMATION AND COORDINATION***

Should not the supply proffered and the quantity demanded converge on an equilibrium point, and the underwriting cycles cease? This is a central thesis of

Western economics, and rapid convergence is evident in most industries with free markets. Stewart [1984], page 293, explains the absence of such convergence:

*The cyclical process does not end for two reasons: lack of information and lack of coordination. Individual insurers do not and cannot know the precise amount of insurance to supply to reach equilibrium. They have different operating costs and, therefore, different break-even points or minimum acceptable margins of profit. Their perceptions and expectations of future profits or losses develop in different ways. In self-interest, they do not coordinate their actions. Collusion, furthermore, is illegal. Even when prior approval and rating bureaus had more influence on prices, insurers varied supply according to their own situations.*

This explanation is unusual, since the lack of strategic coordination and the imperfect information should lead to stable equilibria. If firms can not coordinate prices and quantities, then the price mechanism effectively equates supply and demand. The competitive characteristics of the insurance industry that Stewart notes argue for a more stable equilibrium, since underwriters can quickly adjust supply to end any disparity with the quantity demanded.<sup>6</sup>

#### UNIFORM PSYCHOLOGY

The fundamental problem with this explanation is not the “lack of cooperation” or the “lack of coordination” theses. Rather it is the assumption of a uniform psychology among underwriters. An individual may be more or less optimistic in different years. But how is it that ten thousand underwriters across the United States are optimistic and pessimistic in unison?

Daykin, Pentikainen, and Pesonen [1994] illuminate the mystery of cycles. Fluctuating profits are not uncommon; even random may look like cycles. The mystery is that while the profit patterns in each insurer seem inexplicable, these profit patterns are correlated among most of the insurers in the market.

The enigma of underwriting cycles is not that any individual underwriter accepts risks in one year that he or she would reject in another. Rather, it is that profits for insurers move in **tandem**.<sup>7</sup> In contradistinction to Steward's explanation, this phenomenon indicates a higher level of competitive strategy than we would otherwise suspect. Insurers, no less than other firms, are sensitive to the prices charged by their competitors, and they adjust their own rates accordingly.

Stewart's thesis shows the outlines of the cycle: the stable demand, the competition among insurers, the fluctuating prices, and the relatively uniform practices among underwriters at any given time. But the connections among these phenomena remain unexamined. To flesh out these relationships, we must ask: "What additional characteristics of the insurance marketplace relate to profit cycles?" and "How do these characteristics account for the fluctuations in underwriting income?"

#### CASH FLOW UNDERWRITING

A third interpretation of underwriting cycles relies on interest rate volatility. Insurers pay losses well after they collect premiums, particularly in the liability and Workers' Compensation lines of business. Premiums are invested in financial markets (stocks, bonds, mortgages) and earn investment income until losses are paid.

Insurance income may be divided into underwriting and investment portions. Underwriting income is the difference between (a) premium revenues and (b) loss plus expense payments. Investment income is the return on invested assets.

#### *INTEREST RATES*

Interest rates rose rapidly in the late 1970's, reflecting the inflationary trends in the U.S. economy. Investment income became a larger portion of insurance earnings, and underwriting income decreased. Insurers wrote policies at expected underwriting losses, since they relied on investment returns for an overall profit.

Many insurers, accustomed to underwriting profits, viewed the reliance on investment returns as a lack of "underwriting discipline." They castigated this new philosophy as "cash flow underwriting": writing policies at a loss simply to generate premium dollars for investment.

Cash flow underwriting is appropriate as long as interest rates remain high.<sup>8</sup> But by the mid-1980's, new money interest rates had fallen. The lack of underwriting discipline continued; insurers kept writing policies at underwriting losses. Investment income was no longer sufficient to compensate for these losses, so insurance operating returns declined. This was the underwriting cycle nadir of the mid-1980's.<sup>9</sup>

This argument was popular several years ago. It has lost favor recently, since the underwriting cycle has lost no force despite the present stability of interest rates. Nevertheless, it is still useful to examine the problems with this interpretation.

## ***UNDERWRITING AND INVESTMENT INCOME***

First, the distinction between underwriting and investment income is specious. Cash flows must be discounted to a common date to appropriately match revenues and expenses. True insurance income is the difference between (a) premium revenues and (b) discounted loss plus expense payments.” True investment income is the sum of (a) the return on invested surplus funds, (b) the difference between actual and expected returns on policyholder supplied funds, and perhaps (c) the difference between expected returns and the return assumed in the discount rate.”

When insurance income is properly measured, it is not necessarily reduced by a rise in interest rates. Higher interest rates that are accompanied by accelerating inflation increase the nominal settlement values of insurance losses even as they raise the appropriate discount rate for loss reserves. A rise in inflation increases both investment returns and expected loss payments.

In other words, when inflation is modest, both the discount rate and expected losses are low. When inflation accelerates, both the discount rate and expected losses increase. The net effect is **ambiguous**.<sup>12</sup>

Asset-liability matching theory also implies a different outcome than that suggested by “cash-flow underwriting” interpretations of the underwriting cycle. The average duration of Property-Liability insurers’ assets is longer than that of their liabilities. A drop in interest rates, as occurred in the **mid-1980’s**, causes an increase in profits, not a decrease in profits. In fact, those insurers that bought long-term bonds at high yields in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s enjoyed above average investment returns in subsequent **years**.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, and most fundamentally, a “cash-flow underwriting” interpretation of underwriting cycles reveals a deep academic condescension towards insurance company investment managers and underwriters. It presumes either that investment managers were surprised by the fall in interest rates in the mid-1980s or that underwriters are unable to adjust rates for changes in investment income. But the investment community was not shocked by the fall in interest rates in the 1980’s. On the contrary: financial analysts were surprised that interest rates stayed high even after inflation subsided. Similarly, good underwriters aim at long-term operating profits. They are not easily deceived by steady changes in investment returns.

Interpretations of the underwriting cycle abound. The majority presume that someone is erring: rate making methods are naive, underwriters are simplistic, regulation is rigid, or investment managers are deceived. Such explanations search for a cause where it is not to be found. Insurers are no less rational than other firms are. They exist in a highly competitive market, where the foolish firm does not long survive.

### **Section III: Competition and Profits**

To understand the relationship of underwriting cycles to insurer solvency, we must briefly step aside from insurance and delve into economics and business theory. We ask: “What is the relationship between competition and profits?”

We consider first the economist’s perspective, examining competitive, monopolistic, and oligopolistic market structures. We then analyze the insurance industry from a concrete business viewpoint, examining policy differentiation, policyholder loyalty, and the ease of entry into the insurance marketplace. We ask: “Given the structural characteristics of the insurance industry, what price-cost margin should we expect?”

#### **Textbook Models: Competition and Monopoly**

Undergraduate economics textbooks present two market models: pure competition and single firm monopolies. These models are meant only to illustrate the forces that determine prices, not to depict actual practice.

In pure competition, prices are determined by industry-wide supply and demand. No individual firm can unilaterally affect market prices. If a firm restricts supply, its competitors take up the slack. If a firm raises prices, consumers purchase the product elsewhere.

In a monopolistic industry, a single firm dominates the market. Entry of competing firms is sufficiently restricted that the monopolist can adjust the quantities supplied and the prices charged to maximize its profits.

## **COMPETITION**

What market price results from each model? Suppose that the price in a competitive industry exceeds the marginal cost of producing the product. Any firm could cut prices slightly, garner a greater market share, and increase its profits.

Similarly, if the market price were below marginal cost, firms would leave the industry and employ their capital elsewhere. Equilibrium is achieved when price equals marginal cost.

Equilibrium means that there is no tendency for prices to either rise or **fall**.<sup>14</sup> Economists maintain that prices generally move toward equilibria in free markets. Underwriting cycles, however, seem a stark example of disequilibrium: prices continually fluctuate.

## **MONOPOLY**

Under suitable conditions, the monopolist seeking to optimize its income will not price its product at marginal **cost**.<sup>15</sup> When price equals marginal cost, there are no economic profits for the firm. But if the monopolist restricts output, consumers “bid up” the price to obtain the scarce good. Price exceeds marginal cost, and the firm receives additional profits.

In a purely competitive marketplace, price equals marginal revenue which equals marginal cost. In a monopolistic market, marginal revenue generally exceeds marginal cost. Prices are higher in a monopolistic market than they would be in a competitive market.

## ACTUAL MARKET STRUCTURES

These market structures rarely exist in their ideal forms. Even when there are thousands of firms selling similar products, competition is seldom perfect. For instance, grocery stores exist all over, selling the same foods: is this not pure competition? But most individuals use the nearest corner grocery for small purchases, and do not bother to price shop. In other words, the grocery store may have a near monopoly within a small **neighborhood**.<sup>16</sup>

Monopolies are equally hard to maintain. IBM dominated the market for mainframe business computers in the 1960's, and it enjoyed large price-cost margins during those years. But competitors soon entered wherever profits beckoned -computer peripherals, software programs – and they quickly gained significant market shares.”

Nevertheless, these two models are important, for they set the bounds of the price range. If capital can be transferred to other uses, firms will not price below marginal cost.<sup>18</sup> And if sufficient supply is available, firms will not price above the monopoly price.

This price range is wide, since the monopoly price may be well above marginal cost. So if the market is neither purely competitive nor monopolistic, what prices will actually be charged?

## ECONOMIC MODELS

Economics is rigorous. Theorists provide the needed assumptions, then “prove” the desired conclusions. But these assumptions are invariably idealistic. The

equations are mathematically perfect but of limited practical value.

We can not proceed without a theoretical framework. We will deal with price-cost margins, Nash equilibria, entry conditions, and price elasticity of demand. However, we are interested not in formulating theorems but in understanding a business phenomenon: the underwriting cycle. So we must step gingerly over the coming terrain.

We can view this distinction from another perspective. Economic models abstract reality. They isolate some elements, and the results are determined from the assumptions. The business world is represented by succinct mathematical expressions.

Underwriting cycles, however, are complex phenomena: no two companies react identically to their course. We will not try to determine the exact duration or severity of the cycles. Rather, we seek to understand the driving forces behind insurance pricing.

We begin with an abstract model, of pricing in a competitive market with a limited number of firms.” Our emphasis will be on Nash equilibria and conjectural variation. We then revise the model, discarding the idealism and adding reality, to explain profit cycles in the Property/Casualty insurance industry.

#### *CONJECTURAL VARIATION*

Suppose two rival firms, producing identical products, each have 50% of the market. Consumers are conscientious price shoppers with excellent information,

so if either firm underprices the other it quickly captures the entire market. If the firms compete by setting prices, then a **static** microeconomic analysis implies that both firms will set prices at marginal **cost**.<sup>20</sup> For if one firm prices above marginal cost, the other firm can charge slightly less, gain the other **50%** of the market, and increase its total profits.

This analysis is static: it considers only a single time period. Dynamic models presume that firms respond to their rivals' competitive actions. Moreover, each firm anticipates how its rivals will respond before implementing its own strategy. Economists term this conjectural variation: "Each firm believes that its choice of price will affect the price selected by its **rivals**."<sup>21</sup>

Suppose again that two firms producing identical products and competing on price each have 50% of the market. In the static analysis, if the market price exceeds marginal cost, then either firm may slightly reduce its price and garner the entire market. In reality, the businessman wonders: "If I cut my price to increase market share, how will my rival respond?"

Clearly, the rival will match the price cut – at least if a small reduction in price enables it to retain its market share. If both firms presume that the other will match a price cut, neither will initiate the price **reduction**.<sup>22</sup>

We formulate this mathematically as follows: Let  $P^m$  be the current market price, and  $P^c$  be the competitive, or marginal cost, price. Let " $v$ " be the annual discount rate for future earnings (the discount rate is treated more fully below). Suppose that each firm knows that if it reduces its price below  $P^m$ , its rival will immediately charge  $P^c$ . Finally, assume that a price cut below the current market price promptly attracts the entire consumer **population**.<sup>23</sup>

The current market price,  $P^m$ , provides total industry earnings of  $E^m$ , a positive amount. The marginal cost price,  $P^c$ , provides zero economic profits; that is,  $E^c = 0$ . If both firms maintain the current market price,  $P^m$ , their earnings will be  $\frac{1}{2}(E^m + vE^m + v^2E^m + \dots)$  for each. If either firm slightly shades prices, its earnings will be  $E^m$  in the current period." Since its rival quickly cuts prices to marginal cost, its earnings are 0 in all future periods.

If the firms are to be dissuaded from cutting prices, then  $E^m$  must be less than  $\frac{1}{2}(E^m + vE^m + v^2E^m + \dots)$ . That is,

$$1 < (1 + v + v^2 + \dots) \div 2, \text{ or } v > \frac{1}{2}.$$

This makes sense. If " $v$ " is high enough (more than one half in this instance), firms are unwilling to sacrifice future earnings for immediate profits. Conversely, if " $v$ " is low, firms disregard future earnings and emphasize short-term **results**.<sup>25</sup>

#### *DISCOUNT RATES*

The discount rate measures the relative value of a dollar of future earnings compared with a dollar of present earnings. The interest rate is a part — but only a part — of this. Also important is the uncertainty about future market conditions. Perhaps consumer demand will slacken, other suppliers will enter the industry, restrictive regulations will impede price adjustments — and future profits will dissipate. Perhaps demand will grow and entry barriers will harden, increasing future profits. Perhaps rival firms will differentiate their products and segment the **market**.<sup>26</sup>

Future earnings in an inflationary economy are worth less in real dollars. In a

competitive market, they are also uncertain: anticipated profits may never materialize. Business strategy, which determines the quantities supplied and the prices charged, affects the realization of future profits.

The size of the discount rate (" $v$ ") needed to discourage price cutting varies with the number of competing firms. If there are two firms of equal size, " $v$ " must be greater than  $\frac{1}{2}$ , as the equation above implies. If there are ten rival firms of equal size, " $v$ " must be greater than  $\frac{9}{10}$  to discourage price cutting.<sup>27</sup> The insurance market has hundreds of rival firms in the major lines of business, so this simple model implies that the discount rate must be near unity to discourage price cutting. But if insurers generally price at marginal cost, why are there severe profit cycles? To answer this problem, we present a more sophisticated model. First, however, let us take another detour: How does a firm choose an "optimal" price?

#### **LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY BARRIERS**

The optimal price depends upon the strength of entry barriers. If entry barriers are low and profits are high, new firms enter the market. Entrants can not gain market share if they charge the current price, so they have little to lose by price cutting.<sup>28</sup> Incumbent firms rarely let the market price remain high enough to attract new entrants.

The cut-off price between attracting and discouraging new entrants is termed the "limit price." But why should the limit price be any different from the competitive marginal cost price? If all firms have the same production costs, then any price exceeding marginal cost attracts new entrants.\*

But firms do not all have the same production costs. In particular, new firms face a fixed (sunk) cost of entry, so the limit price exceeds the marginal cost price.<sup>30</sup>

In theory, there are few barriers to entry in insurance. The insurer need build no factories to manufacture its product; it may contract for the needed actuarial, underwriting, and loss adjustment skills; and statutory capitalization requirements are not excessively onerous (though they are higher than they were before the advent of risk-based capital requirements). The firm may simply “hang out a shingle” and begin writing policies.

In practice, this is not correct. In the Personal Lines market, the direct writers are profitable whereas the independent agency companies are losing money. Yet few independent agency companies have successfully switched to direct writing or exclusive agency distribution systems. The constraints on the distribution system are powerful, raising large entry barriers to the profitable insurance markets.<sup>31</sup>

The traditional barriers to entry, such as minimum efficient production scales, or the advertising budget needed to place products on retail shelves, are not important in insurance. The insurance “distribution” barrier to entry does not involve getting consumers to purchase policies. Rather, it involves getting the better risks to purchase policies.

We return to this topic later on, in our model of underwriting cycles. Note, however, how deceptive these barriers to entry are. It is easy to enter the insurance market, since there are no major capital or regulatory barriers. It is far more difficult to enter successfully.

These are the bounds postulated by industrial economics. In the long run, prices will not remain below marginal cost or above the limit **price**.<sup>32</sup> The actual prices charged depend on the number of firms, the extent of “conjectural variation,” the discount rate assumed by each firm, and other factors affecting the price-cost margin.

The theoretical economist would ascribe the insurance industry's lowprofitability to the competitive characteristics of its market? But we need a more specific analysis to understand underwriting cycles, so we ask: "**How do** the nature of the insurance product and the operations of the insurance carrier affect anticipated profits?"

## **Section IV: Insurance Industry Characteristics**

An industry's structure and the characteristics of its products influence both expected profits and strategic possibilities. Three considerations particularly germane to insurance are

1. Product differentiation and substitute products,
2. Cost structures and barriers to entry, and
3. Consumer loyalty and price shopping.

We begin with these insurance attributes, in preparation for the analysis of underwriting cycles.

### **PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION**

When firms supply products with varying attributes, such as automobiles, computer hardware, and fashion clothing, each of them may enjoy some market power and associated economic profits. When the products of competing firms do not vary much, as is true in agriculture, all firms may be constrained by the prices of the most efficient producer. In short, product differentiation increases expected profits.

Most insurance policies are indistinguishable to the average consumer. In certain lines of business, such as Workers' Compensation and no-fault Auto Insurance, benefits are mandated by statute. Even where no laws impede differentiation, product diversity is hard to maintain. Improved policy forms can be copied by rivals, so advantageous innovations are transient.

The existence of close substitutes for an industry's products has a similar effect: substitutability constrains profitability. For instance, aluminum often can be substituted for steel. Aluminum prices constrain steel profitability, regardless of competition in the steel industry.

In many lines of business, there are few substitutes for insurance. The Personal Lines consumer has no choice but to purchase an Auto Insurance or Homeowners' policy. Similarly, most small business owners must buy Workers' Compensation insurance, since self insurance techniques are feasible mostly for large and sophisticated companies. The rising claims consciousness of the public, and the increasing predilection of Americans to turn to the courts, strengthens the demand for Commercial Liability products. Small businesses have no alternative other than to buy insurance protection.

In sum, the lack of product differentiation means that individual insurers have difficulty increasing prices and profits. But the lack of close substitutes for an essential product means that the industry as a whole can raise or lower premium rates without losing consumer demand. Formally, aggregate consumer demand for insurance products is inelastic with respect to price, but inter-firm elasticity is high.

#### COST STRUCTURES AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY

We distinguished above between traditional and "hidden" barriers to entry. Traditional barriers depend on cost structures: minimum efficient plant size, up-front capital requirements, the time needed to enter, and production process learning curves. Potential entrants observe these costs, which influence their willingness to join the industry.

Insurance has few traditional barriers to entry. Almost all costs, whether losses, loss adjustment expenses, commissions, salaries, and premium taxes, are variable, not **fixed**.<sup>34</sup> No plants need be built, no expensive equipment is required, and statutory capitalization requirements are **manageable**.<sup>35</sup> Most costs are paid either on the policy effective date (e.g., commissions) or after the policy is in force (e.g., losses)? The cash inflows from “producing” an insurance policy precede the cash outflows, thereby facilitating the entry of new firms. Underwriting intricacies are not readily discernable, and many entrants believe that there is no significant learning curve. [In fact, casualty underwriting is a fine art, but new entrants sometimes seem loath to admit this.] Finally, a firm can contract for underwriting, actuarial, accounting, and loss adjustment skills, so little time is needed before writing policies.

As we noted earlier, the “hidden” barriers to entry in insurance are powerful. It is easy to enter the insurance marketplace; it is far more difficult to enter successfully. New entrants attract marginal risks, and actual insurance losses are high in early policy periods. It takes many years to obtain a profitable book of business (Conning & Co. [1988]).

So new firms continuously enter the insurance market. Were earnings steady, the high rate of entry would depress expected profits. But fluctuating earnings, and the “hidden” entry barriers discussed above, impair the chances of successful operations. Many new entrants, with low quality books of business, do not last through the trough of the first underwriting cycle.

## CONSUMER **LOYALTY**

Price changes affect purchasing decisions. If the price for a particular brand of

toothpaste rises 10%, some buyers of that toothpaste may switch to other brands.

Some goods have large “switching costs.” Consumers of large electrical equipment may not change suppliers unless prices rise substantially, since such a switch would involve costs of installation, inspection, testing, retraining, and adapting other machinery. In other words, consumer loyalty to a particular brand or supplier depends upon the costs of changing **products**.<sup>37</sup> High switching costs impede competition and raise expected profits.

Toothpaste, unlike large electrical equipment, has no “switching costs.” Consumers have no constraints, either *ante* hoc or post hoc, on the brands they choose. When switching costs are absent, competition more easily dissipates economic profits.

Insurance seems similar. At renewal time, a consumer can purchase coverage from a competing carrier with no additional costs or gaps in coverage. This implies low expected profits in insurance.

In truth, insurance is not at all like toothpaste, particularly in the Personal Lines. Insureds rarely compare competitors’ prices when their policies come up for renewal, whether or not they made such comparisons when they first obtained the **coverage**.<sup>38</sup> Only if an insurer dramatically raises its rates will policyholders begin searching for other agents or carriers.

Over the long term, insurance is no different from other goods. Higher than average prices cause a slow but steady loss of market share, which is extremely difficult to win back. But in the short term, a reputable insurer can maintain a

higher than average price-cost margin without a significant loss of business.

Were insurance earnings steady, long-term expected profits would be low. The lack of product differentiation and the apparent ease of entry would force insurers to price close to marginal cost. But the lack of close substitutes, consumer loyalty, and the difficulty of successful entry facilitate short-term price fluctuations. These characteristics of the insurance industry underlie the model of underwriting cycles in the following sections.

## **Section V: Dynamics of the Underwriting Cycle**

### **PROFIT CYCLES**

Profit fluctuations may take two forms. In the first form, the market is in equilibrium during certain periods. External influences change costs, supply, or demand, and they thereby shift expected profits. Disequilibrium results until the price mechanism forces profits back to the original level. If external influences again affect the market, the fluctuations start anew.

Such profit fluctuations are rarely cyclical. For instance, weather conditions affect farm produce and profits: an unexpected frost may damage citrus fruit production, or a severe drought may lower crop supply. The affected farmers suffer from lost production, while other farmers benefit from higher prices. Prices and profits fluctuate, but the pattern is not cyclical.

Underwriting cycles take a different form: no phase is in equilibrium. Insurer strategies during profitable years drive rates down; changed strategies during poor years push rates up.

At two points in the cycle, in the upswing and the downturn, prices pass through the same point. But the underlying forces are different. One reflects a downward driving price strategy founded on high rates; the other reflects an upward driving price strategy founded on inadequate rates. This difference may be missed by an outsider looking at a snapshot of industry income. But the disparity is keenly felt by the businessman struggling for profits.

### *THE PROFITABLE YEARS*

If there is no equilibrium point, there is no good place to begin analyzing the cycle. Yet we must start somewhere. So we begin, perhaps arbitrarily, at the top, as in 1977-78 or 1986-87 or 1992-94 (for workers' compensation): income is high and insurers are satisfied.

### *ENTRY AND EXIT*

Satisfaction breeds desire. Outside firms are enchanted by the ease of insurance operations: simply write the policy, collect the premium, and pay less in claims while you invest the assets. There are few explicit barriers to entry, so new firms join the industry.

The accompanying graph shows insurance company entries and exits in the 1980's. Note the prevalence of entry into an industry earning below average profits and with low growth potential. Many of these entrants quickly fail. Insurance company exits climbed during the unprofitable 1984-85 and 1989 periods, and dipped in the profitable 1980-82 and 1987 periods.<sup>39</sup>

New insurers can not sell their policies at the going market rate. Entrants must discount prices in any industry. This is all the more true in insurance, where it is hard to attract new customers. But new insurers believe that they have little to lose by charging lower rates. They have no existing business, so they do not lose money on older policyholders by cutting rates. Any price above marginal cost is profit.<sup>40</sup>

## *PRICE SHAVING AND MARKET SHARES*

New entrants charging low rates are an unwelcome thorn in the industry's side. Equally unwelcome is the change in strategy among existing insurers.

The model presented above in the section titled "Competition and Profits" assumes an equal division of the market among insurers. Suppose, instead, that there are 10 firms: one has 50% of the market, 8 have 6% of the market, and 1 has 2% of the market, and that the appropriate discount rate is 10% per annum. Let us restore the ideal assumptions for a moment: if any firm cuts prices it immediately attracts all consumers. Moreover, if any firm cuts prices, its competitors reduce their prices to marginal cost.

The large firm presently earns 50% of the industry's economic profits. If current pricing continues, it will earn this amount in perpetuity. Using the notation of Section III, where " $E^m$ " is annual economic profits at the market price, and " $v$ " is the discount rate, the present value of this profit stream is  $(50\%)(E^m)(1 + v + v^2 + \dots)$ . This equals or  $5.5 \times E^m$  at a discount rate of 10%. If the insurer cuts prices slightly, it earns a bit below  $E^m$  in the current year, but no economic profits in all future years. The large firm has an incentive to continue its present pricing strategy.

Now consider the firm with only 2% of the market. It now earns 2% of the industry's economic profits. If conditions do not change, it will earn this amount in perpetuity. The present value of its profit stream is  $(2\%)(E^m)(1 + v + v^2 + \dots)$ , or  $0.22 \times E^m$  at a 10% discount rate. If it cuts prices slightly, it earns much more than this in the current year. The small but aggressive firm has a strong incentive to cut prices.<sup>41</sup>

Realistically, of course, the small insurer will not instantly capture the entire market with a small price reduction. Most policyholders are loyal to their current insurers, and they often ignore competitors' rates at renewal time. The small firm's rate decrease would slowly increase its market share: say, 10% a year. Although substantial, the gain is not overwhelming.

The large insurer expects different outcomes. A carrier with 50% of the market may have already saturated its target customer populations. Even if it desires to grow rapidly, there are few new insureds for it to attract. The large firm's rate reduction may increase its market share only 1% a year.

### **Rival Responses**

Competitive responses to rate cuts by a small firm or a large firm also differ, particularly in insurance. Premium rates vary by classification, territory, type of coverage, and similar dimensions. Rate comparisons can be an exhausting task, especially when the classification schemes of the insurers differ. So carriers do not monitor premium rates of small companies. In Personal Auto insurance, insurers analyze the rates charged by State Farm, Allstate, and a handful of other large carriers. The premiums charged by smaller insurers are revealed only in industry-wide accounting statistics. Actual rates, although publicly available in rate filings, are rarely examined.

Moreover, rivals do not react swiftly to rate cuts by small insurers. If a firm with 1% of the market has a 10% growth in business, and the new business is drawn evenly from its rivals, then the other firms suffer only a 0.1% decrease in volume. If an insurer with 50% of the market has the same growth, its rivals lose

10% of their business.

Thus, when rates are high, small insurers are tempted to cut prices aggressively.<sup>42</sup> Their actions may not be noticed, responses of rivals will be delayed, they may increase market share rapidly, and their revenues will climb. Large insurers, however, have less incentive to reduce rates. Their market shares increase more slowly, their actions are quickly noticed, competitors respond swiftly, and the premium lost on existing business may exceed the premium gained on new insureds.

The incentive for an incumbent insurer to reduce rates depends on the expected profits in its renewal book of business. Renewal business is generally more profitable than new business, and insurers strive to maintain policyholder loyalty. An incumbent insurer may reduce its own rates to avoid the loss of profitable renewal business to a competitor.

The profitable phase of the underwriting cycle is in disequilibrium. Some firms enjoy current earnings, others aggressively seek to grow, and entrants clamor to join the industry.

### **Competitive Strategies**

Profits influence business strategies. As the profitable phase of the underwriting cycle continues, more firms ignore short term income and seek growth. For simplicity, let us differentiate strategies between (a) aggressive growth and (b) price maintenance. Assume that at time " $t$ ,"  $w\%$  of firms emphasize aggressive growth and  $(100 - w)\%$  of firms emphasize price maintenance.

The change in "w" depends upon the sign and magnitude of economic profits, labeled "p" here. The greater the economic profits and the longer the economic profits are expected to persist, the more firms will seek aggressive growth?

This price maintenance strategy is not sustainable. If your rivals are cutting prices and gaining market share, you must either respond or disappear. But the optimal response depends on the number of firms reducing rates. If the percentage of firms aggressively seeking market share is small, then it is reasonable to hold prices above marginal cost. The high level of policyholder loyalty to the insurer means that insurance market share growth is a slow process. For instance, suppose that 10% of firms are aggressively cutting rates, or  $w = 10\%$ . (For simplicity, assume that firms are of equal size, so 10% of firms means 10% of the market.) If such discounts provide a 10% annual growth in market share, then these firms will have 11% of the market after a year's time, and their rivals will remain with 89% of the market. The maintenance of high prices has led to a 1% reduction in market share - a small loss compared to current profits.

If 50% of firms are aggressively reducing prices, the outcome changes. The same 10% market share growth for these firms reduces their rivals' portion from 50% to 45%. Short term profits do not offset a 10% loss of business.

### **The Nadir of the Cycle**

How might one respond? Following rates downward is no remedy. The insurance industry has thousands of firms, a competitive structure, and invitingly easy entry conditions. Expected profits would be extremely low if prices were left purely to market pressures.

Indeed, premium rates do not drop slowly when the cycle heads downward. Rather, prices cascade downward, to well below marginal cost. Industry wide Annual Statement operating income was negative in 1975 and again in 1984-85. Moreover, the reported operating ratios conceal the true severity of underwriting cycles, for several reasons:

- First, accounting data does not include a “reasonable profit” margin, though the economist’s marginal cost does. For instance, a 2% accounting return on equity is a severe economic loss.
- Second, most insurers desire steady earnings, particularly if their financial statements are scrutinized by government regulators or by stockholders. Insurers tend to under-reserve during poor years, thereby increasing net income. Conversely, when profits improve, insurers strengthen reserves of prior years, dampening their reported earnings.

It is difficult to quantify these effects, since the “reasonable insurance profit margin” is much disputed and reserve strengthening and weakening is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, rates were surely below marginal cost during 1974 and 1983 (in addition to 1975 and 1984-85).

- Third, the severity of the cycle differs by line. General Liability rates, for example, were below marginal cost in 1982 and perhaps in 1981 also. In other words, an accurate analysis of income adjusted for reserve changes by line of business with a reasonable profit provision shows severe price inadequacies for years in a row.

To recapitulate: during profitable years, there are incentives for small firms to

aggressively seek market share and for new firms to enter the insurance industry. The lack of product differentiation, the positive cash flow from insurance operations, and the ease of entry would normally reduce or eliminate profits from the industry.

Yet total consumer demand for insurance is inelastic with respect to price. The difficulty of price comparisons and consumer loyalty to insurers provide a large potential profit margin.

The deciding factor is business strategy. If firms aggressively seek market share by cutting rates, profits decline for all insurers. Formal agreements to maintain high prices are not sustainable in an industry as competitive as insurance. Rather, small firms and new entrants may be dissuaded from pursuing overly aggressive strategies by the competitive reactions of incumbent insurers.

Thus, the downward rate spiral is not a reflection of simple competitive pricing. Rather, it is a competitive response to aggressive strategies. By temporarily cutting rates below marginal cost, incumbent insurers hope to persuade more aggressive but short-sighted firms to modify their objectives from market share to profitability.

### **Changing Strategies**

Indeed, as operating profitability decreases, overly aggressive insurers begin to rethink their strategy. First, low prices no longer attract additional consumers, since even the major firms have cut rates. Second, if profits remain negative, all firms suffer.

The changes in insurer strategies are revealed in the insurance trade press and trade conferences. As the cycle deepens, laments on the evils of price cutting become frequent, and exhortations to refrain from the unprofitable pursuit of premium abound. These public proclamations are disavowals of aggressive intentions. Insurers say: “We renounce the use of rate reductions to gain market share, for we see the folly of our ways.”

We can model the change in strategy as follows. As the trough of the underwriting cycle continues, more firms renounce market share gains and seek profitable business. The larger the expected losses, and the longer the duration of the expected losses, the more the firms emphasize increased profitability.

### **Industry Discipline**

When the cycle turns up, insurers who previously engaged in competitive “warfare” seem to raise rates in unison. Politicians, consumer activists, and the legal community suspect antitrust violations. But there is no collusion, no intercompany agreements, and only a general knowledge of competitors’ intentions.<sup>44</sup>

Rather, the change in behavior reflects the change in strategy. The public exhortations during the trough of the cycle are not accompanied by rate increases. Each insurer knows that if it raises prices unilaterally, it will lose business, not return to profitability. In fact, most insurers always knew that severe rate cutting is destructive to the industry. The public statements are intended to persuade other firms to cease overly aggressive behavior. They are not explanations of any firm’s current **actions**.<sup>45</sup>

Consider again the formal model. If economic profits are sufficiently negative long enough, most firms will have shifted their emphasis from market share growth to maintaining profitable rates. Yet a high price maintenance strategy is profitable only if all or most firms in the industry follow this path. Indeed, after two or three years of pricing below marginal cost, most firms are committed to writing profitable business. But how does one move from a low price situation to a high price situation?

### **Market Leaders**

In a highly competitive and fragmented industry like insurance, firms can not easily monitor the actions, much less the strategies, of their rivals. They need a barometer of industry feelings.

Rate filings make dull newsprint. "The XYZ Insurance Company has requested a 5.1% rate increase in Arizona for Bodily Injury coverage, 4.3% for Property Damage, . . ." Who would ever read such details?

The National *Underwriter* periodically records State Farm's rate filings (often only State Farm's filings) in various jurisdictions. State Farm is the market leader and low cost carrier in Personal Lines coverages. It serves as the barometer of industry movement through the underwriting cycle.<sup>46</sup> By examining and following State Farm's actions, other firms maintain a close grasp on industry price movements, even if they lack the resources to monitor competitive rates on their own.

When other carriers see State Farm raising rates, they know that firm strategies

have shifted sufficiently to allow maintenance of high prices. Insurers follow (or sometimes even anticipate) the market leader in the various jurisdictions, leading to the good years of the cycle.

In the Commercial Lines, there is no clear market leader. The major Commercial Lines insurers, such as Travelers, Hartford, CNA, AIG, and Liberty Mutual, have relatively small countrywide market shares. Other carriers do not follow **AIG's** General Liability rates the way they examine State Farm's Personal Auto rates. Consequently, the industry trade press rarely mentions Commercial Lines rate **actions**.<sup>47</sup>

### **Rating Bureaus**

Rather, Commercial Lines insurance strategies are revealed by deviations from bureau rates or bureau loss costs. The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), and state bureaus in certain jurisdictions (e.g., California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania), provide loss costs for all classifications. Similarly, the Insurance Services Office (**ISO**) provides loss cost data for the other Commercial Lines. Most insurers use **NCCI** or **ISO** rates as a benchmark, and file rate deviations or independent rates with state insurance departments.

After several years of unprofitable operations, insurers know that the industry is ready to increase rates. **ISO** (or another rating bureau) provides the catalyst. When private insurers follow **ISO** loss costs, without seeking major deviations, firms know that the industry is committed to profitable rates. The individual carriers may then curtail schedule rating credits and other price modifications, confident that their rivals are doing the same.

Profits encourage aggressive rate cutting. After one or two good years, insurer strategies begin emphasizing market share growth, and **newfirms** are attracted to the industry. The cycle begins anew, in perpetual disequilibrium.

## Section VI: Public Policy

As each cycle rolls through the industry, insurers ponder: "What determines the severity and frequency of **underwriting** cycles? What lines of business are most subject to them? When will the cycle turn? How do state regulation and statutes influence cycles?" It is time to answer these questions.

### POLICYHOLDER **LOYALTY** AND PRICE **ELASTICITY**

The beckoning of profits leads the cycle. Why drive rates down if you can not recoup the losses later? Firms would prefer to price at marginal cost rather than lose money over the long term.

Periods of high prices are sustainable only if consumers do not reduce their purchases of the good and do not switch to rival suppliers. In other words, the price elasticity of demand must be low enough that consumer demand will not drop substantially when suppliers raise prices.

Removing statutory requirements for Personal Automobile and Workers' Compensation insurance, and curtailing judicial awards in commercial liability cases, might increase the price elasticity of demand for insurance. But the statutory insurance requirements help the victims of motor vehicle and workplace accidents. The benefits they provide outweigh the disadvantages of premium rate fluctuations.

The unpredictability of jury awards in commercial liability cases provide little social benefit, and the harm to society extends beyond insurance availability and

rate fluctuation concerns. Unfortunately, the limited success of tort reform efforts in the 1980's and early 1990's highlight the intractability of this problem. To restate this: the trial bar is a powerful interest group that opposes tort reform. The result of the pervasive attorney involvement in insurance claims are bloated insurance costs and the redistribution of wealth from citizens to a particular profession (see **AIRAC [1988; 19891]**). More volatile underwriting cycles are simply an additional side-effect.

Policyholder loyalty results from the difficulty of price comparisons. Personal Lines policyholders may be unaware of price slashing by competing insurers, since they rarely price shop at renewal. An insurer can maintain high prices for a short period without a major loss of market share when its competitors begin cutting rates.

Price increases, however, encourage insureds to seek better rates elsewhere. Unilateral price increases cause a loss of market share, as consumers switch to rival carriers. Industry-wide price increases are easier to sustain, since consumers can not do better elsewhere in the marketplace. Thus, the descent to the trough of the cycle is precipitated by a small group of insurers, but the return to profitability is a uniform movement.

Greater consumer price information would reduce loyalty to the current insurer and mitigate the severity of underwriting cycles.<sup>48</sup> Firms would not be able to sustain high prices in the face of competitive price cutting without rapidly losing market share. Prices closer to cost would prevail over the duration of the underwriting cycle.

Life insurance regulation demonstrates the difficulty of providing price

comparisons. The **NAIC** Life Insurance Solicitation Model Regulation requires that insurers illustrate surrender cost and net payment cost indices for 10 and 20 year durations, but few consumers examine these numbers (see Black and Skipper [1994]). Such comparisons are difficult, and few individuals expend the effort to understand them.

The same is true for Property/Casualty insurance. Consumers do not forgo price comparisons because the information is not available. Rather, the information is not available because the price comparisons are so distasteful.

### **Underwriting Cycles by Line**

The history of underwriting cycles in America illustrates these relationships. During the 1960's and 1970's, underwriting cycles were most pronounced for Personal Automobile and Workers' Compensation insurance. In the 1980's, General Liability and other commercial liability lines showed the greatest fluctuations in profitability: negative in 1981-1984 and highly positive in 1986-1988.

This difference is influenced by demand elasticities and barriers to entry. Personal Automobile and Workers' Compensation insurance are statutorily mandated by Financial Responsibility or compulsory insurance laws. Price elasticity of demand is low.<sup>50</sup>

The opposite was true for General Liability until the 1970's. Believing that they had little exposure to liability hazards, many small businesses declined to purchase the coverage. Large corporations often used other risk management techniques, such as self-funding and captives.

In the 1950's and **1960's**, many Personal Lines insurers used bureau rates, either as actual rates or as a baseline for pricing. By the **1980's**, the low cost direct writers, such as State Farm and Allstate had garnered most of the Personal Lines market. The efficient distribution systems of these insurers formed strong barriers to entry or expansion by other firms.

The opposite course has characterized the Commercial Liability lines of business. The major direct writers do not dominate these markets. Moreover, the lengthening tails in these lines and the rising interest rates in the 1970's increased the disparity between bureau rates and marginal cost.

The high costs of Workers' Compensation insurance in the late **1980's**, exacerbated by large residual market loads in many jurisdictions, led many employers to alternative risk management techniques, such as group self-insurance and large dollar deductible policies. Price elasticity of demand increased, and a uniform increase in price would drive the better risks from the insurance market. So Workers' Compensation remained unprofitable through the **1980's**, until the state legislative reforms and the managed care revolution of the 1990's lowered loss costs without necessitating large rate increases.

#### REGULATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Changes in state regulation may influence underwriting cycles. During the 1960's and early **1970's**, many states moved from prior approval regulation to open competition **laws**.<sup>51</sup> Competitive rating laws allow more freedom for private insurers to vary premium rates in attempts to gain market share or increase profits.

The 1980's and 1990's show ambiguous trends. California adopted prior approval regulation in November 1988, with the passage of Proposition 103, and consumer groups in other states are pushing similar legislation. Meanwhile, the low cost direct writers are driving agency companies out of the Personal Lines market. Tighter governmental regulation and increasing market concentration may dampen the severity of Personal Automobile underwriting **cycles**.<sup>52</sup>

Social developments in the 1980's and 1990's have had the opposite effect on the Commercial Liability lines. The expansion of tort law doctrines, and the increasing unpredictability of jury awards, have made coverage essential even for small firms. State regulation is less restrictive, since commercial insureds can fend for themselves and do not need the governmental protection that ordinary citizens require. The major rating bureaus, such as **ISO** and NCCI, have changed from advisory rates to loss costs in most jurisdictions and may soon be further transformed into quasi-consulting organizations. Commercial lines rate and form deregulation is possible in the early years of the **21<sup>st</sup> century**.

Consequently, General Liability promises potential profits for the discerning **insurer**.<sup>53</sup> In the late **1970's**, insurers complained vociferously about rising and unjustified liability awards. The criticism was correct: the American legal system encourages lawsuits and the redistribution of wealth from the public to the trial bar. But a secondary effect of these complaints was to impress upon businesses the need for liability coverage.

Numerous suppliers – major carriers, small firms, and new entrants -joined the fray, and insurers began positioning themselves (that is, cutting prices to build market share) for the anticipated profits. The aggressive competition threatened to eliminate the foreseen returns.

So General Liability entered the trough of a severe underwriting cycle, with firms slashing rates well below cost. The consequences were striking: when rates rose in 1985, there was an almost complete absence of aggressive price cutting.<sup>54</sup>

And the cycle continues. The aggressive competition that precipitated the rise in rates in the mid-1980's led to price cutting a few years later. The waning influence of rating bureaus and administered pricing systems in the fragmented insurance market will lead to even more severe swings in premiums.

\* \* \* \* \*

Underwriting cycles are a means of maintaining long-term profits, not a random occurrence that removes them. Insurance underwriting cycles are the display of competitive pricing in a free marketplace. To optimize the results of their companies, pricing actuaries must learn to adapt their rate setting techniques to the phases of the underwriting cycle.

## Section VII: References

AICPA, Insurance Companies Committee, Auditing Standards Division, "Discounting Claims of Insurance Enterprises," (Draft Issues Paper, March 1983).

All-Industry Research Advisory Council, ***Attorney Involvement in Auto Injury*** Claims (Oak Brook, IL: All-Industry Research Advisory Council, 1988).

All-Industry Research Advisory Council, Compensation for ***Automobile Injuries in the United States***, (Oak Brook, IL: AIRAC, March 1989).

Almagro, Manuel, and Thomas L. Gheui, "Federal Income Taxes • Provisions Affecting Property/Casualty Insurers," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 75 (1988), pages 95-161.

Anderson, Dan R., and Roger A. Formisano, "Causal Factors in P-L Insolvency," ***Journal of Insurance Regulation***, Volume 6, No. 4 (June 1988), pages 449-461.

Appel, David and James Gerofsky, "Regulating Competition: The Case of Workers Compensation Insurance," ***Journal of Insurance Regulation***, Volume 3, No. 4 (June 1985), pages 408-425.

Appel, David and James Gerofsky, "Regulating Competition: The Case of Workers Compensation Insurance," ***NCCI Digest***, Volume 2, Issue 3 (September 1987), pages 1-18.

Balcerek, Rafal J., "The Capital Investment Market and the Insurance Industry," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 55 (1968), pages 186-195.

Banfield, Carol, "P/C Insurer Profitability: ISO Paid Claims Data," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 5, No. 2 (December 1986), pages 268-276.

Bailey, Robert A., "A Review of the Little Report on Rates of Return in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 56 (1969), pages 133-162.

Berger, Lawrence, "A Model of the Underwriting Cycle in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 55 (1988).

*Best's Insolvency Study: Property/Casualty Insurers 1969-1990* (Oldwick, NJ: A. M. Best Company, June 1991).

Bickelhaupt, David L., *General Insurance*, Tenth Edition (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1979).

Bierwag, G. O., George G. Kaufman, and Alden Toevs, "Duration: Its Development and Use in Bond Portfolio Management," *financial Analysts Journal*, (July-August 1983).

Black, Kenneth, Jr., and Harold D. Skipper, Jr., *Life Insurance*, Twelfth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994).

Bloom, Thomas S., "Cycles and Solutions," *Bests Review: Property/Casualty Edition*, Volume 86, No. 6 (October **1987**), pages 20 ff.

Boor, Joseph, "A Macroeconomic View of the Insurance Marketplace" (CAS Exam **5** study note, **1999A**)

Boor, Joseph, "The Impact of the Insurance Economic Cycle on Insurance Pricing" (CAS Exam 5 study note, **1999B**)

Braithwaite, Paul, "P/C Profitability: The Long-Term View," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 6, No. 1 (September **1987**), pages 96-104.

**Brock**, Gerald W., "The Computer Industry," in Walter Adams (ed.), *The Structure of American Industry* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, **1986**), pages 239-260.

Butsic, Robert P., "Determining the Proper Interest Rate for Loss Reserve Discounting: An Economic Approach," *Evaluating Insurance Company Liabilities* (Casualty Actuarial Society 1988 Discussion Paper Program) pages 147-188.

Butsic, Robert P., "The Effect of Inflation on Losses and Premiums for Property-Liability Insurers," in *Inflation Implications for Property-Casualty Insurance* (Casualty Actuarial Society 1981 Discussion Paper Program), pages 51-102.

Butsic, Robert P., "The Underwriting Cycle: A Necessary Evil?" *The Actuarial Digest*, Volume 8, No. 2 (April/May 1989).

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws* (Washington, D. C: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1990).

Cholnoky, Thomas V., and Jeffrey Cohen, *Property/Casualty 10K Loss Reserve Disclosures* (Goldman Sachs, May 31, 1989).

Conning & Co., *New Business versus Renewals: The Cost of New Business in a Soft Market* (Hartford, CN: Conning & Co., June 1988).

Conning and Company, *The Real Property & Casualty Cycle: Behind the Reported Results* (Conning & Co., December 1987).

Countryman, Gary L., "Open Competition Rating for Workers' Compensation," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 1, No. 1 (September **1982**), pages 9-22.

Cummins, J. David, and Scott E. Harrington, "Property-Liability Insurance Rate Regulation: Estimation of Underwriting Betas Using Quarterly Profit Data," *The Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 52, No. 1 (March **1985**), pages 16-43.

Cummins, J. David, Scott E. Harrington, and Robert W. Klein, "Cycles and Crises," *Best's Review: Property/Casualty Edition*, Volume 92, No. 9 (January **1992**), pages 15 ff.

Cummins, J. David, Scott E. Harrington, and Robert W. Klein, "Cycles and Crises in Property/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications for Public Policy," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 10, No. 1 (Fall **1991**), pages 50-93.

Cummins, J. David, Scott E. Harrington, and Robert W. Klein (eds.), *Cycles and Crises in Property/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications for Public Policy* (National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1991).

Cummins, J. David, and J. Francois Outreville, "An International Analysis of Underwriting Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 54, Number 2 (June 1987), pages 246-252.

Cummins, J. David, and David J. Nye, "Inflation and Property-Liability Insurance," in John D. Long and Everett D. Randall (eds.) *Issues in Insurance*, Third Edition (Malvern, PA: American Institute for Property and Liability Underwriters, 1984), Volume I.

Danzon, Patricia Munch, "Rating Bureaus in U.S. Property Liability Insurance Markets: Anti or Pro-competitive?" *The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance*, Vol 8, No. 29 (October 1983), pages 371-402.

D'Arcy, Stephen P., "Application of Economic Theories of Regulation to the Property-Liability Insurance Industry," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 7, No. 1 (September 1988), pages 19-51.

D'Arcy, Stephen P., and Neil A. Doherty, *The Financial Theory of Pricing Property-Liability Insurance Contracts* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1988).

D'Arcy, Stephen P. and James R. Garven, "Property-Liability Insurance Pricing Models: An Empirical Evaluation," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 57, No. 3 (September 1990), pages 391-419.

Daykin, Chris D., Teivo Pentikäinen, and M. Pesonen, *Practical Risk Theory for Actuaries*, First Edition (Chapman and Hall, 1994).

Department of Justice, Report to the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities, *The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance*, (January 1977).

Douglas, Evan J., *Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis: Theory and Applications* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982).

Eley, David F., "Investment Income in Ratemaking: An Alternative to the Cycle," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 5, No. 2 (December 1986), pages 180-188.

Ezekiel, Mordechai, "The Cobweb Theorem," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (February 1938), pages 255-280; reprinted in Haberler, Gottfried, (ed.), *Readings in Business Cycle Theory* (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1944), pages 422-442.

Fairley, William, "Investment Income and Profit Margins in Property-Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results," *The Bell Journal of Economics* 10 (Spring 1979) pages 192-210; reprinted in J. David Cummins and Scott E. Harrington (eds.), *Fair Rate of Return in Property-Liability Insurance* (Boston: Kluwer\* Nijhoff Publishing, 1987), pages 1-26.

Feldblum, Sholom, "Asset Liability Matching for Property/Casualty Insurers," *Valuation Issues* (Casualty Actuarial Society 1989 Discussion Paper Program), pages 117-154.

Fox, Eugene H., "Automobile insurance Analysis: The Twenty-Five and Under Age Driver vs. the Twenty-Six and Over Age Driver," *CPCU Journal*, Volume 33, No. 1 (March **1980**), pages **22-25**.

Friedman, James, *Oligopoly Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

**Fudenberg**, Drew, and Jean Tirole, "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig (eds.), *Handbook of Industrial Organization* (North-Holland: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., **1989**), Volume I, pages 159-328.

**Gleeson**, Owen M., and Gerald I. **Lenrow**, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Tax Reform Act on the Property/Casualty Industry," in *Financial Analysis of Insurance Companies* (Casualty Actuarial Society 1987 Discussion Paper Program), pages 119-190.

Greene, **Winfield W.**, and William F. Roeber, "The 'Permanent' Rate Making Method Adopted by the National Council on Compensation Insurance," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 12 (**1925-26**), pages 253-267.

Hamilton, Thomas M. and Eric L. **Routman**, "Cleaning Up America: Superfund and Its Impact on the Insurance Industry," *CPCU Journal*, Volume 41, No. 3 (September **1988**), pages 172-184.

Harrington, Scott, "The Impact of Insurance Regulation on Prices and Underwriting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Survey," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 51, No. 4 (December **1984**), pages 577-623.

Harrington, Scott E., and Patricia **M.** Danzon, "Price Cutting and Premium Volatility in Liability Insurance Markets," in J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington, and Robert W. Klein (eds.), *Cycles and Crises in Property/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications for Public Policy* (National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1991).

Hill, Raymond, "Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance," *The Bell Journal of Economics*, Vol 10, No. 1 (Spring 1979) pages 172-191.

Insurance Information Institute, *Insurance Antitrust Litigation: The Conspiracy Theory and Related Policy Issues* (New York, April 1988).

Insurance Services **Office**, *Changes in the Economic Environment: Insurance Implications* (October 1991).

Joskow, Paul L., "Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry," *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science*, Volume 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1973) pages 375-427.

Joskow, Paul, "Competition and Regulation in the Property/Casualty Insurance Industry," *Report of the Economic Advisory Panel to the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures*, pages 207-227.

Kahane, Yehuda, "Generation of Investable Funds and the Portfolio Behavior of the Non-Life Insurers," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 45, No. 1 (March **1978**), pages 65-77.

Klein, Robert, "Competition in Private Passenger Automobile Insurance," (A Report to the **NAIC** Personal Lines (C) Committee, September 1989).

Klein, Robert W., "Competitive Rating in Workers' Compensation Insurance: Michigan's Experience," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 5, No. 1 (September **1986**), pages 79-108.

Kozik, Thomas J., "Underwriting Betas-The Shadows of Ghosts," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 81, Numbers 154 and 155 (**1994**), pages 303-329.

Kulp, C. A., and John W. Hall, *Casualty Insurance*, Fourth Edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).

Longley-Cook, Laurence H., "Early Actuarial Studies in the Field of Property and Liability Insurance," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 51 (**1964**), pages 140-146.

Longley-Cook, Lawrence H., "Underwriting Profit in Fire Bureau Rates," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 52 (**1966**), pages 305-311.

Lowe, Stephen P., "A New Performance Measure For P/C Insurers," *Emphasis* (Summer 1988) pages 8-11.

Mahler, Howard C., "An Introduction to Underwriting Profit Models," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 71 (**1987**), pages 239-277.

Manta, Joseph G., and Mark A. Welge, *Toxic Tort . Environmental Hazards Litigation Workshop* (Philadelphia, 1990).

Matison, Raymond A., "Capital Cornucopia," *Best's Review: Property/Casualty Edition*, Volume 88, No. 7 (November **1987**), pages 28 ff.

McGee, Robert T., "The Cycle in Property/Casualty Insurance," *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review*, Autumn 1986, pages 22-30.

Mehr, Robert I., and Emerson Cammack, *Principals of Insurance*, Seventh Edition (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980).

Meidan, Arthur, "Marketing Strategies, Organisation and Performance Control in Insurance," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 49, No. 3 (September **1982**), pages 388-404.

Meyerson, Allen L., "Ensuring the Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance Companies," in Spencer L. Kimball and Herbert S. Denenberg (eds.), *Insurance, Government, and Social Policy* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., **1969**), pages 146-190.

Miccolis, Robert S., "On the Theory of Increased Limits and Excess of Loss Pricing," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 64 (1977) page 27.

Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts, "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," *Econometrica*, Volume 50 (**1982**), pages 443-460.

Morrill, Thomas C., "Motorists' Financial Responsibility Laws," in John D. Long and Davis W.

Gregg (eds.), *Property and Liability Insurance Handbook* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pages 576-599.

Mowbray, Albert H. and S. B. Black, "On the Relation of Accident Frequency to Business Activity," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 2 (1915-1916), pages 418-426.

Myers, Robert J., *Social Security*, Third Edition (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1985).

Myers, Stewart C., and Richard A. Cohn, "A Discounted Cash Flow Approach to Property-Liability Insurance Rate Regulation," in Cummins and Harrington (eds.), *fair Rate of Return in Property-Liability Insurance* (Boston: Kluwer . Nijhoff Publishing, 1987), pages 55-78.

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, "Report of the Advisory Committee on Competitive Rating to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners," *Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners*, (1980, Volume II), pages 440-441.

National Association of Insurance Commissioners Study Committee Report, "Regulating Workers' Compensation Groups," in John D. Long and Everett D. Randall (eds.), *Issues in Insurance*, Volume II, Third Edition (Malvern, PA: The American Institute for Property and Liability Insurance, 1984), pages 1-110.

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, *Proceedings*, 1969, page 310.

Nash, John F., Jr., "Noncooperative Games," *Annals of Mathematics*, Volume 45 (1951), pages 286-295.

Nelson, Robert E., "Property-Liability Company Exits," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 38, No. 3 (September 1971), pages 357-366.

Outreville, J. François, "Underwriting Cycles and Rate Regulation in Automobile insurance Markets," *Journal of Insurance Regulation*, Volume 9, No. 2 (December 1990), pages 274-286.

Panning, William H., "Asset-Liability Matching for a Going Concern," in Edward I Altman and Irwin T. Vanderhoof (eds.), *The Financial Dynamics of the Insurance Industry* (New York: Irwin, 1995), pages 257-292.

Pentikäinen, Bonsdorff, Pesonen, Rantala, and Ruohonen, *Insurance Solvency and Financial Strength* (Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Insurance Training and Publishing Co., 1989).

Plotkin, Irving H., *Prices and Profits in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry*, report to the American Insurance Association (Cambridge, MA: Arthur D. Little, Inc., November 1967).

Plotkin, Irving H., "Rates of Return in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 36, No 3 (June 1969) page 173-200.

Plotkin, Irving H., *Studies on the Profitability, Industrial Structure, Finance, and Solvency of the Property and Liability Insurance Industry* (Cambridge, MA: Arthur D. Little, 1970).

Plotkin, Irving H., "Total Rate of Return and the Regulation of Insurance Profits," *Total Return*

Due a **Property/Casualty Insurance Company (Casualty** Actuarial Society 1979 Discussion Paper Program) pages **206-245**.

Porter, Michael, **Competitive Strategy** (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

Redington, F. M., "Review of the Principles of Life-Office Valuations," *Journal of the Institute of Actuaries*, Volume 18 (1952) pages 286-340.

Resony, Allie V., "Discussion of Thomas O. Carlson's 'Rate Regulation and the Casualty Actuary,'" *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 38 (1951), pages 223-225.

Carlson, Thomas O., "Rate Regulation and the Casualty Actuary," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 38 (1951), pages Q-72; discussions by H. J. Ginsburgh, pages 222-223; Allie V. Resony, pages 223-225; Dudley M. Pruitt, pages **225-230**; R. W. Griffith, pages 230-236; authors review of discussions, pages 236-239.

Ryan, Kevin M., and Richard I. Fein, "A Forecast for Workers Compensation," *NCCI Digest*, Volume III, Issue IV (December 1988).

Scherer, Frederick M., **Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance**, Second Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980).

Shapiro, Carl, "Theories of Oligopoly Behavior," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig (eds.), *Handbook of Industrial Organization* (North-Holland: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., **1989**), Volume I, pages 329-414.

Sherdan, William A., "An Analysis of the Determinants of Demand for Automobile Insurance," *The Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 51, No. 1 (March **1984**), pages 49-62.

Lawrence J. Stem, "Corporate Changes 1989," *Best's Review: Property/Casualty Edition*, Volume 90, No. 11 (March **1990**), pages 20-22.

Stewart, Barbara D., "Profit Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance," in John D. Long and Everett D. Randall (eds.), **Issues in Insurance**, Volume I, Third Edition (Malvern, PA: The American Institute for Property and Liability Underwriters, **1984**), pp. 273-334.

Stone, James M., "A Theory of Capacity and the Insurance of Catastrophe Risks," *The Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Part I in Volume 40, Number 2 (June **1973**), pages 231-243, and Part II in Volume 40, Number 3 (September **1973**), pages 339-355.

Strain, Robert W., "Insurance Pricing and its Role in Relation to **Economic Theory** and Marketing Management," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 33, No. 3 (September **1966**), pages **447-457**.

Tarbell, Thomas F., "The Effect of Changes in Values on Casualty Insurance," *Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society*, Volume 19, Part 1, No. 39 (**1932-33**), pages 1-12.

Taylor, Gregory C., "Underwriting Cycles" (Coopers and Lybrand, 1991).

Tennyson, Sharon, "The Effect of Rate Regulation on Underwriting Cycles," *CPCU Journal*, Volume 44, No. 1 (March **1991**), pages 33-45.

lirole, Jean, *The Theory of **Industrial** Organization* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988).

Van de Kamp, John K., et al., *The State of California versus Hartford **Fire Insurance Company**, et al.* (March 1988, The United States District Court for the Northern District of California)

Varian, Hal R., ***Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach*** (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1987).

Varian, Hal R., *Microeconomic Analysis, Second Edition* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1984).

Venezian, Emilio C., "Ratemaking Methods and Profit Cycles in Property and Liability Insurance," *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, Volume 52, Number 3 (September 1985) pages 477-500.

Victor, Richard A., "Major Challenges Facing Workers' Compensation Systems in the **1990s**," in Richard A. Victor (ed.), *Challenges **for the 1990's*** (Cambridge, MA: Workers Compensation Research Institute, July **1990**), pages 9-23.

Victor, Richard B., and Charles A. Fleischman, *How Choice of Provider and Recessions Affect Medical Costs in Workers' Compensation* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Workers Compensation Research Institute, 1990).

Virginia Bureau of Insurance, State Corporation Commission, *Competition in the **Property and Casualty Insurance** Industry: An Evaluation of Alternative Methods of Rate Regulation* (Richmond, Virginia: January 1978).

Waterson, Michael, *Economic Theory of the **Industry*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

**Woll, Richard G.**, "Insurance Profits: Keeping Score," ***Financial Analysis of Insurance** Companies* (Casualty Actuarial Society 1987 Discussion Paper Program), pages 446-533.

The Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau of Massachusetts, *7977 Rate Filing*, "Expense Cash Flow" section.

## Endnotes

1. Cf. Taylor [1991], page 1: "Individual operators in the insurance market view [the underwriting cycle] as a variable exogenous to the formation of their own plans, one whose timing and magnitude is beyond their control. This engenders a passive attitude to underwriting cycles on the part of insurers."

2. There are opposing influences as well. During recessions, thefts increase, leading to higher automobile comprehensive claims. Employees recently laid off are more likely to file Workers' Compensation claims for minor injuries, since there is no loss of regular income while on disability. Workers' Compensation claim severity also increases, since it is more difficult to find replacement jobs for injured employees (Mowbray and Black [1915], page 425; Greene and Roeber [1925], pages 254-255) For a discerning discussion of the relationship between economic conditions and insurance loss costs in a depressed economy, see Tarbell [1932]. For relationships by line of business, see ISO [1991], page 2, for personal auto, homeowners', and workers' compensation, and Victor and Fleischman [1990] and Victor [1990] for workers' compensation.

Unfortunately, little is known about the correlations between insurance loss costs and macro-economic conditions. Kahane [1978], Hill [1979], and Fairley [1979] find that insurance losses have a slight negative correlation with stock returns. Since stock returns reflect economic conditions, this suggests that loss costs may be related to the economy as well. Other find no significant correlation between underwriting returns and stock prices (Cummins and Hanington [1985]; D'Arcy and Garven [1990]; Kozik [1994]).

In general, the relationships noted in the text are based on conjecture and intuition. This explanation of underwriting cycles fails for other reasons, and the absence of facts among adherents of this theory is simply an additional flaw.

3. The Virginia Bureau of Insurance [1978] interprets underwriting cycles in this fashion. "The insurance cycle is usually out-of-phase with the rest of the economy. When prices for general goods and services are rising, insurance rates are often stable and insurance industry profits are decreasing. By the time that the rate of increase in the price for other goods and services diminishes, data is becoming available showing that insurance rates have not kept up with underlying costs. Insurance rates then increase rapidly and profits improve. This lag between price increases in the insurance industry and the rest of the economy is in large part due to the time required for claims to be reported and settled and for claims data to be collected and evaluated."

4. Cummins, Hanington, and Klein [1991] note that "deviations below ISO advisory rates increased substantially from 1981 through the end of 1983, as the market softened" (pages 59-60; see also Figure 5 on page 59, as well as Cummins, Harrington, and Klein [1992], page 18).

5. Venezian [1985] presents a more sophisticated connection of underwriting cycles with rate making techniques: "Insurers and rating bureaus often use regression of past costs, or of loss ratios, on time as a way of estimating future rate requirements. A model of this process suggests that the rates set by such methods would create a quasi-cyclical pattern of underwriting

profit margins. . . . Empirical data on major lines of property and liability insurance are consistent **with** the hypothesis that ratemaking methods contribute to the fluctuations of underwriting profit margins.”

Venezian suggests only that rate making methods contribute to the cycles, not that they cause them. But all these “rate making” interpretations search for the cycle in actuarial indications, where it does not exist; they ignore competitive pricing strategies, where the cycle is powerful.

Similarly, Pentikainen et al. [1 989] use a statistical model of underwriting cycles to examine the influences of market prices on insurance solvency. Cummins and Outreville [1987] propose a model along the same lines, though with different causal variables: (a) data collection lags, (b) regulatory lags, (c) policy renewal lags, and (d) calendar year financial reporting.

6. Stewart also cites a “cobweb” interpretation for the continuation of underwriting cycles: “Cycles that result from supply’s responding to profit expectations are described in textbook economic theory by what is called a ‘cobweb.’ . . .In agriculture, as in property-liability insurance, demand is steady and supply is variable, with the result that prices tend to move with changes in supply” (page 293).

On the contrary: standard “cobweb” explanations rely on the period to period lag in revising supply. In agriculture, supply can not be adjusted rapidly, since it depends on the amount seeded in previous months, not just on the marketplace price. See, for instance, Ezekiel [1938]: “For a commodity where the production process occupies a definite interval of time, the period considered may be taken as so short that the total supply available cannot be changed within the period (as, for example, the supply of cotton or potatoes once the years crop is harvested)” (page 426), and “The cobweb theory can apply exactly only to commodities which fulfill three conditions: . . . (2) where the time needed for production requires at least one full period before production can be changed. . .” (page 437). A six year cycle presumes a three year production lag (page 436). This is not the case for insurance: supply depends only on price and can be quickly adjusted.

Similarly, Cummins, Harrington, and Klein [1991], in describing Stewart’s thesis, write (page 63): “A key element in this explanation is that competition in soft markets ultimately leads to inadequate rates. Prior academic research includes little or no formal analysis of why competition could cause prices in soft markets to fall below levels needed to cover cost expected when policies are sold and to ensure insurer financial soundness.”

7. Daykin, Pentikainen, and Pesonen [1994] note with regard to a set of large Finnish insurers: “The cycle is effectively the same for each of the . . . insurers, so that we can speak about a market cycle” (emphasis in original).

8. Cf. D’Arcy and Doherty [1988], page 86: “While pejoratively termed “cash flow underwriting,” this willingness to accept underwriting losses is not a symptom of temporary market insanity but is a rational economic reaction to the availability of higher interest rates.”

9. See, for instance, McGee [1986], page 22: “Changes in interest rates are the primary force behind the recurrent swings in the industry’s profitability.” To explain the intensity of the 1980’s cycle in the Commercial Liability lines of insurance, McGee writes: “The combined ratio for long-duration lines of insurance should move more than the ratio for short-duration lines over the interest rate cycle, and the mix of insurance by lines will affect the timing and volatility of the property/casualty cycle” (page 25). He acknowledges that “workers’ compensation lines are

long-tailed, but their combined ratio does not behave as the increased interest-sensitivity principle would suggest,” though he ascribes this anomaly to policyholder dividends and stringent rate regulation.

10. Although discounted cash flows may be used to measure income, the appropriate discount rate for insurance losses is unclear. Lowe [1988] suggests a “negotiated rate” that is set by the senior management of the insurance company. Woll [1987] recommends an after-tax “risk-free” rate, such as the Treasury Bill rate. Butsic [1988] derives a “risk adjusted” discount rate based upon historical insurance experience. Fairley [1979], Hill [1979], and Myers and Cohn [1987] use risk adjusted discount rates, based on extensions of the Capital Assets Pricing Model to insurance losses. The 1986 Federal Income Tax amendments use the federal midterm rate to discount losses; see Gleeson and Lenrow [1987] or Almagro and Ghezzi [1988]. Others have suggested embedded yields, as the Insurance Expense Exhibit uses, or new money market rates, as AICPA [1983] recommends and which most life insurers use. The lack of agreement on the appropriate discount rate hampers consistency among insurance companies in analyzing income.

11. Compare Woll [1987] and Lowe [19\_\_]. Different means of categorizing income are possible; we do not mean to prescribe a particular method. A numerical example should help clarify the intention. Suppose the insurer has \$10 billion of funds from insurance transactions and \$4 billion of surplus. Suppose also that the expected investment income on funds from insurance transactions was 8% per annum, the actual investment income was 9% per annum, and the investment income on capital and surplus funds was 10% per annum; all investment income includes unrealized capital gains and losses.

Of the investment income, \$800 million [or 8% of \$10 billion] would be included with insurance income, as this is part of the expected return from the insurance operations. The remaining 1% return on the funds from insurance transactions plus the 10% return on capital and surplus funds would be included with investment income.

Alternatively, if the loss reserve discount rate used for internal company management reporting is 7% per annum, only \$700 million [or 7% of \$10 billion] would be included with insurance income, and the remainder would be categorized with investment income. This procedure might be used if the risk-free interest rate were 7% per annum but the expected investment yield of the company were 8% per annum.

Numerous variants of this procedure have been suggested by actuaries. They differ in the details – such as in the discount rates and the bases – but they all value cash flows as of the same time. The use of unadjusted nominal values to determining insurance profitability simply confuses performance measures and distorts patterns of profitability.

12. For the relationship of liability losses to market interest rates, see Butsic [1981]. McGee [1986] is aware of the inflation sensitivity of liability losses: “Inflation also has an impact on the relationship between the competitive price of insurance and interest rates. If costs of settling claims are expected to rise through time, a higher premium or investment return will be necessary to cover future costs. To the extent that rising interest rates reflect anticipated inflation, they should not affect insurance premiums” (page 23).

McGee hypothesizes that “uncertainty about the inflation outlook” in a competitive industry depresses market prices to those of the most optimistic insurer. Widely fluctuating interest rates lead to greater uncertainty and therefore a decline in insurer profitability. This explanation ignores McGee’s own statement that as long as inflation and interest are correlated, different inflationary expectations should not affect insurance premiums.

Cummins, Hanington, and Klein [1991], page 68, note that interest rate fluctuation is not by itself a sufficient explanation of underwriting cycles: "... prices in competitive insurance markets would reflect the interest earnings on funds held between the premium payment and loss payment dates. Thus, prices should fall when interest rates rise and rise when interest rates fall. This is not a problem unless insurers overreact to interest rate changes or unless serious pricing errors are common." [These remarks assume a positive equity duration for insurers. If liability loss payments are entirely inflation sensitive, the inverse relationship between interest rates and insurance prices does not hold.]

13. For the effect of interest rate changes on the returns of mismatched portfolios, see Bierwag, Kaufman, and Toevs [1983] or Redington [1952]. For an analysis of asset and liability durations of Property/Casualty insurance portfolios, see Feldblum [1989] and Panning [1995].

14. Industrial economists, when considering firm behavior, speak of Nash equilibria (Nash [1951]). A Nash equilibrium obtains when no firm has an incentive to modify its production or price strategy. If firms seek to maximize their income, this implies that no firm can obtain greater profits by raising or lowering its price or by increasing or decreasing the quantity that it supplies. Waterson, using a game-theoretic approach to industrial economics, defines a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium as the "point such that each player's strategy maximizes his expected payoff if the strategies of the others are held fixed" (page 41). Friedman [1983] uses a similar definition: "A [Nash] noncooperative equilibrium consists of  $n$  particular strategies, one for each firm, so chosen that no single firm could possibly have obtained higher profits if it, alone, had selected a different strategy" (page 49). Fudenberg and Tirole [1989] summarize the formal theory of Nash equilibria.

When market conditions cause firms to have different strategies • some seek stable current income and others seek to increase sales • Nash equilibria often dissolve. This phenomenon underlies the model of underwriting cycles developed below.

15. These conditions are that either the marginal cost rises as quantity supplied increases or the demand curve slopes downward. Marginal cost is the cost of producing an additional unit of the good. In insurance, this is the expenses and anticipated losses of writing an additional policy, not the average expenses and losses incurred on the current book of business. The demand curve is the relationship between consumer demand and the product's price. In insurance, this is the number and size of policies and endorsements desired by consumers at each premium rate.

Both conditions are satisfied in the insurance market. (1) The demand curve in many lines of business is nearly vertical, because of statutes, regulations, and business policies that mandate coverage (Sheridan [1984]). (2) The marginal cost curve rises sharply, despite the preponderance of variable costs in insurance. As D'Arcy and Doherty [1988] note: "... an insurer writing a large quantity of policies will eventually have to relax underwriting standards to increase the quantity further, and the newer policies could have a higher expected loss ratio" (page 9). That is, at low quantities, insurers can "skim the cream," selecting the best risks. At higher quantities, insurers offer coverage even to mediocre and poor risks. Thus, marginal costs rise as the number of policies issued increases.

16. Scherer [1980] comments: "Even when firms produce physically identical commodities, complete homogeneity is not likely to be attained because of differences in location. . . . When producers are located at different points on the map, their products are said to be **spatially differentiated**" (page 325).

17. On the history of IBM's market dominance in the mainframe computer industry and the entry of competitors in peripheral equipment and software products, see **Brock [1986]**. Government sponsored monopolies, such as municipal utilities, cable TV franchises, and telephone service until the **1980's**, are different. These industries have strictly regulated rates; they do not price by supply and demand considerations.

The diversity of insurance rate regulation affords a range of insurance markets. In some states, such as Massachusetts and Texas, insurance rates are set by the regulator or by official rating bureaus. In other states, such as Illinois and pre-1989 California, the free market determines insurance prices. Insurance rate regulation is a factor (albeit a minor one) in underwriting cycle severity.

18. Transferring capital can be difficult, and firms may price below marginal cost in a declining industry. The personal insurance lines present an excellent illustration of this. Over the past 40 years, direct writers have steadily garnered most of the Personal Lines market, and they have consistently attracted the better risks among the insured population. Independent agency companies have a declining market with worsening risk quality. Many of these companies are slowly moving to other lines of business (such as Commercial, Specialty, Reinsurance, and substandard auto), experimenting with less expensive distribution systems (such as direct mail), or trying to start joint ventures with other financial institutions (such as life insurers, health insurers, and securities brokers). Meanwhile, average Personal Lines returns for independent agency companies are below marginal cost.

19. In truth, there are thousands of American insurers, and dozens of new ones enter the industry each year. This is a central characteristic of the insurance model that we develop further on. For clarity of exposition, however, we begin with a model of a limited number of firms.

Supplier interdependence is enhanced by high market concentration. Some economists use four firm concentration ratios of 50% or greater, or a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of about 1,000 or greater, as indicators of possible interdependence. (See, for example, the June 1984 Justice Department merger guidelines for antitrust action.) The Personal Auto insurance industry shows a four firm concentration ratio of 40% and a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 610 on a national basis, and corresponding average figures of 53% and 1,000 on a statewide basis. These figures depend on the definition of the market: state versus national and individual line versus all insurance products. Inter-industry comparisons of market concentration must use similar criteria of market definition; if so, insurance shows low relative concentration. On automobile insurance, see Klein [1989], Table 1 (page 12) and Table 4 (pages 18-19); on Workers' Compensation insurance, see Countryman [1982], Table 1 (page 17), Klein [1986], and Appel and Gerofsky [1985; 1987].

20. Firms may compete either by setting prices or by choosing the quantities they supply. Price and quantity are interrelated, since the industry demand curve sets a one-to-one relationship between them. If firms compete by choosing the quantities they supply, "Cournot competition" implies that the resulting price will exceed marginal cost. The price-cost margin varies inversely with the number of firms: one firm (pure monopoly) produces the greatest profits, and an infinite number of firms (pure competition) eliminates economic profits. See Tirole [1988], pages 218-221, or **Scherer [1980]**, pages 152-155.

Manufacturing firms with long production cycles may compete by choosing the quantities that they supply. A Cournot analysis is appropriate for them. Insurers have almost no supply

restrictions; rather, they compete on premium rates. A “Bertrand” analysis, which results in price equaling marginal cost, is the appropriate model (see below in this note). See Tirole [1988], pages 209-212, or Varian [1987], pages 461-464.

The appropriate model for insurers depends on their supply constraints. Unlimited capacity implies that firms compete by setting prices. Severe capacity constraints imply that firms compete by choosing quantities. For an analysis of the limits on insurance capacity, see Stone [1973]. Stone’s analysis applies to large Commercial risks, where random losses may adversely affect an insurer’s income or even solvency. In practice, there are no capacity constraints in the Personal Lines and in small Commercial risks. Moreover, for some large risks, the availability of reinsurance mitigates the capacity constraints.

For a general discussion of insurance supply, see Stewart [1984]. Stewart correctly notes that insurance supply is determined by psychological and financial considerations, not by plant, equipment, labor, or other physical restrictions. The ability of insurers to quickly revise quantities and prices is an essential aspect of the underwriting cycle; see the text below.

21. Tirole [1988], page 244. For a mathematical development, see Varian [1984], pages 102-103, or Waterson [1984], pages 18-19. Porter [1980] presents a non-mathematical discussion of the strategic consideration of expected rival responses.

22. That is, conjectural variation influences optimal business strategy. If an insurer believed that its peer companies use cost-based pricing and that they do not consider competitive pressures, it would have no disincentive to reduce rates in **order to** gain market share. In practice, insurers’ prices are strongly affected by those of their rivals. This is most evident in the Personal Automobile market, where the major direct writers carefully examine their rivals’ rates, by territory and classification, to set their own prices.

23. These are the ideal assumptions so endearing to economists. We will return to reality in a few paragraphs.

24. This is a theoretical model. It assumes that an infinitesimal price reduction attracts the entire market. In insurance, (1) a substantial rate reduction is required to gain market share, and (2) shifts in the insured population occur at renewal time, not continuously. The model of underwriting cycles developed below incorporates these elements.

25. For more complete discussions, see Tirole [1988], pp. 245-251, or Shapiro [1989].

26. Describing the discount rate,  $\delta$ , Shapiro [1989] writes (page 362, note 58): “Formally,  $\delta$  may be thought of as the product of two terms:  $\delta = \mu e^{-iT}$ , where  $\mu$  is the hazard rate for the competition continuing (i.e., the probability that the game continues after a given period, given that it has not previously ended), and  $e^{-iT}$  is the pure interest component of the discount factor, with period length  $T$  and interest rate  $i$ .”

27. That is,  $E^m$  must be less than  $(E^m + vE^m + v^2E^m + \dots)/10$ . Thus,  $1 < (1 + v + v^2 + \dots)/10$ , or  $v > 9/10$ .

28. In underwriting parlance, we speak of new entrants “buying” market share. A new firm may suffer operating losses for several years before it develops a profitable book of business. This is particularly true in insurance, since new entrants attract the marginal and unprofitable risks.

29. "Limit pricing" is a standard economic term, unrelated to the actuarial procedure of "increased limits pricing."

30. On limit pricing, see Milgrom and Roberts [1982] and Porter [1980], page 14 (who uses the term "entry deterring price"). Insurers face few fixed costs, particularly in lines of business dominated by the independent agency distribution system. Entry into the Commercial Lines insurance marketplace is deceptively easy — new firms believe they can enter quickly. Thus, there is a short span between the marginal cost price and the limit price.

31. Several life insurers have recently entered the Property/Casualty Personal Lines market. Although they came with strong underwriting, actuarial, and distribution systems, enormous capital, and extensive experience in life and health insurance, most of these firms have had trouble transforming the newly acquired Personal Lines risks into profitable books of business. The hidden barriers to entry are strong deterrents to prospective insurers.

32. In the short run, this is not true. In declining industries, prices often sink below marginal cost. In expanding industries, incumbent firms may price above the limit price, allowing new entrants even as they reap large profits. Numerous other short term exceptions are discussed in the economics literature.

33. Plotkin [1967, 1969, 1970, 1979] has documented the relative profitability of insurers vs. other firms. See also Braithwaite [1987], Banfield [1986], and Bailey [1969].

34. The distinction between variable and fixed costs differs from the actuarial distinction between costs that vary directly with premium and those that do not. Salaries of non-managerial personnel are variable costs, though they do not vary directly with premium. The other expenditures listed in the text are both variable costs and vary directly with premium.

35. Mayerson [1969], page 151, writing before the advent of risk-based capital requirements, notes that "the initial capital and surplus requirements of most states are much too low under present condition." Danzon [1983] examines the relationship of state licensing statutes to entry barriers, in terms of delay of operations and cost of entry. She finds average delays of 6 to 10 months, and an average personnel cost per state for entry expenses of \$100,000. She notes that these costs are too small to serve as entry barriers. See also Klein [1986], pages 91-92, who shows high entry and exit to the Workers' Compensation market.

The implementation of risk-based capital requirements in 1994 for property-casualty insurance companies should somewhat raise these entry barriers. For some small insurers, though, the risk-based capital requirements are not that much higher than the previous minimum capital requirements. The effect of the new capital standards is more evident for medium and large insurers. In fact, an early attempt to add a "small company charge" to the risk-based capital formula died on the conference table in 1993.

36. Other acquisition expenses and certain administrative and underwriting costs are expended before premiums are received. The National Council on Compensation Insurance, using a 1977 study of Massachusetts Workers' Compensation expenses, estimates that only 14% of "other expenses" (i.e., general expenses, other acquisition costs, and miscellaneous taxes, licenses, and fees; thus, about 2% of insurance costs) are paid before the policy's inception; see WCRIBM [1977]. Mahler [1987] estimates that only 20% of "company expenses" (that is, general expenses, other acquisition expenses, and one half of unallocated claim expenses: thus, about 3% of insurance costs) are paid prior to the policy's inception; see his Appendix II, pages

37. Porter [1980] defines switching costs as “one-time costs facing the buyer of switching from one suppliers product to another’s” (p. 10), and he adds: “Switching costs may include employee retraining costs, cost of new ancillary equipment, cost and time in testing or qualifying a new source, need for technical help as a result of reliance on seller engineering aid, product redesign, or even psychic costs of severing a relationship.”

38. Fox [1980] reports that most of the auto policyholders who made cost comparisons did so at least two years prior to the survey date; see particularly his Tables 2 and 3 on page 23. Joskow [1973] describes the relationship of policyholder information to insurance industry market structure.

39. See Stern [1990]. Nelson [1971], analyzing data for 1957 through 1967, notes that the number of exits is correlated with the combined ratio with a lag of one year.

40. Meidan [1982], page 395, who calls this a “market challenger strategy,” notes that it “is characterized by the aggressiveness of the marketing tactics. Typically insurers that follow this strategy are ambitiously trying to grow as fast as they can.”

41. Harrington and Danzon [1991] suggest that the aggressive marketing strategy of small firms may result from an inability to avoid the “winner’s curse.” In competitive bidding among suppliers, a firm which provides unbiased bids will generally win only when its offered price is too low. When its offered price is too high, another supplier will generally win. Harrington and Danzon differentiate between established and inexperienced firms: “. . . established firms in stable markets have learned to make formal or informal adjustments to their loss forecasts in order to avoid the curse. The availability of information from agents and brokers also may facilitate this process. . . . Inexperienced firms may use nonoptimal forecasts, placing too much emphasis on their own information or drawing incorrect inferences from the actions of other firms.”

42. Anderson and Formisano [1988], in a study of six insurance failures between 1975 and 1985, found rapid premium growth, expansion to other states, and inadequate pricing to be three of the most significant causes of the insolvencies. For instance, in the years preceding the insolvencies, Reliable Insurance Company and All-Star Insurance Company had premium growth of over 50% per annum. Wisconsin Surety Company expanded from 2 states to 13 states in 6 years, and Eastern Indemnity Corp. expanded from 1 state to 34 states in 5 years. The aggressive marketing strategies of these insurers eventually led to their failures. As Anderson and Formisano comment (page 460): “rapid growth . . . can realistically only be accomplished by pricing below cost and taking an unreasonable proportion of poor risks.” Similarly, Best’s [1991], page 39, notes that “approximately 81% of all insolvencies occurred in companies experiencing unusual growth trends, which we defined as growth outside industry norms of 5% to 25%.”

43. Actuaries are tempted to express such relationships as partial derivative equations. We might say that the partial derivatives of “**w**” with respect to both “**t**” and “**p**” are positive. In truth, we lack information about expected **profitability** (and about expected duration of profitability) and we lack good information about business strategies. Mathematical expressions give an aura of empirical precision that is not warranted.

Perhaps one day we will have empirical data on the causes of underwriting cycles. We do not have such data, and we do not pretend to have such data. This data provides an intuitive understanding of

underwriting cycles, based on types of market structures and competitive **strategies found in other industries.**

44. See, for instance, the class action antitrust complaint in Van de Kamp **[1988]** and an industry response by the Insurance Information Institute **[1988]**.

45. Cf. Porter **[1980]**, page 81: "It is not uncommon for competitors to comment on industry conditions . . . . Such commentary is laden with signals . . . . As such, this discussion can be a conscious or unconscious attempt to get other firms to operate **under the** same assumptions and thereby minimize the chance of mistaken motives and warfare. Such commentary can also contain implicit pleas for price discipline: 'Price competition is still very harsh. the industry is doing a lousy job of passing along increased costs to the consumer.' 'The problem in this industry is that some firms do not recognize that these current prices will be detrimental to our ability to grow and produce a quality product in the long run.' Or discussions of the industry may contain . . . . implicit promises to cooperate if others act 'properly.'" [The quotations are from the president of the **Sherwin-Williams Coating Group** and from an executive of a leading commodities producer.]

46. Moreover, State Farm has a sophisticated monitoring system to analyze the rate actions of its peer companies. Not only do State Farm's rates affect a large percentage of the insured population, but they also reflect of the strategies of other carriers.

47. Personal Lines risks are manually rated, so State Farm's rate manual is an accurate reflection of marketplace prices. Large Commercial Lines risks may be loss rated, composite rated, schedule rated, or retrospectively rated. The rate manual is but a crude guide to actual prices. In fact, many General Liability classifications are **"A-rated," so** there are no manual rates to examine.

In the Personal Lines, price changes are effected by rate filings. In the Commercial Lines, prices may also be changed by varying schedule rating credits and debits, by modifying the premium payment pattern, by changing policyholder dividend plans, and by **similar "non-manual"** methods. Thus, rate comparisons are more difficult in the Commercial lines of business.

48. Numerous studies have recommended that states make insurance price information accessible to consumers; see Virginia Bureau of Insurance **[1978]**, **recommendation #5**, or NAIC **[1980]**, pages 440-441.

49. See Stewart **[1984]** Exhibits 5-3, 5-4, and 5-8 on pages 290, 291, and 295. Note how the cycles in automobile insurance mirrored those for the industry as a whole, whereas General Liability showed no clear pattern until the late 1970's. Similarly, Best's **[1991: Insolvencies]**, page 33, notes that "while the majority of insolvencies during the 1970s occurred in personal lines companies, commercial lines companies accounted for the majority in the 1980s."

50. On the low price elasticity of demand, see Sherdan **[1984]**, page 58; Bloom **[1987]**; and Strain **[1966]**, page 448. Strain summarizes the influences on elasticity as "The greater the tendency for the public to buy an insurance coverage without the need for sales stimulation (as to comply with financial responsibility laws, or workmen's compensation acts, or mortgage protection requirements), the more inelastic the demand for insurance." Financial Responsibility laws require a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident either to show evidence of insurance or to post a court bond (Morill **[1965]**; Mehr and Cammack **[1980]**, pages 308-329; Bickelhaupt **[1979]**, pages 646-678). Employers must provide Workers' Compensation insurance, with minor

exceptions relating to farm employment, household work, or businesses with few workers. Employers financially strong enough to self-insure may provide the statutory benefits on their own. For history and detail, see Myers [1985], pages 884-900, Kulp and Hall [1968], pages 191-250, and Chamber of Commerce [1990]. Many states allow group self-insurance (NAIC [1984]). This increases the price elasticity of demand, since consumers have another risk management technique.

51. See NAIC [1969], page 310: "It is the sense of the Subcommittee . . . that. . . reliance be placed upon fair and open competition to produce and maintain reasonable and competitive prices for insurance coverages . . ." See also DOJ [1977]).


52. Cf. Eley [1986], page 187: "If the likelihood of extraordinary profits during hard markets is removed, the willingness of insurers to give away insurance during soft markets will evaporate."

53. This promise may prove illusory. Insurers who provided CGL coverage in the 1960's and 1970's are now facing enormous asbestos, pollution, and products liability litigation (Hamilton and Routman [1988]; Manta and Welge [1990]). Nevertheless, the potential is alluring.


54. The power of underwriting cycles is often misunderstood. Much of the American legal community and the business public concluded that the dramatic and uniform rise in commercial liability insurance rates must be the result of collusion. Yet no evidence of such behavior could be found. In fact, collusion is nearly impossible in the fragmented insurance market.

Even the Attorneys General's antitrust complaint was confined to allegations of boycott in policy form development, statistical support, and coverage exclusions. Pricing in concert is never mentioned (Van de Kamp [1989]). The California Attorney General's office explains that pricing in concert is protected by the **McCarren-Ferguson** Act and so was not contested. An alternative explanation is that the Commercial Liability insurance rate increases were characterized not by pricing in concert but by the competition driving the underwriting cycle.

Insurance Company Entries and Exits



Underwriting Cycles (Best's Aggregates and Averages)



Underwriting Cycles (Best's Aggregates and Averages)

